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172 The Terrible Secret
bureaucratic apparatus. He had never lived in Palestine for any
length of time and his command of Hebrew was uncertain, to
say the least. Hewasa German Jew, which is tosay that he never
quite fitted into the closely knit group ofthe East European Jews
who dominated Zionist politics and who belonged to a different
cultural and social milieu. When he was sent to Geneva in 1939
no one realized how vitally important Geneva would be in the
years to come, as a source of information. ,
In some ways Lichtheim was eminently suited for this
assignment: ofall the Zionist leaders of his generation he had the
surest grasp of world politics. He was widely read in recent
European affairs and he had, of course, followed international
politics for three decades from a close angle. His analytical skill
was impressive. He never had any illusions about Hitler’s
immoderate aims and mad ambitions, nor did he have any false
hopes with regard to the firmness the Western Allies would show
vis-a-vis the Fascist dictators. His predictions with regard to the
course ofthe war and developments in the post-war period were
remarkabiy accurate. True, his reports did not have a great
impact back home in Jerusalem, but it is more than doubtful
whether someone more in tune with the Zionist leadership
would have been more successful in explaining the grim realities
of Nazi Europe.
Lichtheim was less ideally suited in some other respects. He
had not much experience in conspirational work. His training
had been in a different world. But such activities wereimpossible
in any case in Geneva; the Swiss authofities were closely
watching the Jewish emissariessand would have taken a very
dim view if these had engaged in any suspect activities,
Thus, as the war broke out, Lichtheim set up shop in 52 rue
des Paquis, Palais Wilson - and began his correspondence with
Jerusalem which concerned the fate of individualsand that of
whole communities. He became more and more pessimistic as
Hitler occupied country after country. But it was not a
pessimism that led to passivity. He did have suggestions how to
save at least some ofthe Jews of Europe and he was repeating his
proposals relentlessiy and without much success.* In a letter
*The following is based on the Lichtheim correspondence kept in the Central Zionist
Archives in Jerusalem (CZA). Iknew Richard Lichtheim through hisson, George, and I
discussed with him his work in Geneva on various occasions accompanying him on walks
through Rehavia, the Jerusalem suburb where he made his home in the late 19408
World Jewry: From Geneva to Athlit 173
written after the fall of France he mentioned the existence of a.
‘specific office dealing with the solution of the Jewish Question’ -
Eichmann’s department in the Main State Security Office.
Others were to discover this more than two yeais later. But at
that time the “final solution’ had not yet been put on the agenda;
the Nazis were planning ‘radical emigration’ and settlement in
Madagascar. As Berlin saw it, there was sufficient room in
Madagascar. Palestine on the other hand, to quote Lichtheim,
would belong in the Nazi New Order to a power which would
“either liquidate the Jews there entirely or, in any event, not
permit further immigration.’'?
Buttorepeatonceagain, at that time the issue was emigration
and economic assistance, not yet physical survival. ‘What will
become ofthe JewsofEurope?’ Lichtheim asked as 1940 drew to
its close:
I feel thatıa word of warning to the happier Jews of England and
America is necessary. Et is impossible to believe that any power on
earth will be able (and willing?) to restore to the Jews of Continental
Europe what they have lost or are losing today. It is one of the
superficial beliefs of a certain type of American and British Jew that
after Great Britain’s victory - for which, ofcourse, the Jews all over the
world are praying - everything will be all right again with the Jews of
Europe. But even if their civil rights can be restored - what about the
property confiscated, the shops looted, the practices of doctors and
lawyers gone, the schools destroyed, the commercial undertakings of
every description closed or sold or stolen? Who will restore all that and
how? ... And what will be left of the Jews of Europe? I am not
speaking of the hundreds of thousands who during these years of
Persecution have managed to escape and are now trying to build up a
new life in Palestine, in USA, in South America, Australia, San
Domingo or elsewhere. Then there are the refugees in Europe who
wied to escape but did not go fast and far enough. ... What will
become ofthem after the war??°
It was cleariy a problem that could not be solved by simple
formulae such as the slogan ‘Restore their rights’. As Lichtheim
Saw it there would be a mass of several hundreds of thousands
after the war in a ‘permanent no-man’s land drifting from one
frontier to another, fröm concentration camps to labour camps,
from there to some unknown country and destiny’. It was a
remarkably accurate forecast. True, when Lichtheim wrote
even in 1940 about ‘an ocean of blood and misery’ he did not
a
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174 The Terrible Secret
assume that millions would be killed. His predictions may now
appear unduly optimistic; among his contemporaries these were
considered examples of unwarranted despondency.
The situation was rapidly changing for the worse. After the
Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia and the establishment ofthe Fascist
Ustasha state in Croatia the turn came of Croatian Jewry. ‘The
situation of the Jews in Croatia is desperate,’ Lichtheim wrote.
The Italians were behaving much more humanely in their
occupied zones than Germany’s other allies, but “the Croats are
certainly among the worst’. There was no reaction from
Jerusalem.?' Later that year, Lichtheim reviewed the depor-
tations from Germany, Austria and the Protectorate: Jews from
German .cities were concentrated in Berlin, others were
deported to Poland or other East European countries. Similar
expulsion orders had been given in Vienna and Prague.
So far no information had been received that anything
untoward had happened to those deported to Eastern Europe.
Those remaining behind were employed in German war
industries. On the whole, everything considered, the picture
seemed to be not too bad: some Jews had been arrested.but few
people had been actually killed in Germany. Yet Lichtheim had!
dark forebodings for he concluded his report as follows:
With all these degradations added to actual starvation and. brutal
treatment, the remnants of the Jewish comimunities of Germany,
Austria and Czechoslovakia willprobably bedestroyed before the war
ends and not too many will survive.22
In November 1941 the mass deportations had’'not yet started
and the death camps did not yet existBut Lichtheim again
ended a dispatch on a solemn.note;
With regard to Germany, Austria and the Protectorate it must be said
that the fate of the Jews is now sealed. ... Generally speaking, this
whole chapter bears the title: ‘Too late’. There was a.time when the
us and the other American states could have helped by granting
visas. But this was obstructed by the usual inertia ofthe bureaucratic
machine and by red tape.
There was, of course, more to it than the ‘usual inertia of the
bureaucratic machine’. Was there anything that could still be
done to help? Lichtheim noted that America still had some
influence with Vichy and could make use ofthis. At least some of
World Jewry: From Geneva to Athlit 175
the persecuted Jews in France could be rescued in this way. He
returned to this point in another letter sent to Weizmann
through J. Linton in London. Again he stressed that the fate of
the majority of’European Jewry was sealed: of those deported to
the East only a minority of the younger and stronger would
survive. The whole policy of deportation to the devastated
towns ol'western Russia in the middle ofthe winter was ‘murder
combined with. torture’,2* The Red Cross had been informed
but what could\it do against the will of the Gestapo? He
transmitted the most recent information received in Geneva and
then noted that:
It isa curious thing that President Roosevelt never mentioned the Jews
whenever he spoke ofthe oppressed nations. The Governments of the
democracies may have been led to believe that there would be still
more terrible perseeutions ifthey mentioned the Jews in their speeches.
Ithink.thisto be a mistake. Events have shown that the Jews could not
have suffered more than they have suffered if the statesmen of the
democracies would have said the word.
But perhaps there was yet another motive, perhaps they wanted
to avoid the impression that ihe war had anything todo with the
Jews. Such hush-hush tactics would hardly silence the anti-
semites: ‘Great Britain and America should say: we are neither
Jews nor do we wage war for the Jews we are batıling for
mankind against the enemy of mankind.’2s
Where were the voices condemning the atrocities and
warning the perpetrators of such deeds that they will be held
responsible {underlined in the original)? Lichtheim thought that
in some cases such as Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and
Vichy a warning might have had and may still have {underlined
in the original) ‘a deterrent effect’. It was, ofcourse, much more
difhicult in the case of Germany but even there some persons or
circles might be influenced by such warnings.
Why were such warnings not uttered, why were there no
words of sympathy and consolation? Was it not true that the
world witnessed the most terrible persecution of the Jews which
ever happened in Europe, overshadowing by its cruelty and
Extent even the massacres of the Armenians which at that time
. Provoked a storm of protest in England and America? There
was no answer to the questions asked by Lichtheim.
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176 The Terrible Secret
In the winter of 1941 the Nazi war machine suffered its Arst
major setback in the Soviet Union. Lichtheim noted the
enormous losses suffered, perhaps the wounded beast would
sopn feel that the end was near. But he had only scorn for the
zumours according to which the generals would take over,
forcing Hitler into the background:
To those who really know Nazi Germany such talk sounds fantastic:
Hitler and his party, the Gestapo, one million ofhicials and ss guards,
will always be stronger than a handful of generals with nothing but
their Prussian lineage behind them.”
No improvement in the situation ofthe Jews could be expected,
the picture was getting gloomier and gloomier. From a letter in
February 1942 to Arthur Lourie, the head of the emergency
committee in New York:
The number of our dead after this war will have to be counted not in
thousands or hundreds of thousands but in several millions and it is
difficult to imagine how the surviving will ever be able to return to a
normal way of life.2®
If anything, Lichtheim understated the magnitude of the
catastrophe.?? But such gloomy predictions were rare exceptions
at the time: no one wanted to hear of millions of victims in
Febuary 1942. These scemed fantastie exaggerations which
were not believed among the Jewish leadership nor among the
Jewish public. Even some of those who had recently escaped
from Eastern Europe rejected such views as unduly pessimistic,
indeed as dangerous, because they could well lead to
despondency.
Lichtheim frequently returned to his suggestions as to the
measures that should be taken to slow down, at the very least,
the tide of persecutions. He repeatedly emphasized the necessity
ofgiving public expression over the radio to formal prötests and
warnings by Allied leaders and urged approaches to the
Catholic Church in view of its great influence in some of the
countries concerned. Together with Riegner and Sally Mayer,
the president ofthe Swiss Jewish community, in March 1942 he
met Monsignor Bernardini, the papal nuncio in Switzerland,
and handed him a detailed report about the situation of the
Jews. The nuncio stated that he was aware of the unfortunate
Mn 12, zz RP FRPEEEEEEEFESERE
World Jewry: From Geneva to Athlit 177
situation of the Jews and that he had already reported on
Previous occasions to Rome but would do so again, and
recommend certain steps in favour ofthe persecuted Jews. But
soon afterwards Lichtheim sadly noted that the eflorts of the
Vatican in Slovakia had been of no ayail.”° While Lichtheim
watched the slow destruction of European Jewry he was told of
plans made by nötables in Jerusalem to re-establish their
organizations in Europe after the war. For this kind of “post-war
planning’ he had nothing but sarcasm. A renewal ofthe idyllic
pre-war Zionism seerned to him totally unrealistic.
My personal prognosis is quite sombre. Those Jews still alive after the
war will be engulfed by Russia and the neighbouring countries. I do
not share the optimism ofthose who expect the toleration - let alone
the'support - of Zionism by Bolshevism. The remnants of European
Jewrywill have to look somehow for an existence Overseas.’
The mass killings in Poland were first made public in the world
press in late June 1942. At this time Lichtheim reported that
Central Europe was to be made Judenrein (to be emptied of Jews)
by means of deportation and direct or indirect killing ‘through
starvation or even shorter methods":
The Jews in almost all countries ofthis tormented continent live onlyin
the fear ofdeportation which aims at their physical destruction quickly
or over a longer period, or fear ofslave labour in intolerable conditions.
Their only thought is towards rescue and escape but this will be
possible only in a very few cases. ?2
In August 1942 an English friend sent him a copy of Hansard
reporting a debate in the House of Commons earlier that month
about post-war problems of resettlement. One speaker had
mentioned seven, another even nine and a half million Jews who
would need homes after the war. Lichtheim wrote bitterly in his
reply: ‘People in England do not know what is now going on in
Europe.” How could even the Jewish leaders believe that there
would be five or six million Jewsafter thewar who would have to
be resettled? After analyzing the figures Lichtheim stated
eategorically: "We now know that deportation means death —-
Sooner or later.’
Öf the former Polish, German, Austrian, Czechoslovak, Jugoslavian
Jews - altogether 34m. - and of the others who have been or will be
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
178 The Terrible Secret
deported, very few will survive. ... This process of annihilation is
going on relendessly and there is no hope left to save any considerable
number. ... Therefore it is no exaggeration to say that Hitler has
killed or is killing 4m. Jews in Continental Europe and that no more
than 2m. have a chance ofsurviving. With every month that passes this
chance becomes smaller and one year hence even these figures might
appear too optimistic.”
Meanwhile (on 15 August) Lichtheim had dictated a report
based on the account oftwo eyewitnesses who had come directly
from Poland, one of them was a non-Jew, ‘a very reliable and
well known personality’. Both related stories that were, as
Lichtheim wrote in an accompanying letter, ‘so terrible that I
had some doubts if I should forward it or not’. (He kept the
report for two weeks before mailing it and sent it out only on 30
August.} It was the report which was also sent to Stephen Wise
and wasintercepted by the State Department which has already
been mentioned in another context (see p. 117). It dealt
with the mass killings of the Jews in Warsaw, Lithuania and
elsewhere, mentioned Belzec as well as the fact that Theresien-
stadt, the showplace (Musterghetto) in the Protectorate, was
merely an interim station for most of the deportees. The
report dwelt upon the death trains and the role of>the
Lithuanian helpers of the ss; it also saidıthatrno Jews were left
in the regions east of Warsaw. Among the practical suggestions
contained in the report was the request by the authorfs) to
bring these facts to the knowledge of American Jewry without
reference to its source. He complained that cables giving.the
very same information had been sent from Warsaw to London
before but had been publicized in the(British) radio only with
delay. American Jewry should not be kept in ignorance for so
long. The report contained some incorrect staternents such as
the allegation that the corpses of victims were used forfat and
fertilizers or that the whole non-Jewish- population of
Sebastopol had been killed. But by and large it gave an
unvarnished picture of the situation as Lichtheim pointed out
in his comments, Certain facts, he said, had been confirmed
quite independently by other sources:
All this gives a most sinister meaning to the other information
contained in this report — incredible as it may seem to readers in
World Jewry: From Geneva to Athlüt 179
England and America. In fact, I believe the report to be true and quite
in line with Hitler’s announcement that at the end oftthis war there will
be no Jews irı Continental Europe.*
The report met with disbelief not on}y in England and America
but also in Jerusalem. Yizhak Gruenbaum, one of the leading
figuresıof Polish_Jewry and member of the Jewish Agency
Executive, sent Lichtheim a cable in reply which read:
Shocked your latest reports regarding Poland which despite all
difhcult [to] believe stop haven’t yet published do everything possible
verify cable.
Gruenbaum did try to ascertain whether the report was true: he
sent a cable to Rabbi Marcus Ehrenpreis in Stockholm, as he
had done once before in July after Zygielbojm’s revelations in
London. Had the venerable rabbi heard anything about it?
Marcus Ehrenpreis'was in his middle seventies at the time. He
had been born in Lemberg and had served as a rabbi in Croatia
and Bulgaria. He was a prolific author and one ofthe pioneers of
modern Hebrew literature. He was also one ofthe most unlikely
authorities about current events in Eastern Europe, nor was he
willing\to make a great eflort to find out. Lauterbach, head of
the Organization Department, was somewhat more cautious in
his reply to Lichtheim:
Frankly, I am not inclined to accept all the statements at their face
value and, without having, of course, any evidence to the contrary
have great doubts as to the accuracy of all the facts contained therein.
. + „One must also learn from experience to distinguish between reality,
grim as it is, and figments of an imagination strained by justified fear
* 30 August 1942 (letter 802) CZA. The source ofthe report was the Polish legatior in
Bern which served as a base for couriers from Poland. The legation was headed by
Alexander Lados among whose assistants was Julius Kuehl who had come to Bern from
Poland as a student in 1929 (his dissertation was on Polish-Swiss ırade relations). From
1938 on Kuchl was employed in the Polish consular service. He was on friendly terms
with the Sternbuchs, an orthodox Jewish family resident in St Gallen. He passed
information on 10 them and to Silbershein in Geneva. In a letter 10 Dr Schwarzbart in
London (8 October 1942 - Schwarzbart Archives) Silbershein says ıhat the above-
mentioned report reached him through the Polish legation. But the Sternbuchs also
received letters direcıly frorn Poland. The most famous, and the most harrowing, were
two letters from 1. Domb in Warsaw, dated 4 and 12 September in which, in hardiy
veiled language, the writer announced that virtually everyone around him had been
kilied. He was now all alone: “Picase pray for me.’
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u The Terrible Secret
and grows to believe what is whispered without being able, in the
circumstances to check its veracity.
But then he added that ‘without going into gruesome details’
one could not heip but accept the main facts and interpretation
as contained in Lichtheim’s letter.” What emerged from
Lauterbach’s confused letter was that while Jerusalem was by
now persuaded that the situation was very bad it was not quite
as bad as Lichtheim had described.
During the following days and weeks more evidence came to
light in quick succession. On 26 September Lichtheim cabled
London that the ghettos of Warsaw and Lodz were nearly
empty. Some artisans were left, the majority had been deported
to some unknown destination. On 29 September, in a letter to
Arthur Lourie in New York: “The total destruction ofthe Jewish
communities in Belgium and Holland is nearly complete.’ On 135
September in a letter to London, again reiterating his old
complaint: ‘Far too little has been said and done by the Ällies to
warn the Nazis and their satellites of the consequences of their
crime.’ But now with the turn ofthe tide ofthe war.the prospects
were better than they had ever been before. He warned that
unless this was done the last still existing Jewish communities in
_ Europe, the 800,000 in Hungary and the 300,000 in Romania,
would also perish.
On 5 October Lichtheim sent to Jerusalem»(and to London
and New York) ‘a most harrowing report about the situation in
Lettland’. For a long time there had been sporadic news about
the slaughter in the Baltic countries, which had, infact, taken
place a year earlier. But it had been very.difhicult to obtain
reliable reports; there was no correspondence with Vilna and
Riga and very little traffic. The harrowing report was based on
the evidence of Gabriel Zivian, a young Jew from Riga, whohad
witnessed the massacres on the spot, made his way to northern
Germany and had worked as a hospital aide in Stettin.
Miraculousiy he had received an entry visa to Switzerland
through some relations in Geneva. Riegner interviewed him like
an examining magistrate (Riegner’s words) for eight hours.”
"This was in August 1942. A little later another young Jew of
Polish origin had also reached Switzerland illegally. Since he
was quite ill, he could not be sent back to Germany but was
hospitalized under police supervision. A physician called
World Jewry: From Geneva to Athlit 181
Riegner: they had a patient who was telling them horrible
stories. Could Riegner possibly come’and find out whether there
was anything to this?
Lichtheim forwarded this account and said in an accompany-
ing note: “We have heard from other sources of similar mass
murdessin-Poland.’ Then, on 8 October, he prepared a detailed
reply to Gruenbaum who had doubted the veracity ofhis earlier
reports. ‘] can easily understand that you are unwilling to
believe the report in question.’ But the sources were trust-
worthy. How could one possibly investigate the matter on the
spot? No observers were permitted to approach the regions of
death, only the ss and some workers. The only available
testimony was that of German officers retumming from the East.
But there had also been letters and postcards from Jews in
Poland. There could. no longer be any doubt as to the intentions
of Hitler and the Gestapo. He ended the letter as follows:
I have foreseen this development long ago. In my letters to London
and New York I have constantly warned our friends of what was
coming and I have submitted certain proposals. But X always knew
that in the case of Hitler nothing we or others would do or say could
stop him. Therefore I have asked our friends in London and New York
to try to save at least the Jewish communities in the semi-independent
states of Romania, Hungary, Italy and Bulgaria. ....
But we have to face the fact that the large majority of the Jewish
communities in Hitler-dominated Europe are doomed. There is no
force which could stop Hitler or his ss who are today the absolute rulers
of Germany and the occupied countries. It is my painful duty to tell
you what I know. There is nothing I could add. The tragedy is too
great for words.”
The correspondence with Jerusalem continued. There were
more facts but they hardly affected the general picture. On 16
October, in a private letter to Lauterbach:
I'have the impression that my previous reports have not always found
the necessary understanding. Some of our friends did not want to
believe that something like this can happen, others may have been
misled through different (i.e. less alarming) reports. Et is pointless to
deal now with the motives which have caused this. Events speak an
inexorable language and we face these events impotently, or almost
so...
On 26 October he transmitted one of the notes, which he had
STERN,
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182 The Terrible Secret
handed together with Riegner, to the American minister in Bern
four days earlier, containing a general survey of the situation.
On 20 October he wrote another long summary ofrecent events:
the deportations to Poland and inside Poland had nothing to do
with the Nazi wareffort and the need for more labour, ‘there is a
plan behind these measures to exterminate immediately the
largest possible number of Jews’. Previously there had been
pogroms and mass executions but they had been of a local
character, and it had been thought that despite everything,
despite slave labour, starvation and all other deprivations at
least the younger and stronger might survive and that some of
the communities would not be completely destroyed:
But it has become more and more evident in the course of the last three
or four months (and you willhave seen that from my reports) thateven
this outlook was too optimistic and the latest deportation measures
have made it quite clear what is contemplated,
Lichtheim then mentioned reports according to which there had
been discussions in Hitler’s headquarters about theannihilation
ofthe Jews within the next few months. At the end of July Hitler
had signed a formal order approving the plan of total
annihilation of all Jews of Europe on which the Nazis could lay
their hands. Reliable witnesses had seen-the order signed by
Hitler in his headquarters. And he concluded, foronce in a spirit
of resignation:
For the large majority ofthe Jews of Europe there seems to be no hope
left. They are in the hands ofa raving madman whohas become the
absolute ruler of Continental Europe by the will of his own guilty
people and by the tragic blindness ofstatesmen who from 1933 t0 1939
have tried to make a deal with the devil instead of driving him out
while there was still time to do so.??
