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Full text of "Protecting Powers: International Law
"
See other formats
Article
Armed Forces & Society
1-25
Bureaucratic Interests Resi and atalce
< sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
an d t h e Oo utsou re | ng DOI: 10.1 177/0095327X 14523958
afs.sagepub.com
of Security: The @SAGE
Privatization of
Diplomatic Protection
in the United States and
the United Kingdom
Eugenio Cusumano’! and Christopher Kinsey”
Abstract
In spite of its sensitivity, diplomatic protection has received very sporadic scholarly
attention. This article provides a comparative analysis of US and UK diplomatic
security policies, focusing on the increasing use of private military and security
companies (PMSCs) for the protection of foreign service and development agencies’
personnel. The existing theoretical explanations of the privatization of security tasks
cannot explain why countries displaying similar material incentives and similar
political and market cultures have outsourced diplomatic protection to different
degrees, nor can they account for variance in the use of PMSCs by different agencies
within the same country. Our analysis highlights the importance of investigating
organizations’ interests in providing a more accurate explanation of the varying
propensity to outsource armed protection. In both the United States and the United
Kingdom, the outsourcing of diplomatic security was a resultant of foreign policy
bureaucracies and military organizations’ preferences.
| Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia
? Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom
Corresponding Author:
Eugenio Cusumano, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College, Riia 12, 51013
Tartu, Estonia.
Email: eugenio.cusumano@bdcol.ee
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2 Armed Forces & Society
Keywords
diplomatic security, PMSCs, United States, United Kingdom, contractors,
organization theory
The murder of the US Ambassador Christopher Stevens in Benghazi on September
11, 2012, has triggered a heated debate on the protection of diplomatic personnel
operating in postconflict and fragile states. In spite of its sensitivity, however, dip-
lomatic security has benefited from very sporadic scholarly attention. By providing a
comparative analysis of diplomatic security policies in the United States and United
Kingdom, this article offers a novel contribution to the study of both diplomatic pro-
tection and the contemporary privatization of national security activities, arguing
that the varying propensity to outsource diplomatic protection has been shaped by
a convergence of foreign policy bureaucracies’ and military organizations’ prefer-
ences. Besides investigating a relatively unexplored issue with relevant policy impli-
cations, our study offers insights that are of broader relevance to international
relations scholarship by analyzing how foreign policy and military organizations’
shifting interests and organizational cultures shape national security policies, influ-
encing controversial decisions such as the resort to armed contractors.
Private providers of security such as mercenaries, privateers, and trade enter-
prises have played a key role in the development and colonial expansion of Western
states.' The resort to commercial actors, declined over the nineteenth century, has
expanded again in the last two decades, when military organizations and foreign pol-
icy bureaucracies have increasingly outsourced a host of support functions such as
logistics, training, and armed security to commercial entities usually referred to as
private military and security companies (PMSCs). Advocates of privatization have
conceptualized the resort to PMSCs as a response to new technological, operational,
and financial imperatives, arguing that outsourcing offers more effective security at
reduced costs.” Budgetary constraints, manpower strain, and the inability of govern-
ment bureaucracies to hire and retain qualified personnel in an increasingly compet-
itive job market provide important insights into the increasing propensity to
outsource security tasks. Functionalist explanations of the privatization of armed
security, however, prove insufficient for two reasons. First, the evidence that out-
sourcing diplomatic protective tasks generates significant cost savings is contradic-
tory and inconclusive.* A 2005 Congressional Budget Office report, for instance,
found the costs of hiring Blackwater contractors to perform diplomatic security to
be higher than those arising from the employment of light infantry Army units.* The
claim that private security guards provide more effective security details is also dis-
putable. While PMSCs proved capable of ensuring the safety of Department of State
(DoS) personnel in Iraq, there is agreement that their overall conduct was detrimen-
tal to counterinsurgency operations, as epitomized by the turmoil triggered by the
September 2007 Nisour Square incident, when seventeen local civilians were shot
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Cusumano and Kinsey 3
dead by Blackwater security contractors escorting a diplomatic motorcade.° The out-
sourcing of diplomatic security in Afghanistan also proved problematic. As reported
by Congressional investigations, alcohol abuse, inadequate training and lack of suf-
ficient manpower among ArmorGroup contractors repeatedly placed the security of
the US embassy in Kabul at risk.° Development personnel have also reported diffi-
culties, noting the poor quality and the low commitment of some of the contracted
personnel tasked with their protection.’ Moreover, functionalist explanations cannot
account for differences in the privatization of diplomatic security across countries.
Even when sharing similar budgetary and manpower constraints, foreign policy
bureaucracies have privatized armed protection to different degrees.
Scholarship on PMSCs emphasized the importance of ideational factors in shap-
ing the propensity to outsource security and military support tasks. Specifically,
scholars like Peter Singer, Deborah Avant, and Allison Stanger have all observed
that the privatization of activities previously performed by military and police forces
has gained momentum due to an ideological shift based on the belief in the super-
iority of market solutions and the commitment to reduce the size and functions
of the public sector.* An alternative ideational argument is provided by Elke Krah-
mann, who emphasizes the importance of different theories of the social contract in
shaping states’ approach to the control of coercive force. Although the privatiza-
tion of national security is not a uniquely Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, countries
founded on the republican theory of the social contract such as Germany have
shown a lower proclivity to privatize security and military tasks than states with
a liberal political culture like the United States and United Kingdom.” Ideational
factors have played a key role in the establishment of new public management
agendas, informing the belief in the appropriateness of outsourcing security tasks
to the commercial sector. However, while capable of explaining macroscopic var-
iations in the use of PMSCs between countries exhibiting different political and
market cultures such as the United States and Germany, ideational explanations
cannot account for those less pronounced but still significant differences between
states with similar ideological foundations like the United States and the United
Kingdom. Since Thatcher and Reagan’s neoliberal revolutions, the United King-
dom and United States have shared a similar propensity to outsource government
functions to commercial providers. Moreover, the United Kingdom, where citizen
conscription was adopted only between 1916-1918 and 1939-1962, has arguably
embraced a liberal approach to controlling the use of force even more firmly than
the United States.'° Indeed, the United Kingdom has a long tradition of relying on
mercenaries and commercial actors, epitomized by its reliance on noncitizen mil-
itary forces such as the Gurkhas and trade enterprises such as the East India Com-
pany.'' Yet, Britain has outsourced modern armed security tasks to a lower degree
than the United States. Furthermore, domestic political and economic ideologies
cannot explain why different bureaucracies within the same country have devel-
oped different approaches toward the privatization of protective services. In the
United Kingdom, for instance, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has
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4 Armed Forces & Society
displayed a stronger reluctance to outsource armed security than the Department
for International Development (DFID).
Drawing on organization theory, we show that foreign policy and military orga-
nizations’ interests can explain these differences, filling important blind spots left
by the existing theoretical explanations. In the United States, the willingness of the
DoS to have an under command security provider capable of offering low-profile
protection and the reluctance of the US military to perform tasks seen as outside its
mission led to the systematic outsourcing of diplomatic security. In Britain, on the
other hand, the FCO found in the Royal Military Police (RMP) an organization
willing to provide security tasks consistent with UK foreign service personnel’s
preferences. This resulted in a lower proclivity to rely on PMSCs used for the per-
forming of static security and the protection of lower ranking personnel only in
case of RMP inability to perform the task. The UK DFID, by contrast, considered
the resort to UK military escorts inconvenient due to its need for greater mobility
and a low key, civilian approach. This preference, in conjunction with the unwill-
ingness of the UK military to divert part of its scarce manpower to provide for
DFID security, translated into a widespread use of PMSCs as suppliers of close
protection.