Five weeks later, on 25 November, at a meeting in Tel Aviv,
Elijahu Dobkin of the Jewish Agency Executive said: “Perhaps
we have sinned as the first terrible news came to us two months
ago via Geneva and Istanbul and as we did not believe it.’”® This
sentiment was echoed by many others in the following weeks.
But the information had, of course, arrived much earlier and it
now remains to be asked what had prevented its acceptance in
the first place and what caused the reappraisal in November.
As the war broke out more than half a million Jews lived in
World Jewry: From Geneva io Athlit 183
Palestine; most ofthem had been born in the countries occupied
by Nazi Germany. Most had friends and family in Europe and
they tried to keep in touch with them in every possible way -
through postcards and letters sent by way ofneutral countriesor
short ‘Red _Cross letters’. These were special forms in which
messages up to twenty-five words could be transmitted. In the
beginning many such»letters and postcards came, then they
became fewer and fewer. Thus the public in Palestine came to
depend for its information mainly on newspaper reports.
Correspondents were systematically picking up news of Jewish
interests from newspapers in Nazi-occupied Europe, from the
Swedish and Swiss press, and of course, also from the infrequent
reports in the British, American and Soviet media.
But just as the Jewish Agency executive thought that
Lichtheim was exaggerating, and just as the reports by Riegner
and othersywere thought to be unduly pessimistic, the
Palestinian Jewish press quite frequently dissociated itself
editorially from the ‘alarmist information’ published in its own
columns. A few examples should suffice. Moshe Prager, a Polish
‚Jewish journalist was the author (in 1941) ofthe first, and for the
time being only, book on the life of Polish Jewry under Nazi
occupation. In his preface Y. Gruenbaum praised the supreme
ability of Polish Jewry to adjust itself to the horrors and he
predicted that its spirit would triumph over degradation,
tortures and destruction. Prager himselfsaw the main Nazi aim
as turning the Jews into despicable beggars; the Jews, on the
other hand were fighting with their last efforts to keep their
honour and not be defeated.” Terms such as adjustment,
triumph, honour and defeat are, of course, singularly inept
expressions in connection with the ‘final solution’. But these
comments were made in 1941 and at the time they seemed not
altogether unreasonable. What happened in Eastern Europe in
1940 had, after all, occurred before in Jewish history: Jews were
deprived of their elermentary rights, there were sporadic
Pogroms and economic ruin. But there seemed to be no reason to
doubt that the great majority of European Jewry would survive
the war. Thus the correspondents and commentators discussed
whether the Nazi plan to concentrate the Jews in the Lublin
area was not all that terrible (because self-government had its
advantages as some argued) or whether thisscheme was no more
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
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184 The Terrible Secret
than a fraud which would result in one giant concentration
camp, as the New York Forward reasoned.
But there was to be no concentration in the Lublin region, no
. Madagascar resettlement scheme. After the invasion of the
Soviet Union the information received was no longer about the
closing of businesses and violation of human rights, not even of
hunger and disease. It was about mass murder. The perceptions
which had been formed in an earlier period did not, however,
change. As the press saw it, Jewish life continued in Eastern
Europe albeit under very difficult conditions.
There was a frantic search for rays ofhope. Thus the left-wing
press would report with satisfaction that the agricultural
training centres in Poland and other countries in which the
halutzim (pioneers) were preparing themselves for life in the
Palestinian collective settlements continued to operate. The
orthodox newspapers noted with equal satisfaction that twenty-
four Jewish bookshops were still open in the Warsaw ghetto, and
three in Cracow.* Ha’olam, the organ of the world Zionist
movement, published virtually no news about the massacres
during the first halfof 1943; it did feature, however, anarticleby
Apollinari Hartglass, a Polish Jewish leader who had escaped
from Warsaw after the Nazi invasion and who, by tortuous
logic, tried to prove that while the world’had initially ignored
the Jewish catastrophe, it had now discovered that it had its
propagandistic uses and was ‘actually exaggerating it twofold
and more’.*!
Other Hebrew newspapers reported that Amsterdam was to
be the embarkation port for European Jewry to some unknown
destination overseas. Another paper quoted a Polish professor
who had fled to America, to the effect that while the Jews would
merely be deported, the Poles would all be killed by the Nazis.”
The massacres were reported in the, papers but also every
possible rumour, however incredible, and unlimited scope was
given to wishful thinking, and unwittingly of course, to Nazi
disinformation. The news about the massacres was printed but
widely doubted; it was assumed that some misfortunes had
indeed happened but that the number of victims had been
grossiy exaggerated. Hatzofe called correspondents to order In
March 1942: they should show greater responsibility and not
“inflate out of proportion every bad rumour’. Davar wrote that
na anna
World Jewry: From Geneva to Arhlıt 185
_ one should receive with great caution all the atrocity stories
allegediy coming from ‘soldiers returning from the front’.*
According to Davar it had been reported on the authority ofthe
Soviet army newspaper Red Star that most ofthose killed in Kiev
{Babi Yar) had been Jews. But in fact, (Davar claimed) Red Star
had said that most ofthe victims had no? been Jews. Red Star had
said neither the one nor the other, but the Davar editorial was
quite symptomatic of. the prevailing confusion.**
Both Davar and Haizofe put the blame on the unbridied
sensationalism of irresponsible journalists on one hand and the
competition between various news agencies on the other. Each
wanted to kill more Jews than the other.
The irresponsible informanıs ..... absorb every rumour, they desper-
ately look for every,piece of bad news, every enormous figure and
present it to the reader in a way which makes the blood curdle in one’s
veins. ... DO the informants not feel that the news about tens of
thousands of killed, of a quarter million victims does not stir up
many emotions because it is not believed in view of the inherent
exaggeration. ... We still remember the dispatches from the days of
the riots [in Palestine 1936-9] which were sent out all over the globe
andwhich were so much exaggerated.
Hatzofe rejected the Zygielbojm report: all these accounts were
repetitive. T'here had been perhaps a pogrom somewhere, but
then the same news would be reported one day from London,
another day from Stockholm and on the following day from yet
another place. When the Chelmno story reached Davar in
October 1942 it was introduced by the following editorial note:
‘We publish this horrible account on the responsibility of the
source ...* Other newspapers ridiculed the astronomical figures
ofvictims which could not possibly be true. When Czerniakow,
the head of the Warsaw Judenrat, committed suicide, Haboker
commented that the situation could not possibly be altogether
desperate, for otherwise (it was argued) a revolt would surely
break out.
When in later years people were looking for an explanation
for the misinterpretation of the news from Europe — not to put it
any stronger - one coukl point, of course, to various mitigating
eircumstances. The summer of 1942 saw Rommel’s advance into
Egypt; the Afrika Korps was poised to strike at the Nile valley; a
German invasion of Palestine seemed at hand. It was only in the
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Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
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186 The Terrible Secret
first week ofSeptember 1942 that Rommel was checked at Alam
Halfa, and Montgomery’s counter-oflensive which broke
German dreams in Africa began only on 23 October. Until that
date the Jewish community in Palestine seerned in immediate
danger. All other problems were bound to take second place.
But this hardly explains the lack of interest and understanding
before Rommel’s advance during the summer. And it certainly
does not explain the lack of understanding shown by American
and British Jewry’‘which did not face the danger ofinvasion and
Occupation.
It was not, in the final analysis, a matter of lack of
information. As a labour leader put it: “The news had reached
Palestine, the newspapers had published them and also, the
[mandatory] radio service. The community read it and heardhit
but did not absorb it; and it did not raise its voice to alarm
Jewish communities elsewhere.’* There were many voices of
'self-accusation after November 1942 and they included Prager
and Hartglass. How had they been so blind not to believe the
news? There was much recrimination against the-leadership
which had after all had more information at its disposal and yet
had not sounded the tocsin.*
Y. Tabenkin, the veteran kibbutz leader, wrote that it was
simply not true that the Jews in-Palestine had not known about
the fate of European Jewry; “We knew everything. And now we
* Hamashkif, 6, 11 December 1942 and many articles through 1943 and 1944 in the
Hebrew press. But Prager in later years accused not only himselfbuteven more strongly
virtually everyone else {excepting only his friends ofıthe ultra-orthodox Agudat Israel)
and eventually reached the conchusion that the halocaust should not "become the
subject of historical research. (Bei Ya’akov, May 1974, 4-12) Prager (and others) refer
mainly to the pessimism voiced by Y. Gruenbaum who in August 5942 expressed doubts
whether the Jews of Potand could stil] be saved and whether any substantial help could
be extended to then. (CZAS 26-1235, meeting between Gruenbaum. and Rabbi Levin.)
Gruenbaum thought that only the military victory of the Allies would save the
remaining Jews and he believed that protest demionstrations and similar noisy actions
were ineflective and poindess. (A. Morgenstern “Va'adha’hazala’ etc. in Yalkut Moreshet
June 1971, 711 eg.) Many years later when Gruenbaum wasinterviewed about whathe
knew at the time he said that towards the end of 1942 'we got news from Geneva that
something horrible happened in Poland - but we did not know what... .-the confused
account of an eighty-year-old man.’(Eigar 29 June 1961. Gruenbaum interview with
Natan Yalin Mor.) For Dr N. Goldmann’s mee culpa (written in the pluralis majestatis) set
‚Davar 14 September 1966: "Our generation did not.do itsduty, and [include myselftoo.
.. „ Möostofthe people did not understand the danger ol Nazism. We did not warn of the
possibility of death camps. Our imagination was too limited... When the first new&
came on the murder of European Jewry American Jews did not react.’
World Jewry: From Geneva to Athlit 187
look for the guilty ones among us. This is a manifestation of
horrible helplessness. We know who is guilty but it is difhcult to
punish him, and therefore we look for them among us. Why
should we accuse Gruenbaum?’ Tabenkin said that if anyone
reread the last six months of Daxer, the daily organ ofthe left, he
would find that everything had been reported, massacres, .
poison gas etc, ‘But only when we met people who had come
from the valley of the shadow of the death were we strongly
impressed and felt'che catastrophe in all its horror. ’*”
The senior ofhcials of the Jewish Agency did, of course, read
with attention the news from Europe. On 17 April 1942 Moshe
Shertok, the head of the Political Department, addressed Sir
Claude Auchinleck (Commander of the Eighth Army in North
Africa and Montgomery’s predecessor) as follows:
There can beittle doubt that if Palestine were overrun by the Nazis
nothing less than complete annihilation would be the lot ofthe jews of
ihis country. The destrüction of the Jewish race is a fundamental tenet
of the Nazi doctrine. The authoritative reports recently published
show that that policy is being carried out with a ruthlessness which
defies description. Hundreds of thousands of Jews have perished in
Poland, the Balkan countries, Romania and the invaded provinces of
Russia, as a result of mass executions, forced deportations, and the
spread offamine and disease in ghettos and concentration camps. An
even swifter destruction, it must be feared, would overtake the Jews of
Palestine, were they to fall under Nazi sway., . „**
These were strong words and they were written moreover well
before the Zygielbojm report and revelations of the Polish
Government-in-exile. If so why did the Jewish Agency
disbelieve Lichtheim? The answer is, in brief, that everything
Shertok had said could also be found in the newspapers at the
time. True, the ‘institutions’ had received some more details
which is not to say that the information was fully believed.
*Shertok was not too successful with his plea 16 General Auchinteck. The Foreign
Office was on the wholeeven more opposed to theideaofarming the Jews of Palestine. As
Harry Eyes wrote commenting ona letier by Sir Lewis Namier on the very same su bject:
‘From the point ofviewoofthe Jews themselvesit seems most dangerous toarm them ifthe
Germans ever do reach Palestine. Ic seems inconceivable ıhat even the Germans would
set themselves in cold blood! 10 massacre 460,000 Jews. But nothing ismorelikely tomake
them do ıhat ıhan the fact that the Jews were arımed and might have in certain instances
ran racing advance or mopped up a party of parachutisis.” (Minute dated ı
ay 1gar.
!
2
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Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
188 The Terrible Secret
Shertok’s alarming words have to be read furthermore in the
context in which they were written. The Jewish community of
Palestine was in immediate danger, and in his letter Shertok
‚pressed for specific demands for the defence of Palestine: the
‘utmost mobilization’ - more Jewish soldiers, more arms, a
large-scale programme of military training, the expansion ofthe
militia. To reinforce these demands Shertok invoked not only
the military threat posed by Rommel (which was quite real) but
also the news about large-scale persecutions in Europe which
had been reported countless times but which were nevertheless
more distant and probably only half believed.
Again, one example of the confusion then prevailing should
suffice. When Shertok addressed his letter to Auchinleck, Meleh
Neustadt (Noi} was on a mission to Istanbul. In May 1942 he
returned to Palestine and in two long addresses, in closed
session, he gave the most detailed and authoritative account
available at the time to the Jewish leadership.* There was no
one better informed at the time. Noi had established contact
from Turkey with fifty Jewish communities in Poland and-with
virtually every other European country. He had discovered,
much to his surprise, that with certain exceptions {the Baltic
countries and eastern Poland) communication could easily be
established. Air letters from occupied countries took ten to
iwelve days, cables were also sent’ and received, and one could
even book long-distance telephone calls.f Noi noted that Jewsin
Eastern Europe did not like/to use the telegraph so.as not to
attract attention. On the other hand, he saidıthat inside Nazi-
occupied Europe Jewish emissaries were’frequently travelling
from one place to another, that illegal newspapers were
published and that there were regional and even nationwid
meetings.
*On 25 May, at the Mapai (Ihud) World Secretariat, on 27 May at the Histadruf
(Trade Union) Council. A stenogram was taken, and the speeches were, in carly July:
circulated {‘restricted’) among a Iimited number of people.
tt is known from various sources that Slovak Jewish leaders were in fairly frequent
telephonic contact with the Jewish representatives in Switzerland. (Josef Korniansk,
Besklichut Hahıtıim, Ber Lohame Hagetaot, 1979, p. 93.) Dr Silbershein in-Geneva had
a phonc call in May 1942 from an unknown representative.ofıhe German Red Cross in
Kolomea, Eastern Galicia, in which he was told that a great many Jews there had died a
violent death and that the remnants were living in conditions of abject poverty and
needed urgent hetp. (Riegner to N. Goldmann, Geneva, ı7 June 1942. World Jewish
Congress, Institute of Jewish Affairs Archives, London.)
en nn
World Jewry: From Geneva to Aihlit 189
The bad news was the fate of’ Croatian and part of Romanian
Jewry of which he was fully informed.* There had been victims
in Eastern Galicia. Lodz was more or less cut off from the outside
world. There was no direct contact but it had been learned that
“unproductive elements’ had been deported from Lodz to
Minsk, Kovno and Riga. Noi said that it was pointless to
comment on the rumours concerning the fate of the Jews of
eastern Poland (and the Baltic countries); one simply did not
know. But he also said that nothing was more harmful than
‘exaggerated information’ which weakened and even put into
doubt correct news about real atrocities. He expressed regret
that neither the World Jewish Congress nor any other Jewish
body had established so far an ofice in Istanbul, and that there
were no journalists to sift and transmit the information from
occupied Europe. For Istanbul was the best listening post.
The good news wasthat aliover Europe Jewish life continued,
that the Zionist youth movement was showing much activity in
very difhicult conditions and that it deserved the highest praise.
Nor’s information was in part amazingly detailed: he had exact
figures about hospitals and orphanages in Warsaw, the price of
bread in ghettos, the number of participants in sundry
agrienltural courses. In part, it was also very recent: he knew
about the unsuccessful intervenuon ofthe Vatican in Slovakia.
His prediction was that while the Nazis wanted physically to
destroy the Jews, they also wanted to employ them for the war
effort: ‘And it is possible that this will save a great part of
European Jewry.’
What was more striking in these reports: the measure of
knowledge or of ignorance? The mass killings in the former
Soviet territories had been reported in the press many months
earlier and Polish sources had confirmed the destruction ofmost
communities in Lithuania and Eastern Galicia. But seen from
Istanbul these were still ‘rumours’; silence did not necessarily
mean death but perhaps isolation. Chelmno was not taken
seriously and the beginning of “evacuation’ from most Polish
ghettos was not reported.
It was argued in later years that certain Jewish leaders in the
®It was generally thought at the time that the fate of Croatian Jewry had been the
worst. Thus Silbershein in a letter from Geneva dated 4 May 1942: "What happened in
Zagreb happened nowhere.cise....
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
190 The Terrible Secret
United States as well as in Palestine delayed the publication of
the full truth about the European tragedy because they feared
that this would have a depressing, perhaps even paralyzing
‚ effect on the morale öfthe Jewish community in Palestine at a
time ofemergency. But explanations of this kind are more than
doubtful. Internal evidence shows that most Jewish leaders were
genuinely sceptical with regard to the extent of the catastrophe
until ı8and 19 November when four ofthem went tointerviewa
group of Jewish women and children of Palestinian nationality
who had just arrived in Palestine from Europe.
They had been exchanged against a group of German
nationals who had been detained at the beginning ofthe war on
Allied territory. A first such exchange had taken place in
December 1941, involving some forty-six women and children.
But no one had paid much attention at the time, and the new
arrivals had apparently not much of interest to tell. They had
not come from the Baltic countries and western Russia where
most of the massacres had taken place. Then, in November 1942
there came the second group about which more-will be said
presently: there was a third, much smaller contingent in
February 1943 and some further exchanges in summer of 7944,
mainly via Spain.
The attitude ofthe ss to such-exchanges was, on the whole,
negative; time and again, Eichmann and others argued that a
certain person could not’be released even if this was insisted
upon by friends (such asithe Italian Fascist party!) because ‘she
had seen too much’ and would add.fuel to the atrocity
propaganda circulating outside Germany. But on occasion
they were either overruled ordid not persist in their Opposition.
Thus, the group of 137 was permitted to leave Poland on 28
October and Vienna (where they were kept for a few days prior
to their departure) on ıı November. On 14 November their
train arrived at the Syrian border, Among them were seventy-
eight Jews (ten elderly men, thirty-ninewomen and twenty-nine
children) and ofthese sixty-nine were Palestinian citizens. After
a cursory interrogation by British military intelligence they were
taken to Athlit, which had once been a British military camp
(and also a detention centre) some miles south of Haifa, near the
sea. It was there that two members ofthe executive ofthe Jewish
Agency and two senior ofhicials visited them (E. Dobkin,
World Jewry: From Geneva to Athlit 191
M. Shapira, H. Barlas and Bahar). The new arrivals came from
thirteen different cities in Poland (including Sosnowice, Kielce,
Piotrkov, Cracow, Sandomir and Bialystok) from Berlin and
Hamburg, from Belgium and Holland. They had also had the
opportunity to meet in Vienna with the head of the Jewish
community, Loewenherz, and his deputy, Gruen, who told
them that 400, Jews were stili left out ofa community 0f 200,000.
While most ofithe women had been held for some weeks in
various prisons prior to their departure in Poland, they were
able to move about more or less freely in Vienna. Thus they
could provide a fairly comprehensive picture ofthe situation not
only in Poland but also other parts of Europe.
But were they reliable? The visitors from Jerusalem seem to
have been quite sceptical in the beginning. So often before
simple-minded (and even not so simple-minded people) had
simply repeated rumours, often baseless in character. But the
new arrivals could not be so easily dismissed: among them was a
scientific researcher employed at the Hebrew University, two
members of Kibbutz Degania B - members of the Palestinian
elite-a Zionist leader oflong standing] from'Piotrkov and;other
such witnesses. (‘People on whose judgment and discernment
one could rely,’ E. Dobkin was later to say.)
Dobkin summarized his findings in an address to the
Histadrut Executive on 25, November 1942; similar reports were
delivered to the leading bodies ofthe Jewish Agency and Mapai
- the Labour Party. How to reply to the question asked by so
many: was it true? Could it be believed?
As I was sitting in Athlit and listened to the stories of tens of women it
became clear to me, that however great the sorrow, there remained no
doubt and we have to accept it. Perhaps we sinned when we did not
believe the first news which came via Geneva and Istanbul two months
ago.
What emerged from these accounts was firstly that a German
government commission had been set up earlier that summer
(Sonder- or Vernichtungskommission) under ä certain commissar
Feu or Foy to destroy Polish Jewry. (This information was, in
fact, wrong or at the very least inaccurate. There was no ‘special
Committee’, a regular department had been instituted in the
Main State Security Office several years earlier.) ‘Operation
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
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192 The Terrible Secret
Reinhard’, in honour of the late Reinhard Heydrich who had
been shot in Prague, was to exterminate Polish Jewry; it was
under the command of Odilo Globocnik. Paradoxically, these
‚inaccurate details had a greater impact on the Jewish leadership
and public than the previous, more accurate reports. So far they
had always thought in terms of pogroms rather than systematic
destruction. But if a special commission had been appointed,
this of course shed new light on the character and the purpose of
the persecutions.
Furthermore, Dobkin continued, the majority of Polish Jewry
had already been deported or was about to be deported.
Among those who had arrived there was no one from Warsaw,
the biggest ghetto, but they had met in (Polish) Upper Silesia
some Jews who had escaped from Warsaw and who told them
that only 40,000 Jews remained in the capital. (There were, in
fact, still 60-70,000.) Of 40,000 Jews in Czestochova only 2,000
were still there; of 20,000 in Piotrkov only 2,600; of 30,000 in
Kielce, 1,500. There was a general picture of murder and ruin.
They had not been able to extract from those interviewed
information about the fate of those who had been deported.
They had been sent in an ‘unknown direction’ and therewas no
news from them, no letters, no personal regards conveyed,.
What did it all mean? There were various rumours in Poland
and they were apparently correct: some big concrete structures
had been put up near the Russian-Polish border in which the
victims were killed by poison gas and burnedi(This'referred
apparently to Sobibor which was near the Russian border.) On
the other hand, a woman from Oswiecim (Auschwitz) had told
a story about three stoves for burning,Jews which had been put
up in a camp near that city.*
Abowe all, there was the systematic murder of children and
elderly people. Dobkin said that he would'never forget the story
ofan eight-year-old boy who had been hiding with his five-year-
old sister in the house when the police came to collect them. He
had warned the little gir! not to cry, but overcome by fear, she
*There were no Jews in the city of Auschwitz; the witness was in facı from ncarby
Sosnowiec. She said that two more chimneys were now built. From time to time Jews
from che neighbourhood were brought to he camps. Tamzit Yediot eıc, Part one, 20
November ı942 The Information Department of the Jewish Agency circulated
immediately after the Achfit visit fairly detailed summaries of the evidence given by
individual witnesses. Other new arrivals mentioned Belzec and Treblinka.
World Jewry: From Geneva to Atklüt 193
had cried, was found and taken away - one story out of
hundreds of thousands.
What also emerged from these accounts was that the
campaign of destruction had equally affected other countries —
Germany-and Austria, Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Holland. No
country under Nazi rule had been spared. In all of Germany
only 28,000 Jews were now left (the actual number was nearer
50,000} and there were even less in Austria.
The representatives of Palestine Jewry who listened to the
speech and who were reading the evidence that had been
submitted to them were, ofcourse, profoundiy shocked. Cracow
- no Jews left. Siedlec-no Jews left. Mislovice- a hundred Jews
left. These had been major Jewish communities, how could they
possibly have disappeared? They had read ali this before but so
far they had regarded it as mere rumours. But it was one thing to
reject the impersonal news in the newspaper or radio based
perhaps on doubitful informants. It was impossible not to accept
the personal evidence of witness after witness: ‘I left Palestine in
June 1939 to visit my old parents in Cracow. ...’
Witness after witness appeared: the resident of Tel Aviv who
had lived through the destruction of the Piotrkov community, '
the woman born in Petah Tiqva who returned from Holland. It
is more than likely that the information from Geneva would
have had a cumulative effect sooner or later in any case. Thhe fact
that the news from Geneva was confirmed, albeit reluctantiy
and with some delay, by the Allied governments was of great
importance. But as far as the consciousness of Palestinian Jewry
was concerned the arrival of the group of'the sixty-nine was the
turning point.
Those listening to the reports and reading the evidence were
asking themselves, as David Remes did: “Is it possible that such
authentic news did not reach America? I heard from Ben
Gurion that they had heard the shocking news even before we
did... Dobkin:
The news reached us and America via Geneva. But from the way
People reacted here I can well imagine how they reacted over there.
hen we got the information many could not believe in its
authenticity. Ben Gurion says that in America they thought that this
was one of the methods of atrocity (Greuel) propaganda. We have now
to make American Jewry understand that the information is indeed
Correct.?®
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
194 The Terrible Secret
There was great pressure for acting immediately: As one ofthe
participants (M. Erem) said: "Three days have already passed.’
Three days!
On 22 November 1942 the Jewish Agency executive
published an announcement according to which news had been
received from ‘authoritative and reliable sources’ that the Nazis
had started a systematic extermination campaign in Poland.
During a two-day period from 30 November to ı December
expression was to be given to the feeling ofthe community and
the conscience of the world was to be alarmed. There were
demonstrations, meetings, speeches, and the newspapers
appeared with a black frame all over the first page. Emergency
and rescue committees were set up, emissaries were,sent to
Istanbul and other places trying to reach the Jews in Occhpied
Europe; the idca of sending parachutists was first discussed,5'
But, as the US consul general in Jerusalem wrote in a cable to
Washington, the feeling was one of tragic impotence — what
could Palestinian Jewry possibly do to provide effective help?
From late November 1942 the subjectöftheholocaust was to
preoccupy the Jewish communities in America, in Palestine and
in Britain without interruption. But even now the ful] extent of
the disaster had not altogether registered: Jewish organizations
in America and elsewhere continued to publish declarations
about Jewish life in the ghettos that was going on and about the
continuing proud stand.fthe Jewish masses. Zionists, meluding
leaders of the World Jewish Congress, were absorbed in *post-
. war planning’ and were paying little.more than»ceremonious
attention to what was happening in Europe in stark contrast to
the outeries from Geneva and Istanbul demanding immediate
action to save the remnants.?2
In later ycars Dr Riegner noted how much he and his
colleagues in Geneva had been bewildered by theinability ofthe
Jewish leadership abroad to understand both the extent and the
speed ofthe destruction. They talked about two million victims
when in fact four million had already died. The director ofthe
Institute of Jewish Affairs in New York (J. Robinson) published
a study with figures which were altogether inexact and which
also appeared in the European press. The New York Rescue
Committee (headed by Professor A. Tartakower) sent lists of
thousands of Polish Jews to whom Parcels should be dispatched;
World Jewry: From Geneva to Athlit 195
they seerned not to accept that neither the people nor the
addresses any longer existed.
We fin Geneva} had the impression that they no longer understood
what happened. Their attitude can be explained by optimism
and the incapacity to accept the worst. For us this was simply
incomprehensible.*?
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
PrPTEcE RpERREe
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CONCLUSION
THE evidence gathered so far shows that news of the ‘final
solution’ had been received in 1942 all over Europe, even
though all the details were not known. Ifso, why were the signals
so frequently misunderstood and the message rejected?
1. The fact that Hitler had given an explicit order to kill all
Jews was not known for along time. His decision was taken soon
after he had made up his mind to invade Russia. Victor Brack,
who worked at the time in Hitler’s Chancellery, said in evidence
at Nuremberg that it was no secret in higher party circles by
March 1941 that the Jews were to be exterminated. But ‘higher
party circles’ may have meant at the time no more thannadozen
people. In March 1941, even Eichmann did not know, for the
preparations for the deportations and the camps had not yet
been made. First instructions to this effect were given in
Goering’s letter to Heydrich of gıJuly 1941. The fact thatan
order had been given by Hitler became known outside Germany
only in July 1942 and even then in a distorted form: Hitler (it
was then claimed) had ordered that no Jew should.be left in
Germany by theend of 1942. But there is noevidence thatsuch a
time limit had ever been set. It would not have been difficult, for
instance, to deport all Jews from Berlin in 1942, but in fact the
city was declared empty of Jews by Goebbels only in August
1943. Witnesses claimed to have seen the order, but it isdoubtful
whether there ever was a written order. This has given rise to
endless speculation and inspired a whole “revisionist’ literature —
quite needlessly, because Hitler, whatever his other vices, was
not a bureaucrat. He was not in the habit of giving written
orders on aH occasions: there were no written orders for the
murderous ‘purge’ of June 1934, for the killing ofgypsies, the so-
called euthanasia action (T4) and on other such occasions. The
/| more abominable the crime, the less likely that there would
! be a written “Führer order’. If Himmler, Heydrich or even
Conclusion 197
Eichmann said that there was such an order, no one would
question or insist on sceing it.
2. The order had practical consequences, it affected the lives
or, to be precise, the deaths of millions of people. For this reason
details about the ‘final solution’ seeped out virtually as soon as
the mass slaughter started.
The systematic massacres of the Einsatzgruppen ın Eastern
Galicia, White Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltic countries
became known in Germany almost immediately. True, the‘
scene of the slaughter was distant and it took place in territories
in which at the time civilians and foreigners were not freely
permitted to travel. Butmany thousands of German officers and
soldiers witnessed these scenes and later reported them and the
same is true of-Italian, Hungarian and Romanian military
personnel. The German Foreign Ministry was offlicially
informed about the details ofthe massacres; there was much less
secrecy about the Einsatzgruppen than later on about the
extermination camps. The Soviet Government must have
learned about the massacres within a few days; after several
weeks the news became known in Western capitals t00, well
before the Wannsee Conference. The slaughter at Kiev (Babi
Yar) took place on 29-30 September 1941. Foreign journalists
knew about it within a few days; within less than two months it
had been reported in the Western press. The massacres in
Transniestria became known almost immediately. Chelmno,
the first extermination camp, was opened on 8 December 1941;
the news was received in Warsaw within less than four weeks
and published soon afterwards in the underground press. The
existence and the function of Beizec and Treblinka were known
in Warsaw among Jews and non-Jews within two wecks after the
gas chambers had started operating. The news about the suicide
of Czerniakow, the head ofthe Warsaw udenrat, reached the
Jewish press abroad within a short time. The deportations from
Warsaw were known in London after four days. There were
some exceptions: the true character of Auschwitz did not
become known among Jews and Poles alike for several months
after the camp had been turned into an extermination centre. At
the time in Poland it was believed that there were only two types
ofcamps, labour camps and extermination camps, and the fact
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
ar alu ehin
198 The Terrible Secret
that Auschwitz was a ‘mixed camp’ seems to have bafled many.
3. Ifso much was known so quickly among the Jews of Eastern
Europe and if the information was circulated through illegal
newspapers and by other means — there were wireless sets in all
major ghettos - why was it not believed? In the beginning
Russian and Polish Jewry were genuinely unprepared, and the
reasons have been stated: Soviet Jews had been kept uninformed
about Nazi intentions and practices, Polish Jews believed that
the massacres would be limited to the former Soviet territories.
At first there was the tendency to interpret these events in the
light ofthe past: persecution and pogroms. The Jewish leaders in
Warsaw who learned about events in Lithuania and Latvialin
early 1942 should have realized that these were not ‘pogroms’in
the traditional sense, spontaneous mob actions, nor excesses
committed by local commanders. There are few arbitrary
actions in a totalitarian regime. The Zinsatzgruppen acted
methodically and in cold blood. The majority.of Jewish leaders
in Eastern Europe did not yet realize that this was the beginning
of a systematic campaign ofdestruction. The whole scheme was
beyond human imagination; they thought the Nazisincapable
ofthe murder of millions. Communication between some of the
ghettos was irregular; Lodz ghetto, the second largest, was more
or less isolated, But rumours,on the other hand, still travelled
fast. If the information about the ‘final solution’ had been
believed it would have reached every corner of Pöland within a
few days. But it was not believed and when the ‘deportations’
from Polish ghettos began in March7942 it was still generally
an that the Jews would be transported to places further
ast.
The illegal newspapers and other sources conveyed disquiet-
ing news, and the possibility that many would perish was
mentioned. But the information was contradictory. Most people
did not read the underground press and there were no
certainties. Perhaps the Nazis did after all need a large part of
the Jewish population as a labour force for the war economy;
perhaps the war would soon be over; perhaps a miracie ofsome
sort or another would happen. Rumours are rife in desperate
situations and so is the belief in miracles.
After July 1942 (the deportations from Warsaw) it is more
Conclusion 199
and more difhicult to understand that there still was widespread
confusion about the Nazi designs among Jews in Poland, and
that the rumours were not recognized for what they were -
certainties. Any rational analysis of the situation would have
shown that the Nazi aim was the destruction ofall Jews. But the
psychological.pressures militated against rational analysis and
created an atmosphere in which wishful thinking seemed to ofler
the only antidote to utter despair.
4: Ofall the other Jewish communities only the Slovaks seem
to have realized at an early date some of the dangers facing
them. (So did the Romanians but their position was altogether
different.) Buteven they failed to understand untillate 1943 that
the Nazis aimed at killing all Jews. The other communities
(including German, Dutch, Danish, French, Greek Jews, etc.)
seem torhave lived in near ignorance almost to the very end.
These communities were isolated, the means of information at
their disposal limited. But with all this, most Jews in Europe,
and many non-Jews, had at the very least heard rumours about
some horrible events in Eastern Europe and some had heard
more than rumours. These rumours reached them in dozens of
different ways. But they were either not believed or it was
assumed that ‘it cannot happen here’. Only a relatively smail
minority tried to hide or to escape, aware that deportation
meant death. Nazi disinformation contributed to the confusion
among the Jews. But the Nazi lies were usually quite threadbare
and they cannot be considered the main source of the
disorientation.
5. Jewish leaders and the public abroad (Britain, America
and Palestine) found it exceedingly difficult in their great
majority to accept the ample evidence about the “final solution’
and did so only with considerable delay. They too thought in
Categories of persecution and pogroms at a time when a clear
Pattern had already emerged which pointed in a different
direction. It wasa failure ofintelligence and imagination caused
on one hand by a misjudgment of the murderous nature of
azism, and on the other hand by a false optimism. Other
factors may have played a certain role: the feeling ofimpotence
(‘we can do very little, so let us hope for the best’), the military:
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
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200 The Terrible Secret
dangers facing the Jewish community in Palestine in 1942. Ifthe
evidence was played down by many Jewish leaders and the
Jewish press, it was not out ofthe desire to keep the community
in a state ofignorance, but because there were genuine doubts.
As the worst fears were confirmed, there was confusion among
the leaders as to what course of action to choose. This was true
especially in the US and caused further delay in making the
news public. In Jerusalem the turning point came with the
arrival of a group of Palestinian citizens who had been
repatriated from Europe in November 1942. The leaders of the
Jewish Agency, who had been unwilling to accept the written
evidence gathered by experienced observers, were ready to
believe the accounts delivered by chance arrivals in face-to-face
meetings.
6. The Polish underground played a pivotal role in the
transmission of the news to the West. It had a fairly good
intelligence-gathering network and also the meanstocconvey the
information abroad through short-wave radio and couriers,
Most ofthe information about the Nazi policy ofextermination
reached Jewish circles abroad through the Polish underground.
The Poles had few illusions about the intentions ofthe Nazisand
their reports gave an unvarnished picture ofthesituation. They
have been accused of playing down the Jewish catastrophe in
order not to distract world opinion from the suffering of the
Polish ‘people, and of having temporarily discontinued the
transmission to the West of news about thekilling of the Jews.
The Polish underground, needless_to'say, was mainly pre-
occupied with the fate of the Polish people, not with that ofa
minority. But it did not, on the whole, suppress the news about
the mass killings in its bulletins and the information transmitted
abroad. There was one exception - the/period_in late July,
August and early September 1942 {the deportations from
Warsaw), when the London Government-in-exile, either on its
own initiative or following the advice of the British Foreign
Office, did not immediately publicize the news received from
Warsaw. The evidence is conflicting: the information was
certainly played down for some time but there was no total
blackout. There was delay in London but no more than the
delay among the Jewish leaders who also disbelieved the
=
$
Conclusion 201
information when they first received it. It cannot be proved
whether or not the London Polish Government-in-exile did
show the members of the National Council all the material
received. But Zygielbojm and Schwarzbart certainly had access
to allessentialinformation. The Polish Government was the first
toalarm the Alliedgovernments and world public opinion but it
was accused of exaggeration, as were the Jews at a later date.
From this time up to theend of the war the number of victims
given in the ofhcial declarations of the Allied governments was
consistently too low. Even after it had been accepted in London
and Washington that the information about the mass slaughter
was correct, the British and Us governments showed much
concern that it should not be given t00 much publicity.
7. Millions of Germans knew by late 1942 that the Jews had
disappeared. Rumours about their fate reached Germany
mainly through officers and soldiers returning from the eastern
front but also through other channels. There were clear
indications in the wartime speeches of the Nazi leaders that
something more drastic than resettlement had happened.
Knowledge about the exact manner in which they had been
killed was restricted to a very few. It is, in fact, quite likely that
while many Germans thought that the Jews were no longer
alive, they did not necessarily believe that they were dead. Such
belief, needless to say, is logically inconsistent, but a great many
logical inconsistencies are accepted in wartime. Very few people
had an interest in the fate ofthe Jews. Most individuals faced a
great many more important problems. It was an unpleasant
topic, speculations were unprofitable, discussions of the fate of
the Jews were discouraged. Consideration of this question was
pushed aside, blotted out for the duration.
8. Neutrals and international organizations such as the
Vatican and the Red Cross knew the truth at an early stage. Not
Perhaps the whole truth, but enough to understand that few, if
any, Jews would survive the war. The Vatican had an
unrivalled net of informants all over Europe. It tried to
intervene on some occasions on behalf of the Jews but had no
wish to give publicity to the issue. For this would have exposed it
10 German attacks on one hand and pressure to do more from
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202
The Terrible Secret
the Jews and the Allies. Jews, after all, were not Catholics. In
normal times their persecution would have evoked expressions
ofgenuine regret. But these were not normal times and since the
Holy See could do little- or thought it could do little - even for
the faithful Poles, it thought it could do even less for the Jews.
This fear ofthe consequences of helping the Jews influenced its
whole policy. The position ofthe International Red Cross was,
broadiy speaking, similar. It had, of course, fewer sources of
information than the Catholic Church and less influence. But it
also magnified its own weakness. It was less exposed, in fact, to
retaliatory action than it thought, and while its protests might
well have been to no avail, it could have made known directly
and indirectly the facts it knew. Some of its directors did.so,
The neutral governments received much informationlabout
the “final solution’ through many channels. There was no
censorship in Sweden (except self-censorship) and in 1942 Swiss
press censorship did not prevent publication of news about the
fate of the Jews. Not all Swiss newspapers showed an equal
measure of understanding and compassion, andıthe Swedish
press had instructions not to report ‘atrocities’, but their readers
could have had few doubts about the true state ofaffairs by late
1942.
9. Neither the United States Government, nor Britain, nor
Stalin showed any pronounced interest in the fate of the Jews.
They were kept informed through Jewish organizations and
through their own channels. From an early date the Soviet press
published much generalinformationabout Nazi atrocities in the
occupied areas but only rarelyırevealed that Jews were singled
out for extermination. To thisday the Soviet Communist Party
line has not changed in this respect: it has not admitted that any
mistakes were made, that the Jewish population was quite
unprepared for the Einsatzgruppen Ät isnotrconceded even now
that if specific warnings had been given by the Soviet media in
1941 (which were informed about events behind the German
lines} lives might have been saved. As far as the Soviet
publications are concerned the Government and the
Communist Party acted correctly — Soviet citizens of Jewish
origin did not fare differently from the rest under Nazi rule, and
if they did, it is thought inadvisable to mention this. The only
Se
Conelusion 203
mildly critical voices that have been heard can be found in a few
literary works describing the events of 1941-2. Some Western
observers have argued that the (infrequent) early Soviet news
about anti-Jewish massacres committed were sometimes
dismissed as ‘Communist propaganda’ in the West and that for
this reason the Soviet leaders decided no longer to emphasize the
specific anti- Jewish character of the extermination campaign.*
This explanation is not at all convincing because Soviet policy at
home was hardiy influenced by the Catholic Times, and it should
bestressed thatdomestically even less publicity than abroad was
given to the Jewish victims from the very beginning.
In London and Washington the facts about the ‘Analsolution’ -
were known from an early date and reached the chief of
intelligence, thesecretaries offoreign affairs and defence. But the
facts were not considered to be of great interest or importance
and.atleast some ofthe ofhicials either did not believe them, or at
least thought them exaggerated. There was no deliberate
attempt to stop the flow of information on the mass killings
{except for a while on the part of oficials in the State
Department), but mainly lack of interest and disbelief. This
disbelief can be explained against the background of Anglo-
American lack ofknowledge of European affairs in general and
Nazism in particular. Although it was generally accepted that
the Nazis behaved in a less gentlemanly way than the German
armies in 1914-18, the idea of genocide nevertheless seemed far
fetched. Neither the Luftwaffe nor the German navy nor the
Afrika Korps had committed such acts of atrocities, and these
were the only sections ofthe German armed forces which Allied
soldiers encountered prior to 1944. The Gestapo was known
from not very credible B-grade movies. Barbaric fanaticism was
unacceptable to people thinking on pragmatic lines, who
believed that slave labour rather than annihilation was the fate
of the Jews in Europe. The evil nature of Nazism was beyond
their comprehension.
But even if the realities of the “final solution’ had been
accepted in London and Washington the issue would still have
*Thus the (London) Catholic Times on 24 December 1942 - Christmas eve: “It is no
secret that ihe recent wave of propaganda about German atrocities against the Jews was
ussian inspired.’ But such comments were a fairly rareexception. The Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Hinsiey, was one of the first public figures in
Britain to broadcast to Europe in July 1942 about the suflering of the Jews.
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204 The Terrible Secret
figured very low on the scale of Allied priorities. 1942 was a
critical year in the course ofthe war, strategists and bureaucrats
were not to be deflected in the pursuit of victory by considera-
tions not directly connected with the war eflort. Thus t00 much
publicity about the mass murder seemed undesirable, for it was
bound to generate demands to help the Jews and this was
thought to be detrimental to the war effort.* Even in later years
when victory was already assured there was little willingness to
help. Churchill showed more interest in the Jewish tragedy than
Roosevelt and also more compassion but even he was not willing
: to devote much thought to the subject. Public opinion in
Britain, the United States and elsewhere was kept informed
through the press from an early date about the progress of the
“final solution’. But the impact ofthe news was small or at most
shortlived. The fact that millions were killed was more or less
meaningless. People could identify perhaps with the fate of a
single individual or a family but not with the fate of millions.