Our study consists in a controlled comparison of diplomatic security policies in
the United States and the United Kingdom based on the analysis of DoS, FCO, and
DFID protective arrangements.'? By providing the possibility for both in-depth
within-case observation and cross-case analysis, small n case study research is not
only an ideal tool for conducting exploratory studies of previously neglected phe-
nomena such as diplomatic security, but it also reveals a distinct theory development
capacity, helping establish new theoretical connections.'* Both the United States and
United Kingdom have experienced a spike in the demand for diplomatic security due
to their increasing involvement in state-building activities in a host of complex
environments. In addition, while different in size, both their military organizations
suffered from a budgetary and manpower strain in the wake of the occupation of Iraq
and Afghanistan. Furthermore, both the United States and United Kingdom share
similar liberal political and market cultures and a tradition of relying on the commer-
cial sector in the conduct of national security activities. Hence, our case selection
follows a most similar cases approach.'* As variation in the outsourcing of diplo-
matic security in the United States and United Kingdom is not fully explained by the
functional and ideational explanations formulated by the existing literature, a con-
trolled comparison focusing on these two countries provides a plausibility probe for
the argument that bureaucratic interests shape the propensity to resort to PMSCs,
highlighting the heuristic utility of organization theory in offering a more fine-
grained explanation of the varying propensity to privatize armed protection across
and within countries.'* We have collected the evidence supporting our argument
by relying on the existing academic literature, official documents and investigation
materials, and a set of semistructured interviews with diplomatic, military, and
development personnel, consultants, and private security contractors conducted in
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Cusumano and Kinsey 5
Washington, London, and the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College in
Shrivenham between 2008 and 2012.
This article is divided as follows. First, we draw on the scholarship analyzing for-
eign policy making through the lens of organization theory, using it as a source of
insights into the bureaucratic interests associated with the outsourcing of security
functions. Second, we provide an analysis of the protective arrangements designed
to provide security for diplomatic and development personnel in the United States
and United Kingdom. We conclude by summarizing our findings and indicate some
avenues for future research.
Bureaucratic Interests and the Use of PMSCs
Scholars of PMSCs such as Deborah Avant have observed that the privatization of
security tasks changes the relationship between branches of government, strengthen-
ing the executive branch by eroding the power of the legislative to restrict and scru-
tinize foreign policy.'® Executives, however, are far from being monoliths with
unitary perceptions, interests, and goals. As emphasized by organization theory
since Max Weber, state bureaucracies are not merely transmission belts implement-
ing the decisions taken by political leaders, but actors possessing vested power, pre-
ferences and agency. Scholars such as Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and
Graham Allison have translated this awareness into a research program in the study
of international relations, arguing that executives are actually a constellation of
semifeudal, loosely linked bureaucratic organizations that struggle over the conduct
of foreign policy, trying to advance their own “parochial priorities and percep-
tions.” '’ The privatization of national security activities does not only change the
relationship between different branches of government, strengthening the executive
branch vis-a-vis the legislative. It also redistributes power and resources among dif-
ferent actors within the executive branch, providing foreign policy bureaucracies
with the possibility to conduct certain activities independently from military organi-
zations. Scholars of public administration have already noted that administrative
reforms and new public management tools such as the privatization of certain gov-
ernment functions are often shaped by bureaucratic preferences. '* An analysis of the
bureaucratic preferences and interests surrounding the outsourcing of security tasks,
however, is still missing. In this section, we briefly review some of the literature ana-
lyzing foreign policy making through the lens of organization theory, using it as a
source of insights into the varying propensity to outsource armed security tasks.
Organization Theory and the Making of Foreign Policy
The dominant approach to the study of foreign policy, referred to by Graham Allison
as the “rational actor model,” has simplified foreign policy making by treating state
entities as single actors purposively responding to external pressures by choosing an
optimal policy solution based on objective cost-benefit analyses. This simplification,
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6 Armed Forces & Society
however, may “obscure as much as it reveals,” ignoring the fact that “the bureaucratic
players involved in the process choose their preferred policy options in terms of no
consistent set of strategic objectives, but rather according to various conceptions of
national security, organizational, domestic, and personal interests.”!? Far from being
the product of a purposive end-means rationality, foreign policy making and imple-
mentation are shaped by “pulling and hauling,” reflecting different organizations’
parochial perceptions and priorities.”° Drawing on this line of argument, our study
conceptualizes the privatization of diplomatic security as a resultant of foreign policy
bureaucracies and military organizations’ interests.
A large strand of the scholarship drawing on organization theory has identified
bureaucracies’ core interest in the attempt to preserve their autonomy in the pursuit
of their mission. As forcefully argued by James Q. Wilson, “no agency has or can have
complete autonomy, but all struggle to get and keep as much as they can.”*! In order
to maintain autonomy, or turf, bureaucracies seek to maximize control over the cap-
abilities needed to conduct the missions they are tasked with. By preserving and max-
imizing autonomy, bureaucracies reduce their dependence on other organizations’
resources, avoiding external vetoes and constraints and minimizing the impact of
interagency rivalries and cooperation difficulties.*” Moreover, having control over the
resources needed to implement policy allows bureaucracies to conduct their activities
according to their preferred standard operating procedures (SOPs). Large bureaucratic
organizations tend to develop standardized routines to respond to the problems they
encounter in conducting their mission. Far from being merely conventions, such rou-
tines, often referred to as SOPs, are grounded on “the norms of the organization and
the basic attitudes and operating styles of its members.”**
Scholars such as Deborah Avant and Anna Leander have noted that due to their
lobbying capacity and their provision of training, advice, and intelligence to state
bureaucracies and military organizations, PMSCs have developed an epistemic
power allowing them to influence the making of foreign and defense policies.~*
While the existing literature has concentrated on PMSCs’ capacity to exploit states’
increasing dependence on commercial consultancy and military support services,
our study provides a different perspective, focusing on the strategic use of PMSCs
by state bureaucracies attempting to promote their parochial interests. Foreign policy
analysis has already noted that the conduct of foreign policy by proxy often reflects
“competition and rivalry between different segments of the foreign policy bureau-
cracy.””° During the Cold War, corporations and other types of nonstate actors
repeatedly became the self-serving tools of bureaucracies trying to increase their
influence or diffuse responsibility.*° The illegal funding of the Nicaraguan Contras
through the revenues of arms sales to Iran, promoted by the US National Security
Council and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against the wishes of the secre-
taries of State and Defense and congressional opposition, is perhaps the most famous
case in point.”’ The United Kingdom too offers similar examples. For instance, dis-
agreement between the UK Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and Ministry of
Defence (MoD) on whether and how to intervene in the Yemeni Civil War during
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Cusumano and Kinsey 7
the 1960s led to the covert use of mercenaries on leave from the Special Air Service
(SAS). It was precisely the intervention in Yemen that led David Stirling, founder of
the SAS, to establish Watchguard International, the first British PMSC.”® The priva-
tization of armed security is a lawful practice that does not entail the performing of
combat operations or covert activities. Like the diversionary practices mentioned
previously, however, the use of PMSCs may also provide foreign policy bureaucra-
cies with the possibility to maximize their policy discretion by circumventing the
vetoes and restrictions that military organizations would be likely to impose if their
personnel and assets were used. We therefore contend that the outsourcing of secu-
rity tasks has allowed foreign policy bureaucracies to maximize their autonomy vis-
a-vis military organizations and obtain protection in a manner consistent with their
preferred SOPs.
Organization theory does not only argue that government agencies seek to pre-
serve and maximize their autonomy, but it also maintains that bureaucracies tend
to resist being involved in activities seen as peripheral to their mission or essence.”
Peripheral tasks are avoided as they divert resources from an organization’s core
mission and decrease the morale and motivations of their personnel, tasked with con-
ducting activities seen as menial or outside conventional career tracks and hence det-
rimental to promotions.*° Military organizations are a case in point. As noted by
Halperin, since “military officers compete for roles in what is seen as the essence
of the services’ activity rather than other functions where promotion is less likely.””*!
Indeed, military organizations specialized in high-intensity operations such as the
US Army are often “reluctant to divert personnel from combat functions.”*? Hence,
the outsourcing of security tasks can be explained as a resultant of foreign policy
organizations’ attempt to maximize their autonomy and military organizations’
resistance against the conduct of peripheral functions.
Different examples provide support for this line of argument. For instance, the
CIA’s choice to employ contractors to arm the unmanned aerial vehicles employed
for hunting terrorists in Southern Afghanistan reflects the controversy on the
proper roles and missions of US military forces and intelligence agencies, often
referred to as the Title 10—Title 50 debate, and specifically the struggle surround-
ing the use of Special Operation Forces (SOF) in intelligence missions.*? Since its
establishment, the CIA has seen its role challenged by the increasing involvement
of the military in intelligence collection activities. Over the last decade especially,
the intelligence community found itself increasingly dependent on military person-
nel and assets, lamenting that the Pentagon’s efforts to create a separate human
intelligence capability and its involvement in covert activities were “‘encroaching
on the CIA’s realm,” and required the Agency to “regain its ground and reclaim its
lost territory.”** The US military, by contrast, has frequently resisted against the
detachment of SOF for CIA missions obliging its personnel to operate outside of
the protection of the Geneva Conventions and seen as undermining the morale and
the moral standing of its servicemen and women.*° The resort to contractors for
tasks such as the arming of Predator drones has therefore provided the CIA with
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8 Armed Forces & Society
the opportunity to maximize its autonomy over the targeted killing of terrorists and
circumvent the reluctance of the US military to detach military teams in support of
its operations.
The outsourcing of foreign military training offers another example. US State
Department officials have often been dissatisfied with the Department of Defense
(DoD) approach to foreign military training, seen as only capable of turning local
forces into “better shooters in newer equipment” without taking into account the
needs and cultural sensitivities of local societies.*° The use of contractors, by con-
trast, has provided the DoS with the possibility to carry out security sector reform
(SSR) according to its own preferences.*’ The training of the Armed Forces of
Liberia, outsourced to Dyncorp and Pacific Architect and Engineers in 2002, is
a case in point. Had the training been conducted by uniformed personnel, US mil-
itary interference would have encroached upon the content of the program, pre-
venting the adoption of the solutions advocated by the DoS and the Liberian
government but not yet contemplated by Army templates, such as the integration
of women into combat units.** The US military too welcomed the outsourcing of
the program, maintaining that the training of the Armed Forces of Liberia would
divert resources from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.*? This decision does not
only reflect the strategic prominence given by the DoD to the Middle Eastern the-
atre, but it also epitomizes the priority assigned to combat tasks embedded into US
military culture. Indeed, the training of nine battalions of the new Iraqi military
was also initially outsourced to the PMSC Vinnell, which had gained previous
experience in the Middle Eastern theatre by training the Saudi Arabian National
Guard, supported by Military Professional Resources Inc and Science Application
International Corporation as subcontractors. The privatized training program,
however, proved incapable of instilling discipline into Iraqi recruits, and more than
half of the first battalion trained by Vinnell deserted. It was only in the wake of this
complete failure that the contract was cancelled and training activities started to be
performed by military personnel.*° As acknowledged by Major General Paul
Eaton, “soldiers need to be trained by soldiers. You cannot ask a civilian to do
a soldier’s job.”*!
The use of contractors by the State Department International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs Office (INL) in Central and South America is yet another case.
The US Air Force resisted against the prospect of using military pilots to fly the
civilian crop-dusting aircrafts used to conduct coca eradication activities, seen as
a dangerous and degrading task. Moreover, by using contractors, the INL could
enjoy direct control over crop-dusting flights, accommodating partner governments’
requests for a low-profile US presence and circumventing the legal restrictions asso-
ciated with the deployment of US military personnel in certain countries. Over the
last decade, the INL has also resorted to contractors to conduct police training and
curb poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.”
As shown by these examples, the resort to contractors can provide foreign policy
bureaucracies with new means to push forward their preferences. Actors who used to
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Cusumano and Kinsey 9
have no choice but to rely on other bureaucratic players’ resources and personnel,
such as foreign ministries, aid agencies and intelligence services in need of military
assets and skills, can now draw on the market as an alternative source of manpower
and expertise. By outsourcing such services to commercial actors, these bureaucra-
cies may avoid vetoes and restrictions from military organizations, resorting to
actors placed by contractual provisions under their direct command. As profit-
making entities competing over lucrative contracts with government agencies,
PMSCs have strong financial incentives to adhere faithfully to their principals’ pre-
ferences.** Hence, the resort to PMSCs may enhance foreign policy bureaucracies’
autonomy and discretion in performing their activities. At the same time, the use of
contractors relieves military organizations from the pressure of conducting expedi-
tionary tasks seen as peripheral, providing them with the possibility to concentrate
on their own core mission. The privatization of support functions can therefore be
understood as a resultant of foreign policy bureaucracies and military organizations’
interests. In the next sections, we will assess this line of argument against US and
UK diplomatic security policies.
Bureaucratic Interests and the Outsourcing of Armed
Protection in the United States
In light of the incidents occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoS reliance on armed
contractors has come under close scrutiny by academics, media, and the broader
public, raising fierce public criticism after the September 2007 Nisour Square shoot-
ing. The ensuing Congressional Hearing, comprehensively analyzed subsequently,
offers a valuable source of information on the bureaucratic preferences surrounding
the use of contractors instead of uniformed personnel. As revealed by the Hearing,
the systematic use of PMSCs for the provision of diplomatic security in Iraq and
Afghanistan can be fully understood only within the context of DoS commitment
to preserve its institutional autonomy in conducting the state-building activities it
was tasked with. Several scholars have noted that in the last two decades the State
Department suffered from a constant decline in terms of both influence and
resources, becoming a “bureaucratic pigmy among giants.”’“* This trend magnified
in the wake of the War on Terror, when a “‘tectonic shift of decision-making power
from the Department of State to Defense” occurred, epitomized by the decision to
assign primary responsibility for state-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to the
DoD and leave the DoS on the sideline.*” As summarized by the Congressional
Research Service, as the US military is the only institution with sizable expedition-
ary capabilities and fungible assets, there is a critical “imbalance between DoD and
State Department resources ... especially for activities that take place in the context
of military operations.”*° The State Department found in the possibility to outsource
certain support functions a way to reduce its chronic dependence on DoD personnel
and have security performed according to its preferred SOPs. The next subsection
will analyze the use of armed security contractors as a strategy pursued by the DoS
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10 Armed Forces & Society
to preserve its institutional autonomy in the performing of its diplomatic and state-
building activities.