The statistics of murder were either disbelievedror-dismissed
from consciousness. Hence the surprise and shock at the end of
the war when the reports about a ‘transit camp’ such as Bergen-
Belsen came in: ‘No one had known, no one had been prepared
for this.’
Thus the news about the murder of'many millions of Jews was
not accepted for along time and even when it had been accepted
the full implications were not understood. Among Jews this
*The Office of War Information in the United Statesand the Ministry of Information
in Britain were inclined to soft pedal publieity about the mass murder in 1942-3 for a
variety ofreasons: because the public would not believe it, because it would stir upand-
sernitsm in the West, because iı would not be unpopular in some European countrics,
because it would have a devastating effect on the morale ofthe European resistance, etc.
It was not the only time that atrocities were played down. Thus, though Briush
authorities were welt informed about the fate of the British prisoners after the fall of
Singapore, detailed information about Japanese behaviour was not provided at the time
for fear that this would have a detrimental effect on morale on the British home front. It
remains to be investigated in detail how much information was provided by the BBC and
the American radio stations about the ‘final solution’ for listeners at home and abroad.
Such quantitative analysis in conjunction wich a survey ofthe instructions given to the
radio programme directors by the PwE and the Department of State will probably show
that publicity was given in December 1942 and January 1943 after the United Nations
deelaration about Nazi atrociues. But there was comparatively little throughout 1943:
there may have been weeks, perhaps even months, during which the issue was not
mentioned at all. Only in 1944 it became again a fairly frequent topic.
a PURIEENERIEEPEHUREERSIFL: WERFEIEBENG, CR EHRE ERRIFREN. > v + er, CE e . N % Sa las
|
RAU "Ir ae
Conclusion 205
frequently caused a trauma in later years which in extreme cases
led to the beliefthat every danger facing Jews, individually or as
a group, had to be interpreted in terms ofa new holocaust. Such
a distortion of reality is psychologically understandable, which
does not make it any less dangerous as a potentially disastrous
politicalguideline. The impact among non-Jews has been small.
There have been, after all, many intelligence failures through-
out history. Optimists could still argue that one failure should
not inspire pessimism and strengthen the argument for worst
case analysis. As the long term (1910-50) British diplomat
rightly said, his record as an inveterate optimist has been far
more impressive than that of the professional Cassandras for-
ever harping on the danger of war. He had been wrong only
twice. ...
It has been said that in wartime there are no 'strategic
wärnings’; no unambiguous signals, no absolute certainties. Not
only the signals have to be considered but also the background
noise, the interference, the deception. If even Barbarossa and
Pearl Harbor came as a surprise, despite the fact that the eyes of
the whole world were scanning the horizons for such signals -
and despite the fact that there was much evidence and many
warnings to this effect - is it not natural that European Jewry
was taken unaware?! But there was one fundamental difference:
Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor were surprise attacks, whereas the
“final solution’ proceeded in stages over a long period. Some
have claimed in retrospect that Mein Kampf and Hitler’s
speeches should have dispelled any doubts about the Nazis’
ultimate murderous intentions. But this is wrong. Tihe ‘solution
ofthe Jewish question’ could equally have meant ghettoization
or expulsion to some far-away place such as Madagascar. It was
only after the invasion ofthe Soviet Union that there was reason
to believe that large parts of European Jewry would not survive
the war. At first there were only isolated rumours, then the
rumours thickened and eventually they became certainties. A
moderateiy well informed Jewish resident of Warsaw should
have drawn the correct conclusions by May 1942 and some of
them did. But the time and the place were hardly conducive to
detached, objective analysis; the disintegration of rational
intelligence is one of the recurrent themes of all those who have
written about that period on the basis of inside knowledge.
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206 The Terrible Secret ; Conclusion 207
z Democratic societies demonstrated on this Occasion as on are explanations even for paralysis, but later generations can no
3 many others, before and after, that they are incapable of : longer accept them - hence the abiding mystery. Total
. understanding political ‚Fegimes of a different character. Not | hopelessness (the Psychologists say) results in inaction,; when
2 every modern dictatorship is Hitlerian in character and engages there is no exit, such as in a mine or a submarine disaster, this
E; in genocide but every one has the potential to. do so. Democratic leads to resignation. ;
ä societies are accustomed to think in liberal, pragmatic ‚The reaction 6fDutch or Hungarian Jewscan be compared to
Categories; conflicts are believed to be based on misunderstand- that of people facing)a flood and who in contradiction of all
! ings and can be solved with a minimum = will; ee i experience believe that they will not be affected but are
i IS a temporary aberration, so is irrational behaviour in BIETaN, individually or as a groupiinvulnerable, Some social psycholo-
such as intolerance, eruelty, etc. The effort to overcome such gists will argue that such a denial of a threat betrays a fear of
: basic psychological handicaps is immense. It will be undertaken not being able to cope with it. But if such an explanation was
only in the light of immediate (and painful) experience. Each ’ true forsome it certainly didnot apply toothers. They genuinely
new generation faces this challenge again for experience cannot did not know what was in store for them. Danish Jews were
be in ne enden perfectly able to escapeito Sweden and if they did so only at the
€ reaction of Bast uropean Jewry can only be understo very last moment the reason was that they genuinely believed
out of their specific situation in 1942. But there are situations that they would not be deported. Equaliy, to give another
which cannot be recreated, however sophisticated the tech- example, the Jews living in Rhodes could have fled without
niques of simulation, however great the capacity for empathy difhculty to Turkey and would have done so had they known
and Imagination. Generalizations about human behaviour in their fate in Auschwitz. But they did not know. Other Jewish
the face ofdisaster are oflimited value: each disaster i$ different. commMunities were indeed trapped but their situation was still
Some of those who lived through the catastrophe have tried in „not identical with that of the victims of a mine disaster,
BE later years to find explanations. But while their accounts are of Comparisons are only oflimited help for understanding human
$ ER interest, they a Es aprierireliable Be! ann behaviour in unique situations. In many cases the inactivity of
# tions are rooted in a different situation and this is boun es .
® explana e rooted ih ereni 1 ews, individuals and groups, was not the result of aralysis but
j to lead to a rationalization of irrational behaviour. The “final jew, are a
solution’ proceeded in stages, chronologically and geographi-
cally. This should have acted as a deterrent, but it did’not, on
the whole, have this effect. There were no certäinties, only
rumours, no full picture, only fragments. Was it a case of a
‘people without understanding’, which had eyes and ears but
saw not and heard not? The people saw and heard but what it
perceived was not always clear, and when at last the message
was unambiguous it left no room for hope andwas therefore
unacceptable. It is a syndrome observed by biblical prophets
and modern political leaders alike, that it is natural for man to
indulge in the illusions of hope and to shut his eyes against a
painful truth.
But it is not natural for man to submit passively to a horrible
fate, nottotry to escape, however great the odds against success,
not to Tesist, even if there is no Prospect of victory. True, there
PR run
on the contrary of unwarranted optimism. As Isaac
Schneersohn observed with regard to France: ‘Les juifs &taient
alors divises en deux cat&gories: les pessimistes et les optimistes.
Les premiereschercherent ä gagner les Etats Unis, la Suisse ou se
Camouflerent comme ils purent. Les seconds, caressant de
chimeriques espoirs, devinrent par la suite les principaux
Candidates aux voyages ä Auschwitz et Treblinka.’*
One ofthe questions initially asked was whether it would have
made any difference if the information about the mass murder
had been believed right from the beginning. It seems quite likely
that relatively few people might have been saved as a result and
even this is not absolutely certain. But this is hardiy the right
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208 The Terrible Secret
way of posing the question, for the misjudgment of Hitler and
Nazism did not begin in June 1941 nor did it end in December
1942. The ideal time to stop Hitler was not when he was at the
height of his strength. If the democracies had shown greater
foresight, solidarity and resolution, Nazism could have been
stopped at the beginning of its campaign of aggression. No
power could have saved the majority of the Jews of the Reich
and of Eastern Europe in the summer of 1942. Some more would
have tried to escape their fate ifthe information had been made
widely known. Some could have been saved if Hitler’s satellites
had been threatened and if the peoples of Europe had been
called to extend help to the Jews. After the winter of 1942 the
situation rapidly changed: the satellite leaders and even some of
the German officials were no longer eager to be accessories to
mass murder. Some, at least, would have responded to Allied
pressure, but such pressure was never exerted. Many Jews could
certainly have been saved in 1944 by bombing the railway lines
leading to the extermination centres, and of coursezthe centres
themselves. This could have been done without deflecting any
major resources from the general war eflort. It has been argued
that the Jews could not have escaped in any case but thisisinot
correct: the Russians were no longer far away, the German
forces in Poland were concentrated insome of thebigger towns,
and even there their sway ran onlyin daytime - they nolonger
had the manpower to round/up escaped Jews. In short,
hundreds of thousands could have been saved. Büt.this
discussion belongs to a later period. The failureitoread correctly
_ thesigns in 1941-2 was only onelinkin a.chain offailures. There
" was not one reason for this overall failure but many different
ones: paralyzing fear on one hand and, on the contrary, reckless
optimism on the other; disbelief stemming from a lack of
experience or imagination or genuine ignoränce or a mixture of
some or all of these things. In some cases the motives were
creditable, in others damnable. In some instances moral
categories are simply not applicable, and there were also cases
which dely understanding to this day.
|
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 THE ABWEHR CONNECTION
Was information about the “final solution’ passed on by German
military intelligence to Allied and Jewish circles during the war?
Certain claims have been made that there were such signals but
memories are fallible and many relevant Abwehr (military
intelligence) records have been destroyed or are not in.the West
and are therefore inaccessible.
If-Canaris was atall interested in the fate of the Jews, about
which he was, ofcourse, kept informed and informed others, he
did not do much to help them. The case ofthe second-ranking
man in the organization, Hans Oster, was different. Born in
1888, the son ofa Protestant churchman, he fought in the First
World War and later joined the Reichswehr. A staunch
conservative, he was an early opponent of Hitler whom he
regarded as the ‘destroyer of Germany’. The war was ‘madness’;
on several occasions he passed on to the Allies warnıngs of
impending Nazi attacks. He was head of Department 2 of the
Abwehr which dealt with finance and administrative questions
and kept the central list of agents. Together with a younger
friend, von Dohnanyi (who also hailed from a leading
Protestant family - Bonhoeffer was his cousin), Oster made it his
business to deal with all kinds of operations unconnected with
their immediate.tasks, Hans von Dohnanyi, it should be noted in
passing, was partly of Jewish descent. He was ‘Aryanized’
according to a special order issued by Hitler but while he could
serve in key positions in various ministries and eventually in the
Abwehr he was not permitted to join the Nazi Party.
Oster’sdepartment should not have employed outside agents,
but in fact it did and helped get individual Jews out ofGermany
(to Switzerland) and out ofHolland (to Spain) during the war.*
"This refers to what became known as operation U7, the private rescue Operation
undertaken by Admiral Canaris to get two of his personal friends, Conzen and
Rennefeld, out of Berlin to Switzerland together with their families. These seven non-
an Protestants (they were Jews only according 10 ihe Nuremberg laws) were joined
by eight others who had been recommended by Protestant churchmen. it is not known
bi
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210 The Terrible Secret
They were hired ostensibly to spy for the Abwehr in some minor
capacity, but were told privately that they were not expected to
engage in intelligence activities. One ofthe “front organizationg’
founded under the protection of Oster by Colonel Marogna-
Redwitz (another conservative opponent of Hitler) was a
business enterprise called Monopol in Prague. Its main task was
apparently to transfer money from frozen bank accounts in
neutral countries to Germany in order to finance Abwehr
activities. Several Jews were employed in this firm; they had
served as officers in the German or Austrian army during the
First World War and their erstwhile comrades tried to heip
them. According to the son ofone ofthe employees of Monopol,
Alfred Ziehrer, his father who was based in Prague used to visit
Istanbul about once every three months - the last time
apparently in 1943. Another Czech Jew, Dr Reimann, who
joined him on his mission, did not return to Germany; Ziehrer
did and met his death in Auschwitz. According to the son’s
evidence, his assignment was to transmit information to the
British “among other things about the fate of the Jews’.* Ziehrer,
according to the son, was perlectly aware ofthe ‘final solution’.
Oster and von Dohnanyi were arrested in 1944 and executed in
connection with their participation in the plot against Hitler.
The fact that Oster did extend help to Jewsand that he warned
the Allies has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The
discovery (by the ss) that Oster and von Dohnanyi had not only
helped to smuggle Jews abroad but had also sent them money
caused Öster’s dismissal from the Abtwehr in 1943. There is good
reason to believe that these curious hostages of fate did meet
Jewish emissaries in Istanbul. It cannof be demonstrated at
present whether they did pass on eredible information on the
fate of the Jews and whether their stories were believed.
Historians, for one reason or another, have not yet dealt with
this episode and the survivors have not been eager to talk.
Even a bona ide German abroad trying to sound the alarm was
bound to encounter at least some distrust and not without
reason; for whose bora fide was certain? Again one illustration
a a ee nen
whether members ofihis group passed on information about the fate of. the, Jews in Nazi-
occupied Europe though it can be taken for granted that they did talk to the Word
Council of Churches in Geneva. An Abwehr officer in Holland also helped to save a few
Jews by sending them as "agenis’ to Switzerland.
u na
Appendices 211
will have to suffice: Ernst Lemmer had been one ofthe founder
members of the liberal German Democratic Party in 1918 and
represented it in the Reichstag from 1924-33. During the Hitler
era he worked for foreign newspapers in Berlin. There is no
reason to believe that deep down in his heart Lemmer ever
accepted the Nazi ideology. But he certainly served his Nazi
masters to the best ofhis abilities. As a former democrat he was
eminently suited to stress in his many articles for publication
abroad the moderate character and the positive achievements of
Nazism. (Lemmer worked for the German-language Hungarian
daily Pester Lloyd and the Brussels Ze Soir after the occupation of
Belgium, as well as temporarily for some Swiss newspapers.) His
writings ofthese years make em barrassing reading and the East
Germans were not slow to publish selections in the 19605.° They
have not so far published the articles ofthe great Richard Sorge,
whorepresented-Soviet intelligence in Japan under the cover of
a German journalist.
Lemmer certainly played a double game. On one hand he
would glorify German victories in Russia, on the other hand I
haveit on the authority ofa travelling companion that during a
{our Conducted by the Ministry of Propaganda to the eastern
front in late 1941, at an advanced hour and in a state of some
drunkenness he would sit down at the piano and play the
Internationale to the consternation of the Nazi dignitaries who
were present. What matters in the presentcontext isthe fact that
Lemmer was one of the first to convey information about the
“final solution’ to Journalists and political acquaintances
abroad. He regularly spent his summer holiday in Switzerland
during the war. In July 1942 he met several Swiss Public figures
in Zürich and told them about gas chambers, stationary and
mobile, in which the Jews were killed. Lemmer repeatediy
Stressed that he found it incomprehensible that the Allies kept
silent and that no attempt was made to alarm world public
Opinion. One of those whom Lemmer met that summer
ae his impressions many years later for my benefit as
ollows:
He doubtless had the intention to inform me, but he was also probably
Euided by other motives. There was an overall strategy behind these
„PProaches: to provoke the Allies to become more strongly committed
R behalf'of the Jews, despite the fact that they were powerless to do
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212 The Terrible Secret
anything about it. German Propaganda would have exploited this to
the maximum: British and American soldiers were fighting and dying
to save the Jews! The Nazis had always believed that if onty they used
the Jewish question as a bone of eontention, they would be able to
undermine the fighting spirit of British and American soldiers. Some
German circles wanted to keep the “final solution’ secret, others, on the
contrary, were interested for a number ofdevious reasons to inform the
Allies.
Whether this interpretation is correct or not, it is certainly
understandable that in 1942 Lemmer was received in
Switzerland with suspicion. As to his real motives there can only
be speculation. Perhaps he acted without ulterior motives,
perhaps he knew that he was ‘used’ but assumed that the
calculation of those using him was wrong, and that/t was
essential to bring the “final solution’ to the notice ofneutrals and
Allies alike - whatever the consequences,
After the war Lemmer re-entered German politics and served
as a minister in the Bonn Government, with short interruptions,
from 1956 to 1965. He died in 1970. In his autobiography there
is no reference to his warnings concerningithe ‘final solution’ nor
to his activities on behalf of the Pester Lloyd. He does say,
however, that it was Nazi policy in the media tosowdistrust and
dissension among the Allies; Hitler’s enemies behaved in the
same way. But Lemmer does not think that neutral cor-
respondents and those from satellite countries were taken in.by
such manipulations.*
Among the wartime visitors to Switzerland who were
sponsored by the Abwehr, Dietrich Bonhoefler and Adam Trott
zu Soltz ought to be mentioned, Bönhoefler was in touch with
the World Council of Churches in Geneva (Visser’t Hooft) and
Trott had excellent contacts with various British and American
diplomats. Bonhoeffer visited Switzerland twicein 194: and
again in 1942; among the information passed on were details
about the persecution of the Jews/ But it is doubtful whether
they told the British and the Americans much they did not know
already, and even the World Council of Churches was kept well
informed by its Swedish co-director (Nils Ehrensträm who
could travel more or less freely in Germany), and by Hanns
Schoenfeld, the German representative on the Council who had
Contacts with the German resistance, as had the German consul
«
ann mann
Appendices 213
in Geneva, Albrecht von Kessel, If even top secret information
could frequently be obtained in Switzerland it is not surprising
that so much was known about a far less sensitive subject such as
the fate of the Jews.
Last!y the case of Artur Sommer, scholar and spy, strange but
in many ways not untypical in the troubled Germany of the
19308. A largeıman with a powerful physique and a booming
voice, Sommer ( 1889-1965) had served with distinction in the
First World War. In the 19205 he began to study economics and
was fascinated by the teachings of Friedrich List, one oftthe few
original thinkers in this field in nineteenth-century Germany.
List was largely ignored during his lifetime, but there was a List
renaissance several decades after his death. Sommer became a
leading figure in the List society, discovered some important
List manuscripts in French archives and worked closely with
Edgar Salin (1892-1974). Salin, who came from a Frankfurt
Jewish family, had taught first in Heidelberg and in 1927 was
appointed to a chair in Basel. They became close friends. One
of the links in their friendship was their admiration for the
poctry of Stefan George; they were members of the outer fringe
Ofthe George circle.
Sommer lived for years outside Germany, first in Switzerland,
laterin England. He Joined the Nazi Party for reasons which are
not entirely clear in 1932 while continuing his studies in
London. It should be recalled that other younger members of
the George circle were also initially very much attracted by
Hitler — the most famous case is that of Colonel Stauffenberg
who tried to kill Hitler in 1944. When, after his return to
Germany, Sommer became more familiar with the rowdy
character of the stormtroopers he was greatly shocked and said
that much in a letter to a friend abroad, which, to his
misfortune, was intercepted by thecensor. Sommer was arrested
and spent some months in a concentration camp. He did not
suffer too much but with this blot on hiscurriculum an academic
Career was no longer possible. Sommer decided to rejoin the
army, rapidly rose to lieutenant-colonel and became one ofthe
»sOn officers between the general staff and the Abwehr. In view
of his economic expertise he was also appointed a member of
„ German delegation to review periodically trade relations
with Switzerland. Beginning September 1940 this took him
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214 The Terrible Secret
frequently to Switzerland and he re-estoblished contact with his
old friend and mentor, Salin.°
Salin reports that his friend told him in February 1941 about
the growing strains in German-Soviet relations and later about
the impending attack against Russia. Swiss political police
seems to have been well informed about the identity of Salin’s
visitor and came to interrogate him. In September or October
1941 Sommer sent Salin pictures showing Nazi atrocities in
Eastern Europe with the request to pass these on to the papal
nuncio in Bern, which Salin did - without any success, however.
In 1942 Salin found in his post box a letter to the effect that
extermination camps were prepared in Eastern Europe to kill by
poison gas all European Jews and also most Soviet Prisoners of
war. Sommer requested that this information should be directly
transmitted to Churchill and Roosevelt and also suggested that
the BBC should transmit daily warnings.
Salin relates that he did not know how toreach Churchill, but
he got in touch with Thomas McKittrick, the American
president ofthe Bank for International Settlement in Basel, who
knew Leland Harrison, the American minister in Bern who in
turn was in a position to convey messages directly to the White
House. The information was alleged!y passed on to Washington
but again there was no response, and'to quote Salin “when the
Allied troops uncovered’some of the camps in 1945 it, was
pretended that no one'had any inkling. .. .
Sommer also tried to help to get a few. Jewisiyacquaintances
out of Germany in the middle of the war; among them was
a relative of Ernst Kantorowicz,) the well-known medievalist
and also a member of the George circle. After the war Sommer
resumed his academie career and this time with’more success.
He was offered a position at Heidelberg, his leetures were well
attended, he was known as ansexcellentteacher and was
requested to continue as a guest lecturer even after having
reached retiring age. He died in 1963.
APPENDIX 2. PRESS COMMENTS ON THE
HOLOCAUST IN NAZI-OCCUPIED EUROPE
How much was known in London and Geneva, in Washington
and Stockholm, about thefäte of European Jewry on the basis of
Apbendices 215
ncwspaper reports? Details about the technique of extermi-
nation were not published in 1942-3 and there was relatively
little about deportations in the German press inside the Reich,
in France, Belgium and Holland.* Some of the truth would
nevertheless emerge on occasion. Thus the German Official
Gazette, the Reichsanzeiger announced on 12 April 1943 that Mr
Kurt Teichmann of Beuthen, Bismarckstrasse 33, was divorcing
his wife Ruth Sara Teichmann because she had been evacuated
in June 1942 “and that she is not expected ever to return”. (‘By
order of the iocal court’.)