The Privatization of US Diplomatic Security
While the protection of diplomatic personnel has gained renewed attention after the
attack in Benghazi, achieving critical political salience in the 2012 presidential elec-
tion, diplomatic security is far from being a new problem. During the Cold War, US
decision makers constantly faced the dilemma of how to protect diplomatic person-
nel and information from espionage and terrorism without chafing the conduct of
diplomatic activities. After World War II, when US diplomatic presence worldwide
expanded dramatically, the State Department reached an agreement with the Marine
Corps for the protection of Foreign Service posts through a Marine Embassy Secu-
rity Guard program, established in 1947. The Marine Corps accepted diplomatic
security duties “for reasons of interagency politics and survival,” using its newly
established embassy security duties as a “political expediency” to justify its exis-
tence, threatened by the reorganization of US military forces underlying the 1947
National Security Act.*” In the mid-1950s already, however, the DoS became dissa-
tisfied with the Marine Security Guard Program, and considered switching back to
civilian guards. The use of uniforms especially created friction between the Marine
Corps and the Foreign Service, which insisted on the need for guards to have a more
low-profile, civilian outlook.** By the end of the War in Vietnam, the Marine Corps
too, which had now firmly ensured its existence as an independent service and an
expeditionary combat force, grew increasingly frustrated with the provision of dip-
lomatic protection. As observed by a Marines Corps Commander, it is ‘““somewhat
unfair to ask that a twenty year-old veteran of Viet Nam, whose reflexes have been
sharpened by combat, to exercise the restraint and cool judgment required on protec-
tive security assignments.”*? While the Marine Embassy Security Guard Program
survived, its size remained limited and its tasks were largely confined to the protec-
tion of sensitive information.~°
Throughout the Cold War, a key role in the protection of US diplomatic personnel
was provided in-house by the State Department through its Security Office. The
attacks against the US embassy in Lebanon in 1983 and 1984 and the repeated infor-
mation leaks from the US embassy in Moscow called into question the ability of the
State Department to conduct diplomatic security effectively. DoS officials, however,
“fought hard and successfully” to keep the capabilities needed to provide diplomatic
security within the State Department.°' The 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act expanded the DoS Security Office into a larger Bureau of Diplo-
matic Security, assigning primary responsibility for the protection of US personnel
and property to the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), a law enforcement body
composed of US federal agents also tasked with protecting foreign dignitaries and
conducting investigations on passport and visa frauds.°* The size of the DSS was
expanded to over 1,000 personnel in the wake of the 1998 attacks against the US
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Cusumano and Kinsey II
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and saw a further increase to about 1,500 agents
after 9/11. As of the end of 2012, DSS permanent staffing consists of more than
2,000 personnel.** In spite of its enlargement, however, the DSS remained inade-
quate to conduct the entire range of diplomatic security tasks worldwide in the wake
of the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. The State Department’s organizational
culture, grounded on the centrality of the Foreign Service, marginalized pervasive
security arrangements as an impediment to the effective conduct of diplomatic activ-
ities, leaving the people and offices responsible for security in a subordinate position
and forcing them to “wait their turn for new resources.” ** Prior to the attacks
against in Kenya and Tanzania, for instance, the share of resources assigned to dip-
lomatic security was greatly reduced. As noted by the subsequent Accountability
Review Board, funding for diplomatic security followed a “boom and bust”’ cycle,
namely a major influx of new resources in the wake of a major incident followed by
new budgetary reductions in the ensuing years.”°
This resistance against a permanent increase of Diplomatic Security Bureau bud-
get and personnel in the context of shrinking DoS budgets helps explain the resort to
armed contractors for diplomatic protection. Private security teams tasked with pro-
tecting diplomatic premises and personnel were first deployed in Haiti in 1994, and
then in Bosnia in 1995.°° After the spike in the demand for diplomatic security fol-
lowing the 1998 attacks, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security devised the first World-
wide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) umbrella contract, providing for the
possibility to preplan the deployment of security contractors for the protection of
DoS officials. First awarded to Dyncorp, the WPPS contract covered protective
security services in former Yugoslavia, the Palestinian Territories, and the protec-
tion of President Karzai in Afghanistan. In 2004, the protection for the US Embassy
and its personnel in Baghdad was however awarded to Blackwater, due to Dyn-
Corp’s inability to meet the full requirements of the mission. Another firm, Triple
Canopy, was tasked with protecting the US Embassy Office in Basra. In 2005, a sec-
ond WPPS contract was awarded to Blackwater, DynCorp and Triple Canopy, oper-
ating under the supervision of the State Department’s Regional Security Office in
Baghdad. As of 2007, the State Department employed PMSCs in 155 diplomatic
posts in 111 countries worldwide.*’ Contractors account now for roughly 90 percent
of the Diplomatic Security Bureau workforce.°* The need for US diplomats to oper-
ate in conflict zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan created a twofold problem. As
explained by Ambassador Griffin, Assistant Secretary of State in the Diplomatic
Security Bureau, “we do not have the numbers of people that it would take to fully
staff all of those operations, and we don’t have all of the various areas of expertise
such as helicopter pilots and medics and armorers and mechanics, etc.”°” Due to the
need for military expertise and the lack of sufficient manpower within the DSS, dip-
lomatic protective services in Iraq were initially provided by the US Army. The
provision of diplomatic security, however, met considerable resistance from the
US military. As the Army was only willing to escort high-ranking personnel, armed
protection soon became a “bone of contention among the State Department people,
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12 Armed Forces & Society
who came to feel that they didn’t have enough security.”°! Moreover, military pro-
tection purportedly stymied the mobility of State Department personnel and the flex-
ibility of their schedule, becoming an obstacle to the effective performing of the
state-building and reconstruction functions they were tasked with.® As explained
by Ambassador Satterfield, Senior Advisor of the State Department, “Iraq is a dan-
gerous place. Yet I think we can all agree that our diplomats need ... the broadest
possible freedom of movement throughout that country ... Without protective secu-
rity details, we would not be able to have the interaction with Iraqi government offi-
cials, institutions and other Iraqi citizens critical to our mission there.”°? When the
protection of diplomatic personnel and motorcades was provided by the military, it
fell under the chain of command, and DoS officials had no direct authority over
their escorts. As a result, US diplomats escorted by military personnel outside of
the Green Zone had to arrange their movements with a lot of advance notice, with-
out being able to change schedule and itinerary. Moreover, they could be denied
the possibility to move due to security concerns or the incompatibility between
their activities and US military operational needs. Contractors, on the other hand,
obliged by contractual provisions to abide by their employer’s requests, proved
much more suitable for DoS needs, ensuring greater mobility and flexibility for its
personnel.
In addition, military protection was seen as incompatible with the DoS prefer-
ences and SOPs concerning low-profile security details. When asked whether he had
a preference for uniformed personnel or contractors, Ambassador Griffin acknowl-
edged that the US military would have been capable of providing diplomatic secu-
rity. He added, however, that “the Army would be capable of doing it if it was done
in the manner which we prescribed, which would not be Humvees, they would not be
in uniforms ... °° Regardless of whether the military could do the job, the prefer-
ence of the State Department fell on contractors because they could provide a low
key, civilian footprint. As further explained by Griffin, “What you want is to have
a low profile. You want a protocol that says you don’t bring in tanks, you don’t bring
in Humvees, you bring in a civilian car, you want people dressed in civilian clothes
for the most part, not dressed in Army uniform ... when Mr. Bremer went into
places, wasn’t one of the criticisms that he was going in with the Army, with a high
profile of military personnel and having an Army footprint instead of having a civil-
ian footprint?”°° These statements clearly reveal the existence of a large gulf
between DoS and DoD SOPs. Having security provided by the military entailed the
presence of personnel in uniform and military vehicles. By contrast, the State
Department’s diplomatic security protocols are based on making “our protective
details, our presence, as low profile as possible consistent with the mission, as unob-
trusive as possible, and as consistent with the civilian setting in which we operate as
possible.”®’ Such a difference in SOPs has created stronger incentives for the DoS to
rely on contractors instead of uniformed personnel. To be sure, Blackwater, Dyn-
Corp, and Triple Canopy’s contractors were to a large degree former military per-
sonnel, often with a background in Special Operation Forces (SOFs). Unlike
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Cusumano and Kinsey 13
military escorts, however, contractors were under the direct control of DoS officials
and could provide security by using civilian clothes and vehicles. Hence, outsour-
cing protective tasks to PMSCs has provided the DoS with a more low key, under
command source of military expertise.
The outsourcing of diplomatic security by the DoS was also welcomed by the US
military, which saw the protection of diplomats as a task distracting its personnel
from the performing of its core combat mission. The US military has traditionally
resisted detaching its personnel to other agencies. Moreover, the performing of static
security tasks, such as the guarding of a building, is typically considered menial and
degrading by military personnel.” Security operations at large, such as patrolling
and policing, are seen as activities the US military is “peculiarly ill-suited” to deal-
ing with.” Due to its combat-oriented organizational culture, the US military has
therefore considered the performing of security activities as peripheral and has itself
relied on a large number of contractors providing protective services.’’ This helps
explain why US military commanders excluded the prospect of having uniformed
personnel replacing DoS contractors in spite of the widespread awareness that
PMSCs providing diplomatic security were creating command and control problems
and complicating counterinsurgency operations.’” As stated by a 2007 DoS report,
“The US Military in Iraq does not consider it feasible or desirable under existing
conditions in Iraq for the DoD to take on responsibility for provision of protection
support to the Embassy”.”* In Afghanistan too, the US military resisted against the
prospect of providing security for president Karzai and DoS personnel on the
grounds of resource constraints.’”* Hence, the privatization of diplomatic security
in Iraq can be considered as a resultant of DoS and DoD organizational interests and
cultures. Consistent with a line of argument based on organization theory, the pre-
ference for an under command solution providing its personnel with greater mobility
and for a low-profile approach has an important say in explaining the DoS resort to
private security contractors in the wake of the Iraq war. Moreover, a look at the
combat-oriented organizational culture of the US military, which marginalized secu-
rity tasks as peripheral, explains why the DoD welcomed the use of PMSCs in the
provision of diplomatic security as an alternative to the detachment of uniformed
personnel and resisted taking over diplomatic protection tasks in spite of the proble-
matic consequences of DoS contractors’ conduct.
Bureaucratic Interests and the Outsourcing of Armed
Protection in the United Kingdom
Overall, the United Kingdom has outsourced armed security to a lesser degree than
the United States. The UK FCO has been especially reluctant to outsource diplo-
matic protection. While eventually forced to outsource some static and personal
security tasks, the FCO has maintained a firm preference for having diplomatic pro-
tection performed by the UK RMP, which remained in charge of providing security
for Ambassadors and Heads of Mission. DFID, on the other hand, has developed a
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14 Armed Forces & Society
stronger preference for outsourcing armed protection. The analysis of the bureau-
cratic interests surrounding FCO and DFID’s preferences conducted in this section
offers important insights into the drivers of security privatization.
The Foreign Office and Diplomatic Security
Close protection for British diplomatic personnel has traditionally been provided
by the RMP, a corps of the British Army responsible for military investigations,
prisoners’ detainment, garrison policing, and foreign police training. Tasked with
various expeditionary police functions, the RMP is a relatively small body, com-
prising only 2,500 personnel. During the 1990s already, the use of RMP units for
the close protection of FCO personnel had therefore to be restricted to the five
highest threat locations. ’°
As stressed by the FCO, primary responsibility for the protection of UK diplo-
mats “normally resides with local authorities.” © The detachment of UK diplomatic
personnel to fragile and failed states, however, increased the need for protective ser-
vices. As a consequence, already before 9/11 private security contractors started to
be sporadically used.”’ In the wake of the war on terrorism, when the deployment
of British diplomatic personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan further magnified the need
for protective security details, the use of PMSCs such as ArmorGroup (now G4S)
and Control Risks Group for activities like embassy guarding and diplomatic close
protection also increased. The size and scope of contractors’ activities, however,
remained more limited than in the case of the United States. Between 2006 and
2008, FCO’s spending for commercial private security in Iraq only amounted to
about 85 million pounds.’* In spite of the belief that private security contractors
were more cost effective, the protection of senior FCO officials remained the pre-
serve of the UK RMP. Only static security and the close protection of lower-
ranking personnel were outsourced to PMSCs. This lower reliance on contractors
does not only have to do with the smaller scale of UK diplomatic presence but also
with FCO’s preference for RMP protection. This holds true not only with regard to
single ambassadors’ personal preferences but also for the overarching FCO’s
approach. During public consultations on the role of the private military and secu-
rity industry, the FCO clearly maintained that its preferred option was to resort to
military police units as providers of diplomatic security. A limited resort to con-
tractors occurred only as a result of the RMP’s incapacity to meet the FCO’s grow-
ing security needs.”
The reasons for this clear preference are numerous. First, the available literature
and the evidence collected in this study suggest that the FCO and the MoD have been
characterized by a good working relationship and a low degree of bureaucratic com-
petition.*° British diplomats and RMP have often worked side by side, sharing the
same working environment, exchanging information, and developing mutual trust.
Moreover, senior FCO employees can overrule the advice of RMP close protection
teams, preserving similar autonomy in the performing of their work regardless of
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Cusumano and Kinsey 15
being protected by military personnel or contractors.*' Hence, the FCO did not need
to resort to contractors in order to obtain an under command security provider capa-
ble of maximizing its institutional autonomy. Furthermore, FCO employees tend to
prefer RMP teams due to the type of skills and services they can offer. The RMP is a
hybrid body skilled in both combat and law enforcement, and its training is based on
two specializations, special investigations and close protection.*” This made them
ideal providers of protective services in complex environments, allowing their teams
to deliver close protection in a manner consistent with FCO’s preference for a civil-
ian approach. Unlike the US Army, which saw the provision of diplomatic security
tasks as an unwelcome deviation from its essence, the RMP saw close protection as
one of its core tasks. While, due to its small size, the RMP could not meet the spike
in the demand for diplomatic security, its officers maintained their commitment to
directly protect senior FCO personnel.**
The use of private security by the DFID, on the other hand, shows a different pic-
ture. Indeed, DFID’s pervasive tendency to resort to PMSCs can also be explained as
a resultant of its preference for autonomy and low profile and the UK military’s
unwillingness to detach its personnel for protective tasks.