Some information eame from neutral correspondents in
Germany who, incidentally, did not have to submit their cables
to the censor. They knew, ofcourse, that they would be expelied
if their coverage were hostile or if they dealt with ‘sensitive
topics’, But there was also a steady stream of information from
newspapers published in the occupied countries. Many ofthese
were available in Stockholm, Zürich or Lisbon; others - this
tefers mainly to small regional Papers - should not have been
sent abroad, but were received anyway and were read by the
Allies and the Allied Governments-in-exile.
Slovak Jewry was the first to be deported to Poland in spring
1942; this was known almost immediately to the Swedish
correspondents in Berlin, who noted that the Germans would
continue to deport the Jews despite the fact that they badly
needed the locomotives and rolling stock for the coming spring
offensive. From late March 1942 hardly a day passed without
some news about the deportation in the German-language
Grenzbote and the Slovak Gardista, both published in Bratislava.
n 2 April 1942, Gardista said that foreign intervention on
behalf of the Jews would be quite useless, and it engaged for a
long time in polemics against certain circles wanting to protect
the Jews ‘by using false Christian arguments’, From these
®xchanges it appeared that both sides had a fairly accurate idea
of the fate of the Jews in Poland. Thus Evanjelicky Posol
(Bratislava) had written that what wasdone to the Jews was not
ın conformance with the Principles of humanity let alone
Christianity. The Catholic church papers (Katolicke Noviny and
% . . * * *
PERS aha editors received instructions in February 1942 not to report on ihe ‘Jewish
on’ in
Eastern Europe, not even to reprint official communigques frorn newspapers
Published in the occupied territories (Zatschriftendienst, 27 February 1942) u
.
Stiftelse
EA m
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216 The Terrible Secret
others) were ambiguous; sometimes they would argue that the
‚Jews were, after all, human beings, at other times the Impression
would be created that the church was not in principle against
* deportation, provided that those who had been converted were
not affected.” Gardisie and other Slovak papers provided
accurate figures fairly regularly about the number of Jews
deported.
Another important source for the fate of Jews in south-east
Europe was the Donauzeitung published in Belgrade which
covered Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Readers
of the Donauzeitung, accustomed to reading between the lines,
would know what had happened to the Jews. Thus, on one
occasion, commenting on a report that the Yugoslav
Government-in-exile in London had revoked all pre- 1941 anti-
Jewish laws, Donauzeitung announced that certain faits accomplis
had been created which no one could undo. The German-
language paper in Prague (Neue Tag), as well as the Czech
papers (such as Ceske Slove), also contained frequent and detailed
information about the disappearance ofthe JewsIn West
European newspapers such information was much rarer but it
could also be found. Thus, a Dutch newspaper announced that
the deportation was proceeding so quickly that not a single Jew
would be left in Holland by June 1943.® Among the German-
language papers in Eastern Europe Deutsche Zeitung in Ostland
(Riga) was the most informative both with regard to its denials
and its information regarding the liquidation ofcertain ghettos.
In some of Germany’s client states there'were open or hardly-
veiled discussions about Germany’s;Jewish policy. The ‚Finns
showed their disagreement in many ways. Thus the Finnish
radio would announce that according to a report from Berlin
{sie} Cardinal Hinsley had made a speech in London stating
that 700,000 Jews had been executed, The Pope, according to
this account, believed that this was alcorrectreport, whercas the
Germans emphatically denied it. But the Germans had not
reported the Hinsley speech in the first place and had certainly
not added that the Pope had endorsed it. There was open
eriticism of the Nazi treatment of the Jews not only by Finnish
Social Democrats such as Fagerholm but even by pro-Germans
such as Professor Eino Kalla, a philosopher, who wrote that the
Nazis could not claim that they were defending European
Appendices 217
civilization if they committed actions which violated the very
foundations of this assertion.?
A few more examples from a short period November-
December 1942 show the extent of knowledge that could
be gained from reading the press. A small Swedish paper,
Vestmansland-Tidningen, reported on 27 November 1942 that the
whole General Government would be free of Jews by the end of
the month. Dagens Nyheter on 2ı December carried the
impression ofa Swedish businessman, who had been to Warsaw
and Bialystok, according to whom the Jewish population had
been decimated. Volk en Vaderland (Rotterdam) announced on
13 November 1942 that anti-Jewish demonstrations would soon
no longer be possible because there would be no Jews. Gardista of
Bratislava reported on 22 November that there had been a high
level meeting in Slovakia on the ‘final solution’; on 6 December
the same paper announced that a local priest had been arrested
who had forged certificates in order to save Jews. Transocean
announced on 7 January 1943 that 77 per cent ofall Slovak Jews
had been deported. Leipziger Nachrichten of 14 November 1942
wrote that of the 60,000 Jews who had once lived in Cernauti,
only 12,000 remained; the Abend (Prague) carried a news itern
according to which no Jews were left in the town of Nachod.
Czech-language papers had similar reports about other cities.
Donauzeitung (Belgrade, 10 December 1942) reported that in the
Romanian city ofBacau the Jewish school had been closed and
taken over by the authorities; Kauener Zeitung (Kovno, 16
December) said that allthe former Jewish property in Lithuania
was to be registered.
The pattern that emerges is unmistakable - the disappear-
ance of the Jews.* True, there was also a certain amount of
disinformation: the officially sponsored visit to Auschwitz by
Fritz Fiala, a Nazi correspondent, is mentioned elsewhere in the
Present study (see pages 152-3). But there was misleading
information also in quasi-scholarly journals. Thus Ostland, a
Periodical which came out twice monthly, featured in its
'ssues of 15 November and ı December 1942 articles on the
*Reference is made only to newspapers and periodicals which actually reached the
nice and were quoted in the daily Maus Digest of che Ministry of Information in
adon. This Publication was made available t0 editors and Commentators on foreign
cluded material not to be attributed to its source.
“fasrs: it in
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
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218 The Terrible Secret
“conclusion of the resettlement of the Jews’ which contained
many figures, all ofthern quite wrong. According to the article
which appeared on 15 November there were 480,000 Jews in the
Warsaw ghetto, but in fact almost go per cent ofthem had been
killed in the previous four months. The figure given for Warsaw
and Lublin districts (800,000) was equally untrue. On ı
December there was a full list of fifty-hive ‘Jewish dwelling
places’, complete with the present number of inhabitants, most
of which no longer existed. Was it a genuine mistake? This is
hardly likely, for Ostland had on previous occasions commented
on the ‘extermination’ and ‘removal’ ofthe Polish Jews and even
ofthe ‘extirpation ofthe Jewish ulcer’” (1 August 1942). Readers
of the German daily press were treated to explicit statements
like: “We have largely broken and destroyed the racial’core.of
the Jewish power of darkness. For generations to come nö
stream of parasites will pour forth from the Jewish quarters of
the East into Western Europe.’!? Such a staternent was open to
only one interpretation.
When the joint declaration of the AlliesOn themurder ofthe
Jews was published in December 1942, the German press
following Goebbels’ directives immediately counterattacked
without, however, denying in any way the substänce of the
charges. Transocean (17 December). said that the. Allied
governments depended on.the political wishes of Jewry'to an
exceptionally large extent and that there had been demon-
strations against the Allies in Persia. The diplomatic cor-
respondent of DNB, the official news agehicy, maifitained that
Eden’s declaration was nothing but a bit of typical British-
Jewish atrocity propagandas ‘People who could spare no word
ofpity and conderrination when in September 1939 over 60,000
Germans in Poland were slaughtered in the cruellest fashion -
men, women and children — have no right 10 speak about
humanity, for they are obviously strangersito it.’ The European
people knew that the declaration wasa tendentious manoeuvre
(18 December).
Only a few months later the German press reported that the
Warsaw ghetto had been destroyed. Donauzeitung of 23 March
1943 announced that the ‘dissolution’ of the Jewish quarter in
Warsaw had made ‘extraordinary measures necessary in order
to make the streets and houses again habitable, for their state
Som Anheben m nn as ran nun aan
reines are ln nn ti tina ann nenn
Appendices 219
defied all description”. Meanwhile the Scandinavian Press
reported the destruction of the ghettos of Riga and Minsk and
the fact that they were disinfected to absorb 150,000 Germans
evacuated from Germany. In Lwow, according to these SOUTCES,
7,000 Jews out of 160,000 had remained, the rest had been
killed." All of which tends to show that the basic facts about the
destruetion of European Jewry were reported by the press well
before the end of the war nn aa:
APPENDIX 3. THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE
AND THE NEWS FROM POLAND:
JULY-DECEMBER 1942
In August 1942 Dr Riegner’s cable from Geneva was received in
London reporting that Hitler had given the order to kill all
European Jews. F oreign Office comment was sceptical. It was
not doubted that Jews were brutally treated but the information
On mass murder was on the whole disbelieved. The scepticism
was particularly pronounced in the comments on the Agudat
Israel cable (received in London on ı1 September 1942)
according to which soap and artificial fertilizers were produced
from bodies.* The Foreign Office said that this information
should be ‘“treated with the greatest reserve’; it reminded the
officials of horror stories about the last war. But the comparisons
with 1914 were not at all helpful for whereas the Belgian babies
had not been bayonetted, the Jews had still been killed even
though their corpses, as it later emerged, were not used for the
German wareflort. D. Allen said this much: ‘As regards the mass
murders we have no precise evidence although it seems likely
that they have taken place on a large scale.’'2
Foreign Office doubıs concerning the news about the ‘final
solution’ had by no means vanished when it was asked in
€ptember 1942 to provide information fora reply to a question
which had been asked in Parliament by a Liberal member,
. Mander: had the Secretary of State any statement to make
with reference 10 the employment by the German Government
w.Ihe Foreign Office received this dispatch on rı Scptember from Lord Halifax in
ashington, who had obtained a copy from ıhe Polish ambassador.
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
220 The Terrible Secret
ofgas to murder a large number of.Jews in Poland in mobile gas
chambers; and if steps would be taken to interview the three
men forced to act as gravediggers who had escaped - with a
view of collecting evidence against the perpetrators of this
outrage?
This referred to the three Jews who had escaped from
Chelmno in early January 1942. The three gravediggers saw a
rabbi in a small nearby town and told him what they had been
forced to do; they then made their way to Warsaw where the
Ringelblum group (Oneg Shabbat) debriefed them. A detailed
account of Chelmno was passed on to both the Jewish illegal
press in Warsaw and the Polish underground. The information
was brought to the West by courier. It was received in London
some time in June and published in American newspapers in
late July. The story also appeared in a small London local
newspaper, the City and East London Observer, from which
Mander or one of his friends had picked it up.
Following this D. Allen asked F. Savery ofthe British Embassy
to Poland {i.e. the Polish Government-in-exile)-to find out
whether there was any truth in this story, Savery had lived' in
Poland for almost twenty years. He had been consul general in
Warsaw, he was well known in Polish and Jewish circles, and his
Polish was excellent. Savery reportedıback very quickiy. Hehad
discussed this with the Polish Ministry of Information. The story
had been included in one of the periodical reports which. the
Polish Ministry of the Interior had received _from its agents
inside Poland. According to Saveryrthe Polishuofficial with
whom he had talked had been “frankly sceptical ofthe truth of
the story although he had no real means of checking its
authenticity’. In spite ofhisdoubts which, according to Savery,
may not have been shared by other members of the Polish
Government, the story was released to the Polish Social
Information Bureau, an unofficial organization largely run by
Polish Socialists. Savery thought that the release was probably
“attributable to the pressure of Jewish interest in the Polish
National Council’. As for the three gravediggers, Savery had
ascertained that they were still in Poland and there was
therefore no question of getting in touch with them.
The Poles had also told Savery that any reply in the House of
Commons involved risks. The Polish Government’s channel
A en nn er
erh ker
En
Appbendices 221
with Poland might be endangered; doubts might be cast on the
veracity of the Polish Government’s sources of information.
Lastly “undue publicity in the House might involve further
suffering for the Poles, in particular for the three gravediggers
and would oniy lead the Germans to be even more ruthless in
order to ensure that on future occasions there should be no such
survivors to tell the tale.’ Some ofthe arguments were so illogical
that it must be asked whether they were not misquoted in
transmission: how could ‘undue publicity’ possibly harm the
three gravediggers? They were on the run, and, on the other
hand, the story had already been published in the press. Ifthey
had succeeded in escaping, it was not because the Germans had
somehow fatilitated their flight.
Savery then consulted Sir Cecil Dormer, the British am-
bassador to the Polish Government-in-exile, and they both
decided that the best possible course would be to ask Mr
Mander to withdraw his question on ‘humanitarian grounds’.
Otherwise the Government would have to give a ‘very guarded
reply’: It had no means of confirming it."?
The reaction of the British Government raises a number of
question marks, Nine months had passed since the escape ofthe
three gravediggers. There had been many other reports from
Polish and Jewish sources about mass extermination in all parts
of Poland. The information about the use of poison gas had
figured not only in clandestine reports from Poland and Russia,
but also in the press. If some Polish officials had doubts about
this, others, including the Prime Minister, did not. In fact, the
reasons adduced in favour of persuading Mander to withdraw
his story imply that the account was basically true: the
gravediggers had escaped, many Jews had been killed and if
there were any doubts they concerned the manner in which they
had been murdered. There was, probably for psychological
reasons, particularly strong resistance against accepting that
People were killed by gas, a form of murder thought more
reprehensible (and therefore more unlikely) than any other.
It took three more months to disperse Savery’s doubts. On 3
December 1942 he sent Frank Roberts of the Central
Department of the Foreign Office translations of reports just
received by Mikolajczyk, the Minister of the Interior. This
included very detailed descriptions of the liquidation of the
korgagz
Stiftisen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
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I, gan Zu ee Er M
ee... aha nern Soma in Tr rn aa. —
222 The rble Secret
Warsaw ghetto, the report of a Polish policeman inside the
ghetto, a report on the extermination camp at Belzec (based
obvious!y on Karski’s story, on which more below) as well as the
protest against the mass murder of a group in Poland called
Front Odrozdenia Polski (Front for the Regeneration of Poland).*
Savery drew the attention of the Foreign Oflice to one sentence
in the protest ofthe ‘Front’, concerning the ‘stubborn silence of
international jewry’ and the eflorts of German propaganda to
put the odium for the massacre on Lithuanians and even on
Poles in which they discerned the ‘outlines of an action hostile
towards us’. This sentence did not appear in the Polish
Fortnightly of ı December 1942 but it was included in the ofhcıal
translation of the Sprawozdanie circulated as a manuscript
among London editors and Members of Parliament. Savery
added that he was impressed by the very sober (sachlich) tenor of
the report: ‘I feel we may accept pretty well everything which is
said in the report about the happenings in Warsaw and the
neighbouring towns.’ But he was still uncertain exactly how to
regard the three camps of Treblinka, Belzec and Sobibor
(Chelmno and Auschwitz were not mentioned in the reports}:
“On the whole, I think it is most likely that atleast nine-tenths of
the Jews sent away from Warsaw had met their deaths in those
camps.’ But he was not satisfied with the evidenceabout Belzec.
He wrote that he did not put any cruelty beyond the Germans in
Central Europe, and especially in Poland and towards the Jews
but the evidence as evidencedid not seem quite convineing.f
D. Allen, another ofthose who had not been convinced about
eventsin Poland, now commented on Savery’s note: ‘A horrible
and impressive document’. '*
Great publicity was given to these. reports in the British press
and the items were broadcastbythe BB€ in all languages. The
weekly directive for the BBG Polish services 17-23 December
stated that ‘it is particularly important, however,to Continue
telling ihe Poles that we know about the suffering of the Jews.
We do not necessarily need to inform»themof details of these
* All ıhese documents were published by the Polish Government-in-exile within a few
days in both Polish and English. (Polish Forinighilp, ı December 1942.)
tSavery was right on this point. The account on Belzec mentioned execution by
electricity but noı by means of poison gas.
i
+
7
!
1
H
E
&
h
r
ARE 2.2.0...
eb eine LorredAnbredareru. am TEN nk rn nr eher een nn
Appendices 223
sufferings. What we wish to impress on them is our knowledge.’*
Then the Polish department of the Political Warfare
Executive suggested that Savery should broadcast in Polish
about the German treatment of the Jews which he did on ı7
December 1942 after checking with the Foreign Office, the
censor and various other bodies. He had to make a number of
changes. All figures had to become more vague. Not six
thousand Jews were deported daily from Warsaw but ‘several
thousands’..Not 350,000 Jews (as he originally wrote) had
disappeared from Warsaw but ‘hundreds of thousands’. In the
end Savery gotsomewhat annoyed and wrote to Frank Roberts:
After reading and re-reading it several times I do not see anything
which the Germans could get hold of and use to start a polemic. My
own impression is that the Germans themselves probably have no very
accurate stasticsofthe deportations from Warsaw and the massacres
of the last few months. I doubt whether they know for certain whom
they have killed and whom they have left alive.
Savery was right, the Germans did not know, nor were they
interested in polemics.’*
APPENDIX 4. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND THE UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION OF ı7 DECEMBER 1942
Randolph Paul (who was the signatory), John Pehle and Josiah
E. du Bois Jr, oficials of the Department ofthe Treasury, were
involved in the preparation in January 1944 ofa memorandum
On the Acquiescence of This Government ofthe Murder ofthe
Jews’. It read, inter alia,
They [State Department officials] have not only failed to facilitate the
obtaining ofinformation concerning Hitler’s plans to exterminate the
4 *These diregtives were issued by ıhe Political Warfare Executive, The directives given
Pong the previous wecks were in the same vein: "The news about the conditions of
olish Jewry continuesto gTOw worse.. . „while thereis no necessity to tell the Poles what
they know already we should certainly show them that we know it as well. A careful
tar ofthe British press and radio on this point is advised. (3-9 December 1942.)
A would conuinue to seize hold of every opportunity of publicizing expression of
Frog anger. Any declaration made by Great Britain and allied countries condemning
Persecution will be bascd mainly on evidence produced by the Polish Government.’
(10-16 December ı 942.}
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224 The Terrible Secret
Jews of Europe but in their official capacity have gone so far as to
surreptitiously attempt to stop the obtaining of information concern-
ing the murder of the Jewish population of Europe.
Was this a fair statement of the facts? Wise had first written to
Sumner Welles, Undersecretary of State, on 3 September 1942
concerning the Riegner cable; he received a first (telephonic)
reply on g September. But even before, on 27 August, together
with the leaders ofthe other major American Jewish organiza-
tions, Wise had written to Welles about the deportations from
France. In this letter it was said that ‘in accordance with the
announced policy of the Nazis to exterminate the Jews of
Europe, hundreds of thousands of these innocent men, women
and children have been killed in brutal mass murders’.
Ray Atherton ofthe European Division ofthe Department of
State suggested to Welles that in his reply to Wise he could safely
state that it had never been confirmed that the deported Jews
were actually “exterminated’; ‘rather it is our understanding
that they are to be put to labor on behalfoftheGerman machine
as is the case with Polish, Soviet and other prisoners of war who
are now working for their daily sustenance.”® It is impossible to
say on what factual basis this information was provided. There
was nothing in the dispatches from Europe reaching the State
Department or in the newspapers from neutral countries which
could have induced the beliefithat the Jews would work for the
German war effort. Et is/possible that in August and early
September 1942 Mr Atherton was not very well informed. It is
more difhicult to explain similar attitudes three months later
after much additional information-had been received and when
preparations were made for the United Nations Declaration of
17 December 1942.
The initiative for the UN declaration condemning the ‘bestial
policy of cold-blooded extermination’»came from the British
Government which had been for some time under pressure from
the Jewish community, the Polish Government-in-exile, some
organs of the press, church dignitaries and others. On 7
December the diplomatic correspondent of the London Times
reported that the American and Soviet ambassadors had met
Mr Eden to discuss the fearful plight of the Jews throughout
Europe and that Count Raczynski had laid before Eden some of
Bu ae a ab a a aan a 12 RIEF
‚niet ea
Appendices 225
the evidence out of Poland. He also reported that each occupied
country had been given a date by Hitler by which it must have
cleared out its Jewish people. It was only now that the German
plans, long laid and carefully prepared, could be seen in practice
for what they were. The Polish Government had urged the
necessity.not only ofcondemning the crimes and punishing the
criminals but,also of finding means offering the hope that
Germany mighübe effectively restrained from continuing to
apply her methods of mass extermination. Having seen this
note, Churchill asked the Foreign Office for further informa-
tion.'” Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, had
expressed interest in a common declaration even earlier, on 2
December.
The main opposition came from the United States. This refers
not to John Winant, us Ambassador in London, who on several
Occasions hadintervened on behalf ofthe Jews with the British
Government. In a cable on 7 December, Winant said that he
supported a common declaration. On the next day he
transmitted without comment a note on his meeting with Eden:
We discussed whether any steps could usefully be taken by the United
Nations to make clear their condemnation of these horrors and
Possibly to exercise a deterrent effect on their Perpetrators. We agreed
that although little practical efect could be expected, it might be
useful for the United States and the Soviet Government to join with
His Majesty’s Government in condemning these atrocities and in
reminding their perpetrators that certain retribution awaits them.