The DFID and the Outsourcing of Armed Protection
DFID is “the most forward-looking department in its thinking concerning the poten-
tial utility of commercial security” and has overcome its initial suspicion associated
with the profit-driven nature of the private security industry to engage in a close part-
nership with PMSCs.™* The agency has its origins in the Ministry of Overseas Devel-
opment (ODM), created during the Labour government of 1964-1970 by assembling
departments within the FCO and other ministries. Reintegrated within the FCO by
the following conservative cabinet, the ODM was again restored as an independent
ministry and then once more merged in the FCO by the Thatcher government. Sepa-
rated yet again in 1997, DFID is now an independent government department headed
by a Secretary of State for International Development, and it provides support to
developing countries in a broad range of areas such as education, health, environ-
ment protection, and humanitarian assistance. 8 In addition, DFID is responsible for
the civilian component of SSR and has already relied on commercial consultants and
trainers to implement law enforcement training and advisory programs. In Jamaica,
for instance, DFID contracted the consulting company Atos to assist the reform of
the Jamaican police forces, conducted by contractors with a UK police back-
ground.*° The private firm Burton Rands too was resorted as a provider of SSR for
the Southern Sudan’s People Liberation Army.*”
DFID has also systematically relied on PMSCs in the performing of armed pro-
tection, resorting to private security details to protect its staff working in Iraq and
Afghanistan.** The recourse to public—private partnerships and commercial solu-
tions is deeply embedded in DFID’s organizational culture. As a lean and newly
established government department, DFID has developed a flexible and
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16 Armed Forces & Society
goal-oriented approach to the performing of its mission, avoiding the establishment
of unnecessary bureaucracy and delegating the provision of assistance to a range of
international, nongovernmental, and commercial actors.®” Indeed, DFID humanitar-
ian work support is now outsourced on a five years tender, currently held by the firm
Crown Agents.’’ In addition, the development workers’ community conducting
DFID’s projects and the British military feature very different cultures and a some-
times tense relationship. Due to a lack of mutual understanding and insufficient
training on how the counterpart works, interagency cooperation between DFID and
the UK military has at times proved problematic. ' Moreover, DFID personnel have
tended to prefer commercial providers of security to military close protection teams
for two more specific reasons. First, DFID personnel are keen on being perceived as
neutral aid providers by the local societies where they operate, and see the adoption
of a light footprint as a crucial SOP. Consequently, they have come to see the low-
profile approach offered by PMSCs as preferable to being embedded into a military
force protection team composed of personnel in uniform. This holds particularly true
for Southern Afghanistan, where the British military is often seen as an unwelcome
occupying force.”” In addition, similarly to the US DoS, DFID has seen the resort to
contractors as a crucial way to maximize the autonomy of its personnel operating
abroad. Many DFID personnel are not permanent employees of the Department
but are hired for a specific task they need to complete within a time frame. Mil-
itary protection makes it difficult for DFID personnel to move around their proj-
ect site easily, as they first need to get permission from the military units who
are responsible for their safety. Due to the tight schedule within which they
operate, DFID personnel tend to prefer commercial security, capable of provid-
ing them with a “bespoke, dedicated under command solution.””* As stated by a
former employee of the Stabilization Unit, a cross-governmental organization
consisting of FCO, DFID, and MoD personnel, ““PMSC gives much greater flex-
ibility. Essentially you book them as you might book a taxi—albeit a heavily
armed one! Moves with the military have to fit in with whatever their mission
of the day might be. They do not work for you, unless you are the Ambassador
of course. Private security companies do.””*
DFID’s organizational interests, and specifically its need for mobility and low
profile, shaped its approach toward the provision of protective services, increasing
the propensity to resort to PMSCs. The UK military, on the other hand, saw in the
protection of development personnel an unwelcome task. While security for UK dip-
lomats fell within the competences of the RMP, a body that identifies close protec-
tion as one of its core missions, security for DFID employees operating in remote
areas such as Southern Afghanistan could only be supplied by regular British Army
units. Compared to “a boy sent to do a man’s job,” “UK forces in the Helmand
province were thinly spread across a number of platoon-size bases scattered around
a vast, mountainous territory plagued by a virtually inexhaustible supply of foreign
jihadists” and a local economy grounded in criminality and drug trafficking.”* Due
to the severe manpower strain they were facing, UK Army commanders perceived
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Cusumano and Kinsey
Table |. Organizational Interests and the Use of PMSCs.
Foreign policy
bureaucracies’ interests
Military organizations’
interests
Outcome
US DoS _ Dissatisfaction with the Unwillingness of Systematic resort to
provision of armed security Army units to PMSCs
by the military due to: perform activities
e Need for low profile seen as peripheral to
e Preference for under their core combat
command security escorts missions
UK FCO Preference for the provision The RMP identifies Limited outsourcing of
of security by the RMP due to: diplomatic security as security task.
e Ambassadors’ authority one of its core Protecting senior
over RMP escorts missions personnel remained a
e Belief in RMP’s capacity to preserve of the RMP
provide effective and low-
profile security
UK DFID Dissatisfaction with the Unwillingness to Systematic resort to
provision of security by the PMSCs
UK Army due to:
e Cooperation difficulties
e Need for low profile
e Willingness to have under
command security escorts
divert scarce military
personnel to protect
DFID staff
Note: PMSCs = private military and security companies; US DoS = United States Department of State;
UK FCO = United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office; RMP = Royal Military Police; UK
DFID = Department for International Development.
the detachment of military escorts for the protection of development personnel as a
problematic task diverting their limited resources from counterinsurgency activities,
thus welcoming DFID use of PMSCs.”° In sum, as summarized in Table 1 below,
DFID and UK military interests converged in having the protection of humanitarian
personnel systematically outsourced to armed contractors.
Conclusion
A line of argument based on organization theory offers key insights into the varying
tendency to privatize the protection of diplomats and humanitarian personnel in the
United States and United Kingdom, filling some important blind spots left by the
existing theoretical explanations. Agencies like the US DoS and the UK DFID have
found in the use of PMSCs a way to maximize their institutional autonomy and
obtain low-profile security details, circumventing military organizations’ unwilling-
ness to divert their scarce personnel for activities seen as outside their core mission.
By contrast, the UK FCO has found in the RMP an under command body capable of
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18 Armed Forces & Society
providing security consistent with its organizational preferences. Consequently, it
has displayed a lower propensity to outsource armed security.
More research is needed to further assess the explanatory power of bureaucratic
preferences. As an analysis of two countries, our study has only provided a plausi-
bility probe for the argument that today’ privatization of diplomatic security is a
resultant of foreign policy bureaucracies’ and military organizations’ interests. A
broader analysis involving a larger population of cases is needed in order to general-
ize our claims and test whether bureaucratic interests contribute to explaining the
proclivity to outsource the protection of diplomatic and humanitarian personnel in
other countries. Moreover, additional research is required to assess the extent to
which the bureaucratic interests that have shaped the outsourcing of diplomatic pro-
tection in the United States and the United Kingdom also inform the privatization of
other national security activities. A comprehensive analysis of the outsourcing of
military training, counternarcotics assistance, and intelligence through the lens of
organizations theory, only examined briefly in this article, may offer important
insights. In addition, the existing scholarship on military innovation has forcefully
emphasized the importance of parochial interests and interservice politics within
military organizations.’ Future research may investigate whether the increasing pri-
vatization of military support functions reflects the attempt of a certain military ser-
vice to reduce its dependence and maximize its autonomy vis-a-vis rival services.
Finally, the scholarship focusing on the epistemic power and marketing strategies
of the private military and security sector may find fruitful insights into the study
of how PMSCs have exploited bureaucracies’ preference for autonomy and low pro-
file, investigating the interplay of bureaucratic interests and PMSCs’ business stra-
tegies and influence on government programming in the increasing propensity to
privatize armed security and other national security activities.
Acknowledgment
The authors wish to thank Pascal Vennesson, Deborah Avant, Patricia Shields, and the
anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Notes
1. See, for instance, Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State-building
and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994).
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Cusumano and Kinsey 19
)
2. Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson, “Introduction,” in Contractors and
War: The Transformation of United States’ Expeditionary Operations, ed. Christopher
Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012),
1-2. Matthew R. Uttley, “Private Contractors on Deployed Operations: The United King-
dom Experience,” Defence Studies 4, 2 (2004): 146-49.
3. David M. Walker, Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Increased Reliance on Service Contrac-
tors Exacerbates Long-standing Challenges (Washington, DC: Government Account-
ability Office, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives, United States Congress, January 23, 2008),
i. State Department contracts also suffered from insufficient oversight and overbillings.
A recent Office of Inspector General report notes that Triple Canopy contractors’ over-
staffing in Iraq resulted in wasteful spending. See US Department of State Office of
Inspector General, Audit of Bureau of Diplomatic Security Worldwide Protective Services
Contract-Task Order 5 for Baghdad Movement Security (Washington, DC: March 2013).
4. US Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq
(Washington, DC: August 2008), 17.
5. Molly Dunigan, Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies’ Impact on Military Effec-
tiveness (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2011), 52-89. See also Peter Singer,
Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Can’t Go to War Without ’Em (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institute 2007), 5-6. A more nuanced study, emphasizing the importance of strengthened
coordination and accountability mechanisms in reducing the negative impact of using
armed contractors in COIN operations in Iraq is provided by Ulrich Petersohn, “The
Other Side of the COIN: Private Security Companies and Counterinsurgency Opera-
tions,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, 10 (October 2011): 782-801.
6. US Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on
Contracting Oversight, New Information about the Guard Contract at the U.S. Embassy
in Kabul (Washington, DC: May 2009), i and 4-5.
7. Interview with Eduardo Peris Deprez, former US Agency for International Development
(USAID) and Department for International Development (DFID) aid partner (phone
interview: November 10, 2011).
8. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 66-
70; Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force (Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2005), 34-38; Allison Stanger, A Nation under Contract (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2009), 1-15 and 84-104.
9. Elke Krahmann, States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 2010). Ulrich Petersohn develops a similar line of argument
by arguing that differences in national security privatization are shaped by varying con-
ceptions of state sovereignty. See Ulrich Petersohn, “Sovereignty and Privatizing the
Military: An Institutional Explanation,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, 3 (2010):
531-52. An analysis of several European countries’ resort to the commercial sector in the
provision of national security tasks is provided by Anna Anna Leander, ed., Commercia-
lising Security in Europe: Political Consequences for Peace Operations (Abingdon, Eng-
land: Routledge, 2013). A broader, worldwide perspective on private military and
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20
Armed Forces & Society
10.
11.
12.
13,
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22
security companies (PMSCs) activities is offered by Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kummel,
eds., Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Pros-
pects (Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag 2007).
Hew Strachan, “The Civil-military ‘Gap’ in Britain,” Journal of Strategic Studies 26, 2
(2003): 45.
Ibid., 52.
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has also relied extensively on
commercial providers of security. However, the fact that USAID delegates the implemen-
tation of development programs to a host of commercial and nongovernmental actors
makes it difficult to formulate a general argument within the space limits of a journal arti-
cle. While some USAID development partners also noted that the use of private military
and security companies (PMSCs) provides them with greater autonomy, the case of
USAID will therefore not be analyzed here. Interview with Eduardo Peris Deprez.
For a recent analysis of the utility of controlled comparisons, see Dan Slater and Daniel
Ziblatt, “The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison,” Comparative
Political Studies 20, 10 (2013): 1-27. See also Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, “Case
Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield,” Comparative Political Studies
40, 2 (2007): 170-195 and Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political
Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 139; Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Com-
parative Social Inquiry (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), 33.
On the importance of plausibility probes, see Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 76.
Avant, The Market for Force, 43 and 128-29. See also Stanger, A Nation under Contract,
90 and Singer, Corporate Warriors, 214.
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New
York: Harper and Collins, 1971), 162; James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (New York: Basic
Books, 1989), 27-28.
See, for instance, Bidhya Bowornwathana and Ora-orn Poocharoen, “Bureaucratic Poli-
tics and Administrative Reform: Why Politics Matters,” Public Organization Review 10,
4 (2010): 304.
Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some
Policy Implications,” World Politics 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International
Relations (Spring, 1972): 146.
Ibid.
Wilson, Bureaucracy, 29. See also Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 48 and
Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed.
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 38.
Guy B. Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy: An Introduction to Comparative Public
Administration (New York: Routledge, 2009), 214: Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy
Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2007), 78.
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Cusumano and Kinsey 21
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
Allison, Essence of Decision, 83.
Avant, The Market for Force, 154. Anna Leander, Eroding State Authority? Private Mil-
itary Companies and the Legitimate Use of Force (Rome, Italy: Centro Militare di Studi
Strategici, 2006), 19.
Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press,
1994), 146.
I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organi-
zational Reform (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 66; David N. Gibbs,
“Secrecy and International Relations,’ Journal of Peace Research 32, 2 (1995):
218.
Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action. The CIA and American Intervention in the Postwar
World (London, England: I. B. Tauris 1987).
Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security (New York: Routle-
dge, 2006), 43-46. See also Clive Jones, Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965
(Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 2004) and Alan Hoe, David Stirling: A Bio-
graphy (London, England: Warner Books 1996), 354-16. The first time the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) used private security contractors was in the mid/late 1970s
to protect its Ambassador in Argentina. Foreign and Commonwealth Office 7/3043, Latin
America Embassy Security, 1976, Confidential.
Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brook-
ings, 1974), 39-40.
Bureaucracies tend to evaluate policy choices based not only on their substantive conse-
quences but also with a view to their potential effects on the morale of their employees.
See Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, 31 and Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, 79.
Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 55. See also Deborah D. Avant,
Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell UP 1994), 132.
Nina M. Serafino, ““The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background,
Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report to
Congress (Washington, DC: August 25, 2008), 1.
James Risen and Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Said to Use Outsiders to Put Bombs on Drones,”
The New York Times, August 20, 2009.
Andrei Feickert and Thomas T. Livingstone, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):
Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service Report to Con-
gress (Washington, DC: December 3, 2010), 8.
Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military
Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal
3, 1 (2011): 89-90.
Sean McFate, “‘Outsourcing the Making of Militaries,” Review of African Political Econ-
omy 35, 118 (2008): 652.
Interviews with Sean McFate, former Program Manager for DynCorp International
(phone interview: July 20, 2010); Author’s interview with Susan McCarthy, State Depart-
ment Official, African Bureau (phone interview: August 2, 2010).
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22
Armed Forces & Society
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
McFate, “Outsourcing the Making of Militaries,” 651.
Interview with Arnold Rumphrey, US Army, former Office of Defense Cooperation
Chief in Liberia (phone interview, July 20, 2010).
Avant, The Market for Force, 124; Stanger, A Nation under Contract, 99.
Christopher Kinsey, Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq (New York:
Routledge, 2009), 88.
Interview with Nina Serafino, Congressional Research Officer, September 10, 2009;
Interview with Mervyn Levitzky, former director of the State Department International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (phone interview: October 1, 2009); Interview
with Dan Fisk, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, September 15, 2009.
Representatives of the private military and security industry confirm that the ability to
accommodate their principals’ requests offers a “competitive advantage” and has increased
government bureaucracies’ propensity to outsource certain tasks. Interview with Doug
Brooks, President of the International Stability Operation Association (Washington, DC:
International Stability [then Peace] Operations Association, September 18, 2009).
Charles W. Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process
(New York: St Martin Press, 1996), 383; Kevin P. Marsh, “The Intersection of War and
Politics: The Iraq War Troop Surge and Bureaucratic Politics,” Armed Forces & Society
38, 3 (August 2011): 417.