The main opponent ofgiving undue publicity to the plight of
the Jews wasR. B. Reams, who wasin charge of,Jewish affairs in
the European Division of the State Department. He had ‘grave
doubts in regard to the desirability or advisability of issuing a
Statement of this nature,’ as he stated in a memorandum
addressed to Hickerson and Atherton, his superiors.
In the first place these reports are unconfirmed and emanate to a great
extent from the Riegner letter to Rabbi Wise... . While the statement
0€s not mention the soap, glue, oil and fertilizer factories it will be
taken as additional confirmation of these stories and will support
Rabbi Wise’s contention of official confirmation from State
Department sources. The way will then be open for further pressure
tom interested groups for action which might affect the warefiort. The
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
‚226 The Terrible Secret
plight of the unhappy peoples of Europe including the Jews can be
alleviated only by winning the war. A statement of this kind can have
no good effect and may in fact induce even harsher measures towards
the population of Europe. '®
On the next day in a meeting with Sir William Hayter,
subsequently British Ambassador to Moscow and Principal of
New College, Oxford, he complained that the statement
proposed by the British Government was ‘extremely strong and
definite’. Its issuance would be accepted by the Jewish
communities ofthe world as complete proof of the stories which
were now being spread about.
These people would undoubtediy be pleased that the Governments of
the United Nations were taking an active interest in the fate of their
fellows in Europe but in fact their fears would be increased by such a
statement. In addition the various Governments of the un would
expose themselves to increased pressure from all sides to do something
more specific to help these people.'*
Reams then said (‘Speaking personally’ and for-Mr_Hayter’s
private information’) that he (Reams) believed that Riegner’s
cable t0 Wise was responsible for most of the Present anxiety
with regard to the situation. In other words, there would have
been no troubleifthe British had helped.to suppress the Riegner
cable. Reams tried to postPone as long as possible\the
confirmation ofthe ‘stories’ Thus in an answer to Congressman
Hamilton Fish in December 1942,
I replied that this whole matter was now under considerationand that
it was difficult for me to give him any exact information. These reports
to the best of ıny knowledge were as yet unconfirmed.2°
This was the general line taken by the middle echelons in the
State Department at the time. Thus Reams told anofheial ofthe
Latin American Department, commenting-On protests from
Mexico on 15 December, that the information about the mass
murder oftthe Jews was unconfirmed. A cable went out to San
Jose, Costa Rica, two days after the United Nations declaration
again claiming that ‘there had been no confirmation of the
reported order from other sources (except from a Jewish leader
in Geneva)’. Answering a query by the Christian Century whether
. the Department would confirm or deny Rabbi Wise’s staternent
Appendices 227
mentioned by the Associated Press that Hitler had ordered the
extermination ofall Jews in Nazi-ruled Europe and that thishad
been confirmed by the State Department, M. J. McDermott,
chiefof the Division of Current Information, replied in a letter:
I today informed correspondents in confidence and am glad to give to
you, not for publication, that Rabbi Wise was in the Department
several months ago.and again yesterday and he had consulted with the
In short, the State Department wanted to have nothing to do
with the content ofthe message.
The statement of 17 December was drafted in the Foreign
Office in London. Maisky proposed one amendment, namely
addingthesentence, "The number of vietims ofthese sanguinary
punishments is taken to amount to many hundreds ofthousands
Quite Innocent men, women and children.’ This was accepted
and appeared in the final version as follows: “The number of
European victims of these bloody eruelties is reckoned in many
hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women and
children.’
The United States made three amendments; two were
accepted, the third came too late. Mr Reams, eager to weaken
the Statement, suggested the following: the original draft had
said that ‘the attention of the allied governments had been
drawn to reports from Europe which leave no room for doubt that the
Germans were carrying out their oft repeated intention to
exterminate the Jewish people in Europe.’ Reams wanted the
Nalicized words deleted. Secondiy, the original statement had
that, ‘From all the countries Jews are being transported
‚respective of age and sex and in conditions of appalling horror and
brutality to Eastern Europe.’ Again Reams insisted that the
Nalicized words be deleted. He argued that this had not been
!Fue up to the present time in France and might not be true in
Other occupied territories.” Reams was quite wrong: it was
Precisely this fact, the separation of children from their parents,
which had provoked so many protests in France and
"itzerland. The official bulletin of the Swiss churches wrote
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228 The Terrible Secret
that the fact that children were brutally taken away from their
parents reminded one ofthe murder ofchildren at Bethlehem in
the days of Jesus Christ. Cardinal Gerlier said in a protest
declaration: Nous assistons & une dispersion cruelle des familles
ou rien n'est epargne’ (“We are witnessing a cruel dispersal of
families in which nothing is spared’). And Saliege, Archbishop
of Toulon: ‘Les membres d’une meme famille soient separes les
uns des autreset embarques pour une destination inconnue. Re
("Members ofthe same family are separated from each other and
embarked for n unknown destination .. Ae) Dana
The last amendment came from the Secretary of’ State, and it
had nothing to do with either Hitler or the Jews. According to
the original version the first sentence ofthe statement listed the
various members ofthe United Nations and then added “and of
the Fighting French Committee’ (or “French National
Committee’). Cordell Hull sent a cable to London asking
urgently for the insertion of the word ‘also’ in front of the
‘French Committee’, It was the only cable concerning the whole
affair which was sent with triple priority but it came too late,
Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Washington,
explained (and Winant from London supported him) that in
view of the difference in time the telegram had reached Eden
only when he was about to make his declaration in the House of
Commons. The British Foreign Secretary had said moreover
that it was too late toconsulttheother signatories. Consequently
the statement was published in Washington with ‘also’ inserted
before ‘the Fighting French’ whereas there wasıno ‘also’ in the
London version or elsewhere.
Did Reams, McDermott, Breckinridge Long and the others
genuinely doubt the available information? This is difficult to
believe. It is more likely that their second line of argument was
decisive: if the State Department confirmed the news it would
‘come under pressure to do something’. But was the war efort
really their overriding concern? This mäkes sense only if one
also assumes that the American diplomats were more single-
mindedly and relentlessiy devoted to the war efort than
Churchill, Stalin and all the others, a supposition which
stretches the powers of even a vivid imagination.
|
Appendices 229
APPENDIX 5. THE MISSIONS OF JAN KARSKI,
JAN NOWAK, AND TADEUSZ CHCIUK
The mission from Warsaw to London of Jan Karski
(Kozielewski) has been repeatediy mentioned. Karski was
neither thefirst nor the last Courier to arrive from Warsaw, but
as far asthe information about the fate ofthe Jews in Poland was
concerned, hewascertainty the most important. Karski wrote a
book about his mission which appeared in the United States in
1944 and became a bestseller; it was also published in Britain,
Switzerland, and Norway. But the war was not yet over when
the book was published and the author had to exert self-
censorship.?*
Who was Jan/Karski, and what was the purpose of his
mission? He was born in Lodz in 1914, studied at the Jan
Kazimierz University in Lwow for a degree in law, served in the
Polish army in 1935-6 and then for two years travelled in
Central and Western Europe. In 1938 he entered the Polish
Foreign Ministry asa trainee and graduated in January 1939 at
the top of his class. When the war broke out he served as a
lieutenant in themounted artillery. With his unit he retreated to
the East and was then taken prisoner by the advancing Soviet
army. He disguised himselfas a private. Polish officers were kept
back by the Russians and most ofthem never returned. He was
Tepatriated to Poland where the Germans puthimona traintoa
labour camp. He jumped from the train and made his way to
Warsaw where he became an early member of the Under-
ground. He acted as a courier between Angers (in France -
where the exiled Polish National Council was located before the
fall of France) and Warsaw. The usual route was Warsaw to
Zakopane, by skis over the Carpathian mountains to
udapest-Italy-France. Professor Stanislaw Kot, the Polish
finister of the Interior at the time, asked him to return to
oland cartying with him the first blueprint for the creation of
the various institutions which were to constitute the under-
8Tound state. On another such mission in June 1940 he was
“aught by the Gestapo in Presov, Slovakia. Having undergone
!örture he tried to commit suicide by cutting his wrists, but
alled. He was sent back to prison hospital where an under-
STound cell succeeded in whisking him out. This operation was
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
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230 The Terrible Secret
undertaken by a unit commanded by Jozef Cyrankiewicz, the
future Prime Minister in Communist Poland, but at that time
still a leading member of the pps - the Socialists. Karski lived
underground in Warsaw in 1941-2, engaged in ‘black propa-
ganda’ among German soldiers, printing and distributing
leaflets in German. In 1942 he was again asked to go to London
as a courier on behalf of the Delegat. Various techniques were
used at the time to get such couriers to Western Europe. The one
chosen by those who arranged Karski’s trip was simple,
Thousands of Frerich ‘guest’ workers were employed in Poland
at the time. They had the right to go back to France twice yearly
for their home leave. The Polish Underground offered them a
two-week very well paid holiday on a Polish country estate in
what were for wartime exceedingly luxurious conditions,
French workers surrendered their passports; the pictures were
removed and those of the couriers afıixed. If the courier did not
return in time they would have to report the passport’s loss and
had to pay a fine - which wonld be covered, needless to say, by
the Underground.
Karski travelled through Germany in November 1942 to
Paris where he stayed fortwelve daysin an apartment belonging
to a priest. He spent his evenings in the cafes, restaurants, and
gambling places in Montmartre andıwas struck by the spirit of
fraternization between Frenchmen and Germans and theservile
attitude frequently displayed. Equipped with new papers he
made his way to Toulon where a Polish underground network
took over. He was taken to Perpignan and.crossed the,Pyrenees
“ with a Spanish Communist acting as a’guide. In Barcelona he
was fetched with a diplomaticlimousine which seems to have
belonged to the 0S$ rather than British intelligence. From there
he went first to Algeciras and then to Gibraltar where he had
dinner with the Governor. The following day he flewto London.
Karski’s mission concerned, of coufsejpredöminantly Polish
affairs. But prior to his departure he had several meetings with
Jewish leaders, and he solemniy promised them to convey their
message to the West. Hedid not know at the time the identity of
those he met. Later he learned that one ofthem had been Leon
Feiner; the identity of the other is not clear to this day. Et was
apparently Menahem Kirschenbaum or Adolf Berman. The
two saw him by special permission ofthe Delegatura. Karski also
Appendices 231
visited the Warsaw ghetto in October 1942. This did not, in his
words, present any special dificulty: the area oftthe ghetto had
very much shrunk after the deportations of July-September
1942; the tramways crossed the ghetto to reach the streets which
had been taken over by the ‘Aryans’. Elsewhere one could enter
or leaveithe,ghetto through the cellars of houses which served as
the ghetto wall.
Karski relates that he was taken to Belzec by a Jewish, but
Aryan-looking, contact (who had told him that this was a
transition rather than extermination camp) to a nearby shop.
There he was approached by a man in civilian clothes who said
he would provide both a uniform (of'an Estonian guard) and a
permit. Karski does not know whether this contact {who spoke
perfect Polish) was a smuggler or a ‘Racial German’, perhaps
even a low-level Gestapo agent who was in the pay ofthe Jewish
underground. The two entered the camp through a side gate
without attracting suspicion. There he saw ‘bedlam’ - the
ground littered with weakened bodies, hundreds of Jews packed
into railway cars covered with a layer of quicklime. The cärs
were closed and moved outside the camp; after some time they
were opened, the corpses were burned and the cars returned to
the camp to fetch new cargo. After watching the scene for some
time he felt sick and began to lose his nerve. He wanted to escape
and walked quickly towards the nearest gate. His companion
who had kept some distance from him realized that something
was amiss. He approached Karski and harshly shouted, ‘Follow
me at once!’ They went through the same side gate they had
entered and were not stopped. Karski says that he learned only
in later years that Belzec was not a transit but a death camp and
that most ofthe victims were killed in gas chambers. He had not
actually seen the gas chambers during his visit, apparentiy
because these were walled in and could be approached only with
a special permit.
‚Karski arrived in London in November 1942. General
Sikorski was in America at the time but he met him later; he
Participated however in two meetings of the Polish
Overnment-in-exile. In the following weeks he met many
British, American, and Jewish leaders and briefed them about
the situation in Poland and the fate ofthe Jews. Among thosc he
saw in London were Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary,
ee
232 The Terrible Secret
Lord Cranborne, Hugh Dalton, and Arthur Greenwood,
members of the War Cabinet, Richard Law, Parliamentary
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Selborne, who as
Minister of Economic Warfare was in charge of SOE, Anthony
D. Biddle and Owen O’Malley, the US and British Am-
bassadors to the Polish Government-in-exile, as well as various
ıinembers of the House of Commons.
Among those he saw in the United States were President
Roosevelt, Herbert Hoover, Cordell Hull, Henry Stimson,
Francis Biddle, Adolph Berle, Archbishops Spelman, Mooney
and Strich, Felix Frankfurter, Bill Donovan and John Wiley
(both of the oss), and the Apostolic Delegate.
Among Jewish leaders: Stephen Wise, N. Waldman, S.
Margoshes, and M. Fertig. He also talked to many writersand
newspapermen, among them: H.G. Wells, Victor Gollancz,
Arthur Koestler, Kingsley Martin, Allen Lane, Walter
Lippmann, Eugene Lyons, Dorothy Thompson, George
Sokolsky, William Prescott, and Mrs Ogden Reed.
The message Karski transmitted to the West in November
1942 on behalf of the Polish Jewish leaders could not be
published during the war. He wrote it down at my request in
1979:*
I. My mission to the Polish and Allied Governmenks
The unprecedented destruction.of the entire Jewish population is net
motivated by Germany’s mälttery requirements. Hitler and his
subordinates aim at the total destruction ofthe Jewsbeforethe war ends
and regardless ofits outcome. The Allied governments cannot disregard
this reality. The Jews in Poland are helpiess. They have no country of
their own. They have no independent voice in the Allied councils.
They cannot rely on the Polish underground or population-at-large.
They might save some individuals - they are unable to stop the
extermination. Only the powerful Allied governments can help
effectively.
The Polish Jews- solemnly appeal“to the Polish and Allied
governments to undertake extraordinary measures in an atiernpt to stop
the extermination,
They solemnly place historical responsibility on the Allied
governmenss if they fail to undertake those extraordinary measures.
*] am grateful t0 Professor Jan Karski for having patiently submitted to detailed
questioning. (Washington, 3 September 3979.)
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie,-2014- seh Aus ak Arc ven. 1ER VPOSEUSERNE Bee
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1
3
Appendices 233
This is what the Jews demand:
I) A public announcement that Prevention of the physical extermi-
nation of the Jews became a part ofthe over-all Allied war sirategy,
2) Informing the German nation through radio, air-dropped leaflets
and other means about their government’s crimes committed against
the Jews. All names of the German officials directly involved in the
crimes; statistics; facts; methods used shouid be spelled out.
3) Public and formal appeals (radio, leaflets, etc.) to the German
people to exereise Pressure on their government as to make it stop the
extermination.
4) Public and formal demand for evidence that such a Pressure had
been exercised and Nazi Practices directed against the Jews stopped.
6) Public and formal announcement that in view ofthe unprecedented
Nazi erımes againstthe Jews and in hope that those crimes would stop,
a) certain areas and objects in Germany would be bombed in
retaliation. German people would be informed before and after
each action that the Nazi continued extermination of the Jews
Pprompted the bombing.
b) certain German war prisoners who, having been informed about
their government’s crimes, still profess solidarity with and
allegiance to the Nazis would be held responsible for the crimes
committed against the Jews as long as those crimes continue.
€) certain German nationals living in the Allied countries who,
having been informed about the crimes committed against the
Jews, still profess solidarity with the Nazi government would be
held responsible for those crimes.
d) Jewish leaders in London, particularly Szmul gielbejm (sunn)
and Dr Ignace Szwarchard (Zionists), are solemnly charged to
make all efforts so as to make the Folish government formally
forward these demands at the Allied councils.
Spiritual grounds to expect protection of the Vatican. Religious
$anctions, excommunication included, are within the Pope’s jurisdic-
ton. Such sanctions, publicly proclaimed, might have an impact on
the German people. They might even make Hitler, a baptized
Cause ofthe nature ofthis message and the source it came from as
al de 12,5 522
al nd en
Stiftelsenngrsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014 _ SEHR RTL. AHPERIREHER II PURCHLET ER
234 The Terrible Secrei
well as because ofdiplomatie protocol’s requirements, I was instrücted
to deliver the message to the President ofthe Republic oriy. Let him use
his conscience and wisdom in approaching the Pope. I was explicitly
forbidden to discuss that subject with the Jewish leaders. Their possible
maladroit intervention might be counter-productive,
TEE. For the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief (General Wladyslaw
Sikorski), Minister of Interior (Stanislaw Mikolajezyk), Zygielbojm and
Dr Szwarchard.
Although the Polish people-at-large sympathize with or try to help
the Jews, many Polish criminals blackmail, denounce or even murder
the Jews in hiding. The Underground authorities must apply punitive
sanctions against them, executions included. In the last case, the
identity of the guilty ones and the nature of their crimes should be
publicized in the Underground press.
Zygielbojm and Szwarcbard must use all their Pressure, so that
pertinent orders would be issued.
In order to avoid any risk ofanti-Polish propaganda, I wasexplicitdiy
forbidden to discuss that subject with any non-Polish Jewish leaders. I
was to inform Zygielbojm and Dr Szwarcbard about that part of my
instructions.
IV. For the Commander-in-Chief of ihe Polish Armed Forces (General
Sikorski) and Zygielbojm and Dr Szwarchard only.
A Jewish military organization emerged. Its leaders as well as
younger elements of the Jewish ghetios, the Warsaw ghetto in
particular, contemplate some armed fesistance against the Germans.
They speak about a “Jewish war’ against the Third Reich. They asked
the Home Army for weapons./Those weapons had been denied. -
The Jews are Polish citizens. They are entitled to-have weapons if
these weapons are in the possession of the Polish Underground. The
Jews cannot be denied the right to die fighting, whatever the outcome
of their fighting may be. Only General Sikorski, as commander-in-
chief, can change the attitude oftthe Commander ofthe Home Army
(General Stefan Rowecki). The Jewish leaders demand Gen. Sikorski’s
intervention.
1 refused to carry that message unless I Was authorized t0 see Gen.
Rowecki in person, to inform him about the complaint and to ask for
his comments. Both Jewish leaders heartily agreed. I did see General
Rowecki. I did obtain his comments and I did refer the matter in
London as instructed.
In order not to feed any anti-Polish propaganda, I was explicitly
forbidden to discuss this subject with any non-Polish Jewish leaders. I
was to inform Zygielbojm and Dr Szwarcbard about this part ofmy
instructions,
Lara nn
N nn Damian
€) Some Jews.of not Semitic appearance could leave the ghettos,
r Poles under
Money to bribe the ghetto’s guards, various officials (Arbeitsamt) as
well as subsistence funds is needed.
d) Many Christian families would agree to hide the Jews in their
homes, But they risk instant executions if discovered by the Germans.
AU of them are in dire needs, themselves, Money is needed, at least for
subsistence. j
e) Money, medicines, food, clothing is most urgently needed by the
SUrvivors in the ghettos. Subsidies obtained from the Delegate of the
olish government-in-exile as well as other funds sent through various
channels by the Jewish international Organizations are tolally
insuficient. More hard Currency, sent without delay, is a question oflife
or death for thousands of Jews.
VI, Arousing the public opinion in the West on behalf of ihe Jews.
In addition to all the messages I was to carry, both Jewish leaders
solemnly committed me to do My utmost in arousing the public
OPinion in the free world on behalfof the Polish Jews. I solemniy swore
that, should I arrive safely in London, I would not fail them.
Karski, it will be recalled, reached London in November 1942.
= following month (on 7 December) the Polish National}
Duncil passed a resolution committing the Government to act
Without delay in connection with the extermination of the Jews.
N 10 December, accordingly, the Polish Government issued a
°rmal appeal to the Allied governments and on 17 December
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
236 The Terrible Secret Appendices 237
the Allied Council passed the resolution which has been quoted at least a Paper of some verisimilitude, even if jt was not
elsewhere. On 18 December the President ofthe Polish Republic ne ber Senuine ... Rabbi Wise was fascinated by this
scheme.
sent a note to Pope Pius x11 asking for his intervention. On ı8 i \
January 1943 Count Raczynski, the Polish Foreign Minister, Jemand wpJstice Frankfurter eything he knew about the
nn ; il ew: en Nie nished the Justice said so j
presented the following demands at the Allied Council things and then. Tearı Kali Ju - ;.SoMe Complimentary
a) The bombing of Germany as a reprisal for the continued again with him, told F rankfurter that Karski h
extermination of the Polish Jews. the. äuth ority ofthe Polish Covermment and anche
b) To press Berlin to let the Jews out of the German-dominated possibility in the world that’'he was not tellin
coumtries, partieularly Poland.
c} To.demand action so as to make the Allied as well as the neutral
Countries accept the Jews, who had succeeded or would succeed in
leaving German-occupied countries.