Gabriel Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process. The Challenge of Adapta-
tion,” in Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security, ed. Gabriel Marcella
(Carlisle, PA: National Defense University Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 40.
Serafino, ““The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance,” 25.
US Bureau of Diplomatic Security, The History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of
the United States Department of State (Washington, DC: Global Publishing Solutions,
2011), 101.
Ibid., 103 and 205.
Ibid., 128.
The Department of State (DoS) Accountability Review Board summoned in the wake of
Ambassador Stevens’ murder in Benghazi, called for an expansion of the Marines Secu-
rity Guard Program. These new detachments will be the first of fifty such units filling US
diplomatic security gaps worldwide. Alex Tiersky and Susan B. Epstein, “Securing U.S.
Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues,’ Congres-
sional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: May 7, 2013), 7. In June
2013, three new Marine Security Guards detachments have been deployed to protect State
Department diplomatic posts in Africa. “Marine Security Guards stand up new posts in
Africa” (June 28, 2013), accessed February 5, 2014, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/
article/20130628/NEWS/306280032/Marine-Security-Guards-stand-up-new-posts-
Africa.
Wilson, Bureaucracy, 183.
Tiersky and Epstein, “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad,” 4; US
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, The History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 300-1.
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Cusumano and Kinsey 23
53.
54.
3).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
Tiersky and Epstein, “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad,” 5.
Wilson, Bureaucracy, 94.
Tiersky and Epstein, “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad,” 2.
US Bureau of Diplomatic Security, The History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 343.
Nathan Hodge, Armed Humanitarians (New York: Bloosmbury, 2011), 30.
Tiersky and Epstein, “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad,” 4; US
House of Representatives, Blackwater USA. Hearing before the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2,
2007). Far from decreasing with US disengagement from Iraq, the use of private security
contractors by the State Department has further increased after the withdrawal of US
troops. See US Senate, Hearing before the Commission on Foreign Relations “Iraq: The
Challenging Transition to a Civilian Mission” (statement of James F. Jeffrey, US Ambas-
sador to Iraq), accessed February 5, 2014, http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jef-
frey-Austin_Testimony.pdf.
Blackwater Hearing, 150
In his recent analysis of contractors’ role in US national security, Thomas Bruneau
observes that the US military cannot perform security tasks for personnel not belonging
to the Department of Defense (DoD). As epitomized by the case of the Marines Embassy
Security guards, this is not entirely true. Moreover, as Bruneau acknowledges, the mili-
tary can provide security for civilians supporting the military mission such as the DoS
personnel supporting the reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq. See Thomas Bruneau,
Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 122.
Laura Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2011), 37.
Ibid.
Blackwater Hearing, 123.
Interview with anonymous Diplomatic Security Bureau Special Agent (November 20,
2012). See also Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace, 38-40.
Ibid., 147.
Blackwater Hearing, 148.
Ibid. To be sure, the extent to which Blackwater private security details can actually be
considered “low profile” is questionable. A former private security contractor dismisses
Griffin words as “plain ludicrous,” observing that “there is nothing low profile in shiny
brand new SUVS covered in 10 ft. tall antennas driving in herringbone formation at 60
mph with a machine gun pointing out of the back window.” Interview with anonymous
private security contractor (October 10, 2012).
Interview with anonymous Diplomatic Security Bureau Special Agent.
Interview with Colonel Christopher Mayer, Director for Private Security Contractor Pol-
icy and Programs at the Department of Defense (Brussels, April 28, 2011); Interview with
Doug Brooks.
Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen HI, Changing an Army. An Oral History of
General William DePuy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 133.
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24
Armed Forces & Society
71.
ds
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
Moshe Schwartz, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in
Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress (Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 8.
For instance, former US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral James
Fallon observed that “My instinct is that it is easier and better if they were in uniform
and working for me.” Blackwater Hearing, 78.
Report of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq
(Washington, DC: October 2007), accessed February 5, 2014, 5. http://www.expose-
the-war-profiteers.org/archive/government/2007-2/20071023.pdf.
Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 122.
Interview with private security consultant (September 19, 2011).
Kinsey, Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq, 86.
Interview with Lt Col. Patrick Wellington, MBE, Royal Military Police (April 11,
2013).
Foreign Commonwealth Office Freedom of Information Request, ref 0610-11 (released
July 1, 2011).
Interview with Lt Col. Patrick Wellington.
Allen, for instance, observes that “it is hard to find examples of external policies being
negatively affected by bureaucratic conflicts involving the FCO as one of the parties.”
See “The United Kingdom,” in Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation, ed. Brian
Hocking (London, England: Macmillan, 1998), 215.
Interviews with anonymous Foreign and Commonwealth Office Security Managers
(November 10, 2012).
http://www.army.mod.uk/agc/provost/23207.aspx (accessed June 18, 2013).
Interview with Lt Col. Patrick Wellington.
Kinsey, Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq, 110.
See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/About-us/History/ (accessed on May 1, 2013).
Francesco Mancini, In Good Company? The Role of Business in Security Sector Reform
(London, England: Demos International Peace Academy, 2005), 53.
Nicola Lowther, “Security Sector Transformation in South Sudan,” Journal of Interna-
tional Peace Operations 6, 3 (2010), accessed February 5, 2014, http://web.peaceops.
com/archives/1049.
Kinsey, Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq, 110.
UK Department for International Development, Humanitarian Emergency Response
Review (London, England: March 21, 2011), 5-8.
Ibid., 7.
Interview with Barney Mayhew, independent consultant for the development sector
(April 30, 2012).
Interview with private security consultant (September 19, 2011). On the difficulties
encountered by the UK military and by Department for International Development
(DFID) personnel in the Helmand province, see Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, “COIN
Machine,” The RUSI Journal 154, 3 (2009): 18-25.
Interview with anonymous private security consultant (September 19, 2011).
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Cusumano and Kinsey 25
94. Interview with Rebecca Buckingham, former Head of the Rule of Law Team in the Hel-
mand Provincial Reconstruction Team (January 23, 2012).
95. James Ferguson, A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan
(London, England: Bantam, 2008), 118; Robert Egnell, “Lessons from Helmand, Afgha-
nistan: What Now for British Counterinsurgency?” International Affairs 87, 2 (2011):
303; Anthony King, “Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations
in Afghanistan,” /nternational Affairs 86, 2 (2010): 231.
96. Interviews with UK Army officers (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, February
1-10, 2011).
97. Allison, Essence of Decision; Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics
and Foreign Policy, 2006; Harvey M. Sapolsky, Polaris System Development: Bureau-
cratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1972); Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and
Vietnam (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986); Owen R. Coté,
“The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The U.S. Navy and Fleet Ballistic
Missiles” (PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political
Science, 1996).
Author Biographies
Eugenio Cusumano obtained his PhD from the European University Institute in
June 2012. He was a Fulbright Scholar at the Korbel School of International Studies,
Denver, and he is now an assistant professor of international relations at the Baltic
Defence College in Tartu, Estonia. His research interest revolves around the political
and bureaucratic drivers of security privatization and its implications for military
conduct and civil—military relations.
Christopher Kinsey has published extensively on the role of the market in supply-
ing war. His present work looks at outsourcing of diplomatic security and the regu-
lation of private military and security companies. His previous books include
Corporate Soldiers and International Security, London: Routledge, 2006; Private
Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq: Transforming Military Logistics,
London: Routledge, 2009; Contractors and War: The Transformation of United
States’ Military and Stabilization Operations (ed.) Stanford University Press, 2012.
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