! the news from Eastern Europe was not believed for so long. In
Raczynski did not advance demands for reprisals against England, H. G, Wells was actively hostile and Lord Selborne
German war prisoners and German nationals living in the (the administrative chief of underground resistance) said that
Allied countries, considering them contrary to the accepted Kaıski was doing a magnificent job, But he also said that in the
practices of international law. Anthony Eden, acting on behalf First World War there had been atrocity stories about Belgian
of the British Government, rejected the Polish demands and babies; His Majesty’s Gövernment knew, of course, that they
offered instead some vague promises to intervene in certain were false but had done nothing to Stop them. The comparison
neutral countries. The various diplomatic initiativesvand-the between the Beigian babies who had not been killed and the
proclamations of December 1942 came as the result of the Jewish who were dead was not reassuring. Selborne also said
evidence which had accumulated over many months, but the that the proposals to buy out some Jewish women and children
Karski mission still played an important part in this respect. by paying with gold and/or goods were totally unacceptable,
What does Karski remember-of his many meetings after his Such a transaction could perhaps be kept secret in wartime, but
arrival in Britain? He assessed, quite accurately, the two Jewish \t would haye to be revealed after victory, and no prime minister
members ofthe Polish National Council-* Zygielbojm met with Or cabinet would accept this responsibility. It would surely be
him with suspicion and reacted \rrationally’(‘Why did they blamed for the killing of British soldiers as the result of
send you? Who are you? You are not a Jew. Let mesee yaur Prolonging the war. Eden’s main Concern was with the difhcult
wrists. .. ”) and Schwarzbart (“A pröfessional politician and a question of where the Jews, ifliberated, would g0. Britain had
bitofamanipulator’). President Roosevelt listened tohim for an alrcady a hundred thousand refugees and could not accept
hour and asked many questions; in the end he dismissed him more. *
with “Tell your nation we shall win the war’ and some more such
Finging messages. There were no words ofcomfort for the Jews. Jan Nowak (Zdzislaw Jezioranski) also acted as an emissary to
Stephen Wise was the Jewish leader. most interested in practical London in 1943 and 1944. His story has been told in fascinating
details: what kind of passports were needed? Any Latin detail but belongs to a later Period.?* It is of indirect interest,
American would do. . .. But would not the Gestapo see through Owever, because Nowak fully confirms certain aspects of
this scheme? It probably would but low- and even middle-level Karski’s evidence, especially with regard to the reception in
Gestapo ofhicials could be bribed. But those to be bribed needed
*Eden sent two notes to the War Council affer his meeting with Karski, but they
.: co . . 5:
*There was a third, Leon Grossfeld {member of the PPs} who does not, however, u. Be Polish afairs. The Polcs would nor be willing to accede to the Scvier demands
Ägure prominenly in this story. "ltorial change, and ıhis was bad news.
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238 The Terrible Secret
London. He was the first emissary to arrive from Poland after
the battle ofthe Warsaw ghetto. Nowak was .debriefed by Frank
Roberts, head ofthe Central Department ofthe Foreign Offce,
Brigadier Harvey Watt, Parliamentary Private Secretary to
Churchill, Major Morton, Churchill’s intelligence adviser,
Osborn and Moray McLaren of PWI, Tepresentatives of MIgand
others. He dwelt at length on the fate of the Jews but there was
no interest whatsoever in this topic, with the exception of one
counter-intelligence officer who was personally deeply moved.
The various minutes (by Frank Roberts, Lawford, Morton)
which have been preserved, bear this out. Nowak also reports
that in his meetings with Schwarzbart (‘a tragic figure’) and
other Jewish leadershe was advised not to dwell too much on ther
number ofthe victims, for this would not be believed, But to refer
instead to individual cases,?7
Tadeusz Cheiuk-Celt was sent twice by parachute from
London to Poland during the war. The first time he stayed in
capacity’. He also mentiöned the first signs ofthe liquidation of
the Warsaw ghetto (the ‘small ghetto’) as well as the
extermination of the Jewish communities- in Radom, Lida,
Minsk, Rovnoetc.%#
a re
A NOTE ON SOURCES
I HAVE had access to most collections in which the material
needed for the present study can be found. Three major
exceptions were the Soviet and Vatican archives, and, less well
known but ofconsiderable importance, the collection of Nathan
Schwalb, kept in the archives of the Histadrut in Tel Aviv, I
would like to record my gratitude to the directors and staflofthe
following: National Archives, Washington DC; Yad Vashem,
Jerusalem; ıhe archives of the Hagana, the Labour Movement
Wiener Library, World Jewish Congress, Sikorski I nstitute and
Studium Polski Podziemnej, all in London; the yıvo Institute,
the Franz Kurski Archives of the Jewish Labour Bund and the
Leo Baeck Institute, allin New York; the Archives ofthe Royal
Swedish Foreign Ministry in Stockholm; the Berlin Document
Centre; the Swiss Federal Archives in Bern; the archives of the
International Red Cross in Geneva; the German Federal
Archives in Koblenz; the Institute für Zeitgeschichte in Munich
and the military-historical archives in Freiburg. Unfortu nately,
I cannot say with any assurance that I had access to all the
relevant material in all of these collections.
Special thanks go to those who have helped me with my
research: Josef Algasy (who helped me greatly with research in
Israeli archives), Mrs N.Pain and Mr Z.Ben Shlomo in
London, Sophia Miskiewicz and Joseph Pilat in Washington, and
Dr Svante Hansson in Stockholm.
The list of those whom I have consulted on specific aspects is
Ong and this is also true with regard to others who have heiped
Me to obtain material otherwise dificult to receive. I would like
to thank in particular: in Britain — Peter Calvocoressi, Dr E.
Eppler, Mrs Eilna Ernest, Professor M.R.D.Foot, Dr
J-Garlinski, Dr F.Hajek, Professor F.Hinsley, Baroness
ornsby-Smith DBE, Professor L.Labedz, Ronald Lewin,
= Ba = 120 vi
Stiftelseri fiorsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014. BET RR EE en el en
u. rn an. 2
240 The Terrible Secret
Professor M. Marrus, Sir Cecil Parrott, DrS.Roth, Professor Sir
Hugh Trevor-Roper, MrsS. Wichmann, Professor Z.Zeman; in
Israel - Dr Y. Arad, Professor Y.Bauer, Dr W.Eitan, Dr
I. Fleischauer, Dr M.Gilbert, Dr I.Gutman, Dr M.Heiman,
Dr $.Krakowski, Dr O.Kulka, Shlomit Laqueur, Mr Philip, CHAPTER NOTES
Ambassador Gideon Rafael, Professor Y. Reinharz, Dr
L.Rotkirchen, Dr M.Sompolinski, Professor B, Vago, Dr INTRODUCTION
; Reuben Hecht; in Switzerland - Dr H.Boeschenstein, Kurt 1. Supplement to British i
2 Emmenegger, Dr O.Gauye, Dr Graf, Dr W. Guggenheim, 2. D.Singten, Bel Uneyred (Lencn 0 ober Bi
3 M.J.Moreillon, A,Müller, Dr G.Riegner, Madame C,Rey MR ne enormous literature on (he subject is reviewed and analyzed in Jamcs
7 Schirr, Dr E.Streiff, Dr L.Stucki; in Sweden - Professor „Reed, Atrocity Propaganda 9741919 (New Haven, 1941); see also most
4 W.Carlgren, Ambassador M.R.Kidron, Dr Jozef Lewandowski, Pas we Wilson, Lord Bryce’s Investigations into Alleged German
4 Dr H.Lindberg, Baron G. von Otter, Professor M. Peterson, N 369-83 “en Peigium 1914/58), Journal of Contemporary History (July 1979), pp.
2 Ake Thulstrup; in Germany - Dr H.Abs, Dr Auerbach, Dr 4. Details in Ino Arndt-Wolfgang S s 2
2 H.Boberach, T.Cheiuk-Celt, Professor J-Rohwer; in“the > "in Pierteljahrshefte für erckiche, ee which Bere
: Netherlands - Dr Louis de Jong; in the United States — 2 detailed bibliography, a
4 Ambassador J.Beam, Professor H.Deutsch, Dr L. Dobroszycki, 5. For instance, “Eine Stätte des Grauens — Bericht aus dem K.Z. Lager
3 Howard Eltng Jr, A.Gellert, Ambassador A. Goldberg, Dr Oswieeim [Auschwitz], Neue Volkszeitung, New York, 14 March 1992.
hr R.Graham sj, Professor Feliks Gross, Dr F.Grubel, David ;
e Kahn, Professor J.Karski, Hillel Kempirtiski,— Professor ; a WALLOF SILENCE»
= G.Kennan, S.Korbonski, Dr David Kranzler, Dr J.Kuhl, Dr 1. Ihe many bureaucratic Tamifications are described in great detail ;
F.Lessing, Professor G.Lerski, Jan Nowak, A,Pomian, De Verwaliste Mensch (Tübingen, 1974). a:
Ambassador H.Probst, Dr B.Rubin, A.Szegedi Maszak, John men “ oem, Longden and Davison afidavits, Nuremberg
}; - : > 0121693, NI-11703, Ni-1 7694.
; E. Taylor, Dr H.Tütsch, Dr Robert Wolfe, Norbert Wollheim. 3. Nurembe /f
i : ud a . "8 wär crimes trial, 20 October 1947, Ni-1 1984,
e I shall be forgiven for not providing a bibliography. All the 4. Nuremberg Documents, NI-6645. 4
major books on the final solution include bibliographies and ö 5. Dr L.de Jong, Has Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de teede Wereldoorlog (5
: there are, furthermore, specialized guides on unpublished en EL Part ı, p. 333.
F materials prepared by Yad Vashem. savit Schulhof,‘21 June 1947, NL-7967. ed i üben
Er Pa
15. 23 November 1942. National Archives 740,0016 Ew 1939/726.
16. Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews, p. 169.
17. See, for instance, Hilberg, The Destruttion, p. 470 (Slovakia), pP: 331
(Poland).
18. PRO FO 9371/34551. Mr Cavendish-Bentinck jater explained that his pre-
war experience ofGermany had been limited and that he therefore disbelieved
the atrocity stories in 1942-3. He added that when he visited Auschwitz in late
1945 and reported to ıhe Foreign Office that millions of people had been killed
there, it was still not believed. .
19. D. Allen, PRO FO 5371/30917, dated 14 August 1942.
20. Kelly to Roberts, pro Fo 371 [265 15.
21. Hinsley, British Intelligence, PP- 357-8. Documents pertaining to Ultra
tailway intelligence are not yet accessible at the Public Record Office,
22. Lahusen report on trip to Russia, NOkw 3147, 23 October 1941.
23. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5 May 1979.
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
A
La FR
I me nr ern nn nam
246 The Terrible Secret
24. PRO FO 371/30898. Censorship reports will not be declassified in Britain
for another filty years. The one 1 i
» 24, 31 December) and there was only sporadic
London, 1979), passim.
26. Moı memorandum, R.F; fazer, 10 February 1942, ınr 1/a51.
27. Ian MeLaine, Ministry af Morale (London, 1979), PP. 164-6,
29. New York Herald Tribune, 25 November 1942.
30. Henry L.Feingold, The Politics 0 Rescue (New Brunswick, 1970), p. 180,
of oss, 26896. This report is identical with
the information received by Lichtheim in Geneva and forwarded by him to
32. Stephen S.Wise papers, Frankfurter to Wise, 16 September 1942.
33- Sikorski’s letter is dated 22 June 1942, the Roosevelt answer. 3 July.
These documents, as well as the cables emanating from Biddle, can be found in
the National Archives, record group 84. Warsaw 1942, file 711 - Jewish
34- RG 220, 055 272735.
35. 0$s, Research and Analysis, No. 605; Nav York Herald. Tribune, 29
October 1941 (Oechsner dispatch). Richard Helms had worked for Oechsner
at ıhe Berlin ur bureau; when Oechsner joined the oss he enlisted Helms for
the organization.
36. 0ss 882354. The Research and Analysis department ofthe o8s.conchuded
as early as March 1942 that 'the Pattern ol German violence includes the
systematic liquidation of Jews”. (Report 605, 14 March 1942.)
37. 05 24736.
38. 055 24728.
39. H.Johnson to Secretary ofState, Stockholm, 5 Apfil 1943.
40. Werner Rings, Advokaten des Feindes (Düsseldorf, 1966).
4). New York Times, 4 December 1942. Two days earlier it had been said in
an editorial in the same paper that ‘to sum up this horrible story, itis believed
that two million European Jews have perished and that five millions are in
danger of extermination.’
42. W.A.Visser’t Hooft, Memoirs (London, 1973), PP- 165-6,
4 THE NEWS FROM POLAND
1. On the ax see Polskie Sily ’ ’ 2 ’
Passim; Burton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge Mass, 1973), a
APPENDICES
!. Letter signed by Martin Bormann, dated ı anuary ı in Nazi
Central Archives (Berlin Document Centre). 7Jammnıy 10s9, es
üpäsjenshisterie,-2014........_...
Stiftelsen norsk ORküpäsjönshisterie,-20
FR
252 The Terrible Secret
2. Yaakov Zur, in Peulat Hazalah be’ Kushta (Jerusalem, 1969), PP- 54.
3. Ernst Lemmer, Goebbels Jeurmalist, Nazi Spitzel, Revanche Minister (East
Berlin, 1969).
4. Ernst Lemmer, Manches war doch anders (F rankfurt, 1968}, P- 208.
5. The following is based on Edgar Salin, ‘Über Artur
h relations by marriage (jüdisch versippt). Er
idem, 2 April 1942; Stockkolm Tidningen,
7. Grenzbote, quoting Gardista, ı1 April 1942; Gardista, 29 April; National
ertung, Essen, Quoting Gardista, 30 April.
= D Storm, 17 July 1942; this was the organ of the Dutch ss,
9. Lahti, ı0 July 1933; Fagerholm in Arbeterbladet, 6 Odto
Hufvudstadsbladet, 5 October 1943; Radio Mo:
10. Das Hakenkreuzbanner, Mannheim,
11. Aflentidningen, Stockholm,
12. FO 371/31097, x/ro 3703.
13. Ibid. It is only fair to add that when the Chelmno Story was first
i estinian press it also met with some disbelief.
ber \1943;
tala, 5 October 1943.
24 December 1943.
24 August and 5 December 1943.
14. FO 311/31093, ;
15. FO 371/31 » X/PO 3709. . n
3 Eon Be 3 September 1942, National Archives, Washington.
17. Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews, p. 172.
18. 740.00 116 European War 1939/6894 #s/pa 5 December.
19. Zbid. 10 December,
20. Ibid. 674 10 December,
21, Ibid. 656 25 November 1942.
22. Ibid, 664.
23. Schweizerische Kirchenzeitung,
27 August 1942; Trbund de Genie, 26
September 1942.
26. Kurier z Warszamy (London, 1978).
27. Conversation with Jan N. owak, Washington, 7 September 19799
28. Personal communication, October 1979. T.Chciuk-Gelt described his
INDEX
Abend, 217
Abwehr, 84, 209-14
AEG, 22
Agudat Israsl, 219
AK, see Home Army
Allen, D., 79, 219, 220, 222
Almguist, Counsellor, 88
Alter, Victor, 136
American Jewish Congress, 161
Amsterdam, 89, 184
Anıhoni, Arno, 36-7
Antonescu, Marshal Ion,
The Apocalypse, 67
Argentina, 86
Armenians, 9, 61, 69, 175
ASEA, 104
Associated Press, 50, 227
Atherton, Ray, 94, 224, 225
Athlit, 190-1
Auchinleck, Sir Claude, 187-8
Auschwitz, gı, 7%, 192; establishment of,
12-19, 14; public knowledge of, 20,
22-5, 29; gas chambers, 42; Red Cross
knowledge 08, 61-2; British knowledge
of, 86; escapes and releases from, 98;
168-9; Polish information on, 111;
Stovakian Jews sent 10, 144-6; reporıs
from, 159, 154, 197-8
Auschwitz 11 {Birkenau}, 13
Austria, g, 15, 146, 152, 174
38, 140
Babi Yar Massacre, 45,
197
cau, 217
Backe, Herbert, 82
71, 89, ıto, 185,
Baeck, Leo, 14B
har, ıgr
Battic States, 125, 142, 180, 197; see also
Individual countries
Tbarossa’, 79:96
Barbey, sg
argen, Werner von, 27
arlas, H., ıgı
tou, Noah, ı 59, 160, 162
rıelmas, Adolf, 23
arpkada Wolnosci, 109
Basler Natiomalzeitung, 47
BBG, 92, 134, 147, 204N, 214; German
listeners, 28; Thomas Mann broadcasıs
On, 445 Feporis of Jewish Massacres,
7% 131-2, ı 36-7, 222-3; ignores
Korbonski's reports, 133
Beauchamp, Sir Brograve, 79
Becker, Juri, ı 54n
Beckerle, Adolf Heinz, 38
Belev, Alexander, 38
gium, 27; First World War, 8,9, 3an,
Jews deported from, 14, 15,74, 146
Beigrade, 72, 165
Belzec, 31, 72%, 110, 135, 178; establish-
ment of, 12, 14; von Otter’s report on,
49-9; Karski visits, 120; Ringelblum
hears of, 131; escapes from, 168; news
of, 197
Ben Gurion, David, 137, ,93
Benes, Edward, 162-4
Bergen-Belsen, 1-2, 204
Berle, Adolph, 232
Berlin, 86, 174; razzias, 21; knowledge of
Massacres, 32-3, 46; Jews scek refuge in
Swedish Embassy, 50; Jews deporied
from, 61; American Embassy, 67;
an communication networks, 84:
Jewish suicides in, 148; Goebbets de-
elares free of.Jews, 196
Berman, Adolf. 230
Bermuda, 90
Bern, 41
Bernardini, Monsignor, 55, 56n, 176-7
rabia, 125, 142
Bialystok, 12, 14, 67-8, 109, 126
Biddle, Arıhony J. Drexel Jn, 81, 95, 232
Biddle, Francis, 232
Biltmore Tamme, ı
Bircher, ge =
Bismarck, 35
Binletyn, 126
Biuietyn Informacyjny, 111,114
Blaeziler, F; Franz, 43
Bletchley, 84-5
Bluecher, Wipert von, 36-7
Bock, Fedor von, 9
Stiftelsen MOGSkES SEE DEE OhENIEIONS EOTT nn I PERS AERO
m
254 Index
Boegner, Pastor Marc, 40 Cheneviere, J acques, 59, 61, 62
Boehme, Karl, 88 Chile, 86
Boheman, Eric, 49, 104 “Christiän‘, Private, 72
Bonhoeßer, Dietrich, 212 Christian Century, 226-7
Bordier, Mme, 62 Churchill, Sir Winston, 31, 86, 98, 119,
Borisov, 69 204, 214, 225, 228, 238 z
Bormann, Martin, 29-30
Brack, Victor, 196
Bracken, Brendan, 90-1
Braham, Randolph, 138
Brand, Joel, 142, 143
Bratislava, 72, 165
Brazil, 55
Brenner, Karl, 72u
British Anti-Tank Regimeng, ı
British Red Cross, 60-1
Broad, Pery, 23-4
Bruce Lockhart, Sir Robert, 9, 164
Buchan, John, 8
Bucharest, 67, 94
Bucher, Dr Rudolf, 42-3
Budapest, 38, 41,67,94, 138-9, 142
Bukovina, r25, 142
Bulgaria, 9, 38-9
Bund, 73-5, 104-5, 108, 110, 118, 119-20,
126, 135-7
Burckhardt, Carl, 59, 61, 63-4, 80-1
Burzio, N uncio, 56, 141
Busch, General, zon
Bussche, Axel von dem, z0n
Cadogan, Alexander, ı 17n
Calvocoressi, Peter, d5n
Campbell, Sir Ronald, 55
Campion, Miss, 60-1
Canaris, Wilhelm, 209
Carpatho-Ruthenia, ı 38
Casaroli, Cardinal, 57
Catholic Church, see Vatican
Catholic Times, 203
Caucasus, zt, 72
Cavendish-Bentinck, 83, 1ı7n
censorship, Sweden, 52; Switzerland, 45
Ceske Siovo, 216 i
Chamberlain, Austen, 9
Charkov, 85
Cheiuk-Celt, Tadeusz, 238
Cheimno, Id 22, 72, 135, 185, 189;
establishment of, 6, 12, 20; reported in
Daily Telegrapk, 74; Schwarzbart Fep-
orts on, 75; Ringelblum’s account of,
104, 105, 108, 110, 128-9, 13T, 220-1;
newsof, 127-32, 197; escapesfrom, 168,
169
Ciano, Count Galeazzo', 35
Ciechanowski, Jan, 237
City and East London Observer, 220
code-breaking, 84-6
Cohen, Professor David, 149-50
Comintern, 102, ı 36
Commission Mixte de Secours, 61, 63n
Communist International, 102
Commanisıs, Poland, 102, 126, 196
Congress Weekly, Ban
Consistoire, 149
Conzen, 2091
Cossacks, 8
Costa Rica, 226
Coward, Charles Joseph, 23
Cracow, 135, 165, 184, 193
Cranborne, Lord, 232
Crimea, rt, 14,88
Croatia, 14, 15, 35,38, 54, 59, 166, 174,
189
“Croustillon', 166
Culbertson, Paul, 80, 139
Cyrankiewicz, Jozef, 290
Czechostovakia, t4, 15,66, 146, 162-4
Czerniakow, Adam, 314, 117-178, 135,
185, 197
Czestochowa, 170, 192
Dagens Nyheter, 51, 53,88, 217
Deily Bulletin, 126
Daily Telegrapk, 9, 73-4, 92n
Dalıon; Hugh, 232
Davar, 184-5, 187
Davis, Eimer, gı
de Gaulle, Charles, 93
de Jong, Louis, 150, 153, 155-6, 169
Denmark, 50,65, 86, ı 50-1, 166
Deutsche Zeitung in Ostländ, 69, 216
Dibelius, Bishop Otto, 49-50, 57
Dienst aus Deutschland, 164
Dimitrov, Georgi, 102
diplomass, 86-8, 89-90
DNB, 29n, 218
Dnepropetrovsk, 69, 139
Dobkin, Elijahu, 182, 190-3
Doertenbach, Dr, 25-6
Dohnanyi, Hans von, 209, 210
Domb, I., ı79n
Ann mr tan.
Donauzeitung, 72, 216, 217, 218-9
Donovan, Colonel William, 94, g6n, 232
r, Sir Cecil, 927
Doyle, Arthur Conan, 8
Dr. ancy, 149
Dubno airport, 20n
du.Bois, Josiah E. Jr, 223-4
ufour, General, 58
Dulles, Allen, 98-9
Dunant, Henry, 58
Durbrow, Elbridge, 80
Dvorzhetski, Dr M., 125
Dzankoi, ı9
Easternan, Alex, 15,
Eck, Naıhan, Fe i
Economic Warfare, Ministry of (MEw;
Great Britain), 65,86
Eden, Anthony, 76, 119, 120, 218, 224-5,
228, 231-2, 256, 237
Egypt, 185-6
Ehrenpreis, Rabbi Marcus, 179
Ehrenström, Nils, 2ı2
Ehrlich, Henryk, 136
Eichmann, Adolf, 11, 18, 35, 36, 54, 67,
173, 196-3; Wannsee Conference, 6;
Spreads misinformation, ı 52-3; OPpo-
sition to Jewish exchanges, 190 k
Einsatzgruppen, 6, 56, 109, 147; establish-
ment of, 11-12, 18-20; Operations in
Soviei Union, 14, 67, 71-2, 124, 139,
197; reports of, 26; Romanian collabor-
ation, 38; Western knowledge of, 83-4;
kombi interceptionof wireless Feports,
5
Elting, Howard, 80
Engzelt, Gösta, 49
igma, 86
Erem, M., 194
Eskitstuna Ki unren, 51
Essen, 24
tonia, 19, 36, 116
Etter, Philip, 63
njelicky Posol, 21 5
Evangelische Flüchtlingshilfe, 457
Evening Standard, 72-3, 76
Exchaguet, Dr,6:
Eyes, Harry, 187n
Fagerholm, KA.,97,216
alconi, Carlo, 57-8
Feiner, Leon, 108, 118-1 9, 197,230
Ferricre, Mme, 60-1
Fertig, M., 292
Index
255
Finland, 35, 35-7, 86, 87, 139, 216-17
» 8-9, 58, 91, 124, 157,
r 170, 237
Fish, Hamilton, 226
Flawil, 46
Fleischmann, Gisi, 144-5, 146n
Foreign Ministry (Germany), 26-7
Foreign Nationalities Intelligence Branch
(FNIB), 168
Foreign Office (Great Britain), 5, Bo,
81-2, 92, 116, 121, 219-23
foreign radio stations, 28
Forward, 184
France, 174-5; propaganda in First
World War, 8; Jews deported from, ı5,
62, 74, 146; Tazzias, 39, 44-5; know.
ledge of massacres in, 39-40, 149, 152;
Vichy Bovernmene’s artirude, 43;
Vatican Intervention, 54; intelligence
networks, 66; Jews escape from, 166
Frank, Dr Hans, r7, 31,82
Frankfurter, Felix, 3,94-5, 162, 232, 237
Free France Committee, 93
Freudenberg, Rev. Dr, 48
Friedrich, Zalman, ı 35
Frischer, Ernst, 75, 8ı
Fron! Odrogdenia Polski, 222
Galicia, 14, 74, 97, 110, 127, 138, 162,
189,197
Gardiste, 215, 216, 217
Garrett,
Garteiser, Colonel, 61
Gebhardt, Professor Karl, 59
Geltert, Andor, 33, 34
Geneva, 55, 58, 59-60, 67, 165, 170, 173
George, Stefan, 213, 214
Gerlier, Cardinat, 228
an Red Cross, 59, 60, 62, 630, t88n
Gersdorf, Rudolf von, 19n
Gerstein, Kurt, 48-30, 87, 168
Gestapo, 110, 148, 150, 275, 176, 203;
arrests Swedes, 105; captures
Ringelblum, 125 Lublin massacre,
133; bribery of, 141, 145, 235, 237;
discovers Czech underground, 363-4;
Capture Jan Karski, 229
Glasberg, Abbe, 65
Globochik, Odilo, 192
Gmelin, Hans, 56
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014
air
Goldmann, Nahum, 1858-62, 167, 1860
Gollancz, Victor, 232
Gömbös, Julius, 34
Göteborgs Handelsoch Sjofartstidning, 50-1
Grabow, 128
Grawitz, Dr Ernst, 59
Great Britain, propaganda in First World
War, 89; German propaganda
against, 27-8; intelligence services,
65-6, 84-6, 92, 167-8; unwillingness to
believe truth about Jewish situation,
72-6; reaction to Riegner cable, 79-80,
81-3; controls release of informatien,
90-3; anti-semitism in, 92; Jewish
community, 1598-60; reaction to news
of massacres, 160, 162; reaction to
Lichtheirm’s reports, 179, 180; Foreign
Office reaction to Ringelblum report,
21923; United Nations Declaration
(1942), 224-6
Greece, 54, 151,167
Greenberg, Chaim, ı 5758, 161
Greenwood, Arthur, 74
Grenzbole, 72, 152, 215
Grodno, 126
Grossfeld, Leon, 236n
Gruen, ı9ı
-Gruenbaum, Yizhak, ı7ın, 179, 181,183,
186n, 187
Gruenberg, 148
Gruenhut, Aron, 140-1
Gubbins, Colonel Colin, 67n
Guenther, Christian, 52
Guggenheim, Paul, 63
Gunther, Franklin M., 94
Gustaßsson, Carl Gösta, 103
Gustav, v, Kingof Sweden, 104
Gutkovski, A,, 129
Gutterer, Leopold, 29
Haas, 30-1
Haboker, 185
Hagana, 107
Haguc convention, 5
Hahn, Fritz Gebhard von, 26,27
Hal, Dr Van der, ı 53-4
Halifax, Lord, 219n, 228
a: ni a cn ai a En DEN PEENEEREEN TE nn
256 Index
Goebbels, Joseph, 27-9, 32, 87, 88, 152, Haller, General Jozef, 101
196, 218 Hamburg, 87
Goering, Hermann, 12, 18, 196 Ha'elam, 184
Golda, Karl, 290 Harrison, Leland, 64, 78, 80, 81, 214
Goldberg, Major Arthur, 6 Hartglass, Apollinari, 184, 186
Goldfarb, Zvi, 142 Hashomer Hatzair, 108, 126
Hatzafe, 184, 185
Hayter, Sir William, 226
Hekalutz, 144, 171
Held, Adolph, 96n
Henik, 126
Herbst, Stanistaw, 109
Herslow, Carl Wilhelm, 103-4, 105
Heydrich, Reinhard, rı, 12, 18, 20, 30,
192, 196-7
Hickerson, 225
Himmler, Heinrich, ı8, 30, 117n, 196-7;
sccrecy, 11, 17-18, 152; Korherr
report, ı5n; informs Musolini of
massacres, 35; and Finnish Jews, 35-6,
87; misinformation about, 82; arresıs
Swedes, 105; visits Auschwitz, 169
Hinsley, Cardinal, 74, 203n, 216
Hisiadrut, 191
Hitler, Adolf, 18, 172, 208;-orders ex-
termination of,Jews, 11, 63, 64, 77-83,
95 101, 223-4, 197,.152, 196; con-
spiracies against, 2on, 55, 210, 213;
reduces Seehaus reports, 29; 3ecrecy, 30;
inform Mussolini of massacres, 35;
spceches, 44;,orders menzal patients to
be killed, 49; relations with Vatican,
54-5; invades Soviet Union, 79; ignores
Allies’ protests, 119; Lichtheim on, 196,
178, 179, 181, 182
Hocss, Rudolf, 169
Hoherhörn, Ss, 37
Home Army (AK), 101-12, 135, 136, 234;
Bureau of Information and Propa-
ganda, 109, sı1
‘Home Intelligence Weckly Report’
{Great Britain), 92
Hoover, Herbert, 232
Horelli, Toivo; 36,97
Hornsby-Smith, Barones, 116
Hrubicszow, 133
Huber, Max, 58, 59-60, 62-3, 64
‘Hubert’, 108
Hull, Cordell, 228, 232
L’Humariti, 40
Hungary, 32, 88, 105, 136, 151; ans
mission of news of massacres Br
33-4; knowledge of massacres in, $
Red Cross in, s8, 60, 61; Kamenels
mm
IG Farben, 22, 29,245
Information, Ministry of (Great Britain),
90-3, 204n, 217n
Inter Service Liaison Department (1sıp),
107, 167-8
International Red Cross (IRC), 27, 48,
58-64, 90, 144, 175, 201-2
Ireland, 86
Istanbul, 39, 41, 53m, 105, 142, 165,
170-1, 189, 210
Italy, 32, 34-*, 88, 199, 159, 166, 174
Jabotinski, Vladimir, ı71
Jacobson, Bertrand, 199
Japan, 204n
Jasto, 109
Jassy, 90-1
Jerusalem, 170, 177
Jewish Agency, reports, 2gn, 42, 142, 160,
164, 187; Swiss Fepresentatives, 77-8,
170; and ISLD, 107, 167-8; financial
restrietions, 1710; interviews Polish
Jews, 1904
Jewirh Chroniele, 68, 50, 117-18
Jewish Congress, 80
Jewish Historical Institute, Warsaw, 129
Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), 68, 93,
15,118, 199
Johnson, Hershel, 98
Jeint Distribution Committee, ı 39, 157
Joint Intelligence Committee (Great
Britain), 66 n
Journalists, in Germany,
Judenrat, 135 =
Jitrzuia, 126
Kaduk, 23-4
Kalla, Eino, 216-1 7
Kallai, Nikolaus, 34, 38
Kamenew-Kasirki, 42
menets Podolsk, 61, > 94, 1
Kantorowicz, Ernst, ie m...
Kaplan, Elieser, 171n
Kaplan, Haim Aron, 134-8
Kaplan, Jacob, 149
ki, Jan, 3, 105, 108, 1179-20, 222,
229-38
Kastner, Ludwig, 140-1
Kastner, R., 141-2
Ädtolicke Nociny, 215-16
257
Katowitz, 23
Katyn, 30
Kauener Zeitung, 21 7
Kaunas, 67
Kelly, David, 79,8
Kerch, 69 3
Kersten, Felix, 33, 96n, 87
Kessel, Albrecht von, 69, 213
Kherson, 96
Kielce, 192
Kiepura, Jan, 154n
Kiev, 68,69, 71,85, 89, 96, 105, 110, 185,
197
Kirschenbaum, Menahem, 230
Kishinev, 72, 140, 165
Kiwimaeki, Professor, 360,87
Klepper, Jochen, 88
Knochen, Helmut, 39
Koch, Erich, 71,89
Komoly, Otto, 142
Komorowski, General Bor, 12-14
Korbonski, Stefan, ı 13-14
Korherr report, 15n, 17-18
Kornianski, Josef, 142
Koseiwanow, Georgi, 39
‚110
Kor, Stanislaw, 229
Kovno, 109, 125, 189
Kowel, 126
Krakouskie.Vesti, 68
Kremenchug, 19
Kreuger, Ivar, 104
Labour Party (Great Britain), 76
‘Lacaze, Pierre’, 166
Lades, Alexander, 89-4, 1
Lagerfelt, Viscount, 49 RR
Lane, Allen, 232
Lange, Herbert, 127
Laptos, Leo, ı 53-4 g;
Latvia, 14, 69, 71, 111,176
Lauterbach, Leo, 179-80, 181
Laval, Pierre, 39-40, 43, 149
Law, Richard, 232
Lawford, 238
Stiftelsen-rorsk-Okkupasjonshistorie,.201
Bi
E:
2
=
he}
»
Lithuania, 14, 68, 71, 74, 97, 309, s13,
125-7, 178
z, 11, 12, 14, 127, 128, °%90-1, 146,
180, 189
Loebe, Paul, 147
Loewenherz, Josef, 193
Lomza, 68
London, 40, 41, 67, 101
Long, Breckinridge, 93, 228
Lothammer, Private, 30-1
Lourie, Arthur, 176, 180
Lowry, Donald, 40
Lublin, ı2, ı3, 35, 103; Nazis plan to
establish Jewish zone in, 11, 183-4;
Cvacuation of ghetto, 14, 72, 75 110,
111, 827,151, 133, 334, 218
Lubrodz woods, 128
Ludwig, Professor, 41, 42,47
Latat, Erich, 24
Lwow, 12, 15, 69, 97, 109, 118, 219
Lyons, Eugene, 232
McDermott, M. J., 227,228
Macedonia, 39
McKittrick, Thomas, 21 4
McLaren, Moray, 66n, 238
Madagascar, 11, 173, 184,205
Madrid, 84
Main State Security Office {RSHA),
27, 29, 85, 173, 192
Maisky, Ivan, 225, 227
Majdanek, 12-13, 14, 143
Manchester Guardian, 75, gan, 115
Mander, G., 219-20, 221
Mann, Thomas, 44
Mapai, 192
Margoshes, 5., 232
Mariupo!l, 69
Marogna-Redwitz, Colonel, zı0
Marseilies, 43
Marti, Dr, 61-2
Martin, Kingsiey, 232
Masaryk, Jan, 76
Mauthausen, 51
A nie zus:
nn en a a aaa
258 Index
Leipziger Nachrichten, 217 Mayer, Sally, 176
Lemmer, Ernst, 34, 2117-12 Mazor, Michel, 1491.
Ley, Robert, 32 Meldungen aus dem Reich, 28
Lichtheim, Richard, 7778, 81, 117, 159, Mercier, Charles, 97
160, 165, 171-83, 187 Mexico, 226
‚ Lida, 238 MIS, 66
Linder, Eli, 135 Miß, 85
Linton, J., 175 Mig, 66, 167, 238
Lippmann, Walter, 232 M119, 66, 117n
List, Friedrich, 21 3 Miedzytzec, 109
Mikolajezyk, Stanislaw, 112, ı 14-13,
221-2, 234
Minsk, 67, 75,95, 105, 109, 146, 189, 219,
238
Mislovice, 193
Moldavia, 70
Molodeezno, 109
Molotov, 69, 70
Moltke, Count Helmuth, 320
Monopol, 210
Montgomery, Field Marshal, 186
Mooney, Archbishop, 232
Morgen Frai, 126
Morrison, Herbert, 76
Morse, Arthur, 78n
Morton, Major, 238
Moses, Dr Julius,(147
Motel, 109
Müller, Albert, 89
Mussert, Anton, 150
Mussolini, Benito, 35
Nachod, 217
Namier, Sir Lewis, 1870
Nation, 45
Neave, Airey, 83
Netherlands, Jews deported from).14, 13,
74 146, 149-50, 152, 153; government-
in-exile; 48; asks Sweden to help save
Dutch Jews, 51; intelligence services,
66; Jews escape from, 166
Neu Tag, 216
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 46, 89
Neugeboren, Ernst, 33
Neumann, Oskar, 146
Neustadt, Meleh (Noi), 188-9
New York, 13, 2on, 51,76
Nau York Herald Tribune, 93, 117n
New York Post, 139
New York Rescue Committee, 194-5
New York Times, 74-5, 99, 199 i
News Chronicke, 76
Nicolson, Harold, g
Nikolaev, 85
rue
NKVD, 70, zı
Norrman, Sven, ı » 164, 10
North Africa, 52 el
Norway, 15, 50, 51, 52-3,.66
Nova-Wilejka, 109
Nowak, Jan, 237-8
NU, 51
Nuremberg trials, 17,24
Aya Doglight Allehand:, 88
Odessa, 61,69, zu
ier, Mme, 62
Oechsner, Fred, 96
umenical Committee for Assistance!
10 Refagees, 48
Office of War Information (usa), gr,
204n
Oblendorf, Dr Otto, 90
O’Malley, Owen, 232
Oneg Shabbat, 128, 132/220
Operation Reinhard, 191-2
Organization Todt, 166
messon, Wladimir d’,55
Orsenigo, Nuncio, 50n, 56
Ortmann, Paul, 24
Osborn, 66n, 238
055, 13, 6gn, 89, 96-7, 98, 230
ter, Hans, 209-10
Ostland, 26
Ostland, 217-18
Östryna, 109
Otter, Baron von, 48-50, 87, 88
Oulik, György, 33-4
Palestine, 107, 123, 143, 154, 157, 16
Fe eo 54 157, 167-8,
Papte, Casimir, 56n
Paris, 39, 84
Parrot, Cecil, 104n
Patek, Wiestaw, 116
Paul, Randolph, 223-4
Peasanıs Party (sr; Poland), 101
Pehle, John, gı, 223-,
Pelczyaski, General Tadeusz, 114n
Perkins, Colonel, 67n
Perlzweig, Maurice, 1539-63
Pernow, Birger, 50n
Pester Lloyd, 33-4 211,212
Petschuk, 140
Picche, General Gi h
Pickalkiewicz, Jan, 101 7% Ei
Pilar, Andre de, 63n
Pincas, Dr Herman, 147
Pinsk, 103, 109
Index
259
Piotrkov, 191-3
Pius xı1, Pope, 54-5, 216, 236
Plomienie, 126
Poale Zion, 129
Poland, ghettos established, 11; extermi-
nauon Camps, 12-19; destruction of
ghettos, 14, 15» 72-4, 76-7, Bı, 105,
106, 112-18; prisoner-of-war camps,
59; intelligence networks, 65-6;
mawacres, 81, 83-4, 94; 97, 101, 151-2,
177; underground movement, 102-14,
119, 121, 331, 136, 170, 200, 234;
FEPOFtS, 104; reaction to
news of massacres, 212, 114-186, 195,
200-1, 235-6
Polish Second Bureau, 85n
Polish Sixth Bureau, 102
Polish Social Information Bureau, 220
Polish Socialist Party (PPs), 101, 108, 136
Political Warfare Executive {PWE; Great
Britain), 92-3, 164, 204n, 223
Ponary, 73, 123
Ponsonby, Colonel, 79
Portugal, 86
Postal services, interception, [)
Prager, Moshe, 183, 186
Prague, 74, 87,274
cott, William, 232
‚Jacob, 153
Prey, Dr Guenther, 24
Prolelarisher Stimme, 126
Propaganda, Ministry of (Germany),
28-9, 88, 211
Quisling, Vidkun, 52
Raczkiewicz, Wladyslaw, 233-4
Raczynski, Count Edward, 120, 121,
224-5, 236
Radio Oranje, 150
radio stations, foreign, 28
Radom, 238
Railway Research Service, 85-6
railways, 21,29,8
Ratajski, er >
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjönstiistofie 2014 mei.
£
h: 260 Index
: Rawa Russka, 62,97 Savery, F., 220-3
= Reading, Eva, Marchioness of, 139 Schaffhaurer Zeitung, 46
= Reams, R. B., 225-8 Schindier, Oskar, 169
B Red Army, 70 Schmeling, Max, 13
Red Star, 185 Schneersohn, Isaac, 207
\ Reed, Mrs Ogden, 232 Schoenfeld, Hanns, 212
E "Rehwald, Dr Erwin, 147 Schuerch, Charles, 44
=. Das Reich, 32 Schulman, Rabbi Jakob, 190-1
Reichenau, Fietd Marshal von, 19 Schwalb, Nathan, 144, 165, 171
Reichsanzeiger, 215,
Reichivereinigung, 148
Reimann, Dr, 210
Rejewski, Marian, d5n
Remes, David, 195
Rennefeld, zogn
5 Reuters, 134
3 Rhodes, 207
E: Richer:, Ambassador, 51
Fi Riegner, Dr Gerhard, 63n, 64,:77-9. 165,
F: 267, 172, 176, 180-1, 183, 194
B Riegner telegram, 77, 79-83, 93, 118,
bi: 160-1, 13, 219, 224, 225-6
E Riga, 62, 67, 68-9, 81, 116, 146, 165, 189,
; 21
Ringelblum, Emanuel, 104, 107, 308, 110,
129, 131-3, 135, 220
3 Roatta, General Mario, 35
> Roberts, Frank, 79, 82, 83, 221, 223, 238
Rt Robinson, ]., 194
E Rohner, W., 61
x Romania, and Einsatzgrußpen Operations,
> 12; massacresin, 26, 72, 74, 189; refuses
to hand over Jews, 38, 39; Vatican
Intervention, 54; Red Cross in, 59, 60,
£ 61; Transniestrian massacres, 140; Jews
4 escape from, 143, 166
Rommel, Erwin, 52, 285-6, 188
Roncalli, Angelo, 55
Roosevelt, Franklin D.,i75, 78,194-5, 98,
120, 158, 160-2, 175, 204,214, 232,236
Rosenberg, Alfred, 134
Rostov-on-Don, 68, 72
Rothmund, Dr, 41-2, 47
Rovno, 71, 75
Rowecki, General Stefan, 101, 104, tı2,
113,234
Rowne, 238
Royal Air Force, 104
Rufer, Gideon, 168
Rumkowski, Haim, 128
Sagalowitz, Dr Benjamin, 78-9
Saliöge, Arch bishop of Toulon, 228
Salin, Edgar, 213, 214
Schwarzbart, Dr Ignacy, 75, 81, 1214-15,
1790, 201, 233-6, 238
Schweizerische Kirchenzeitung, 45
Seotsman, 76
Scott, Major Malcolm, 66n
SD, 30, 32, 85n
Sebastopol, 178
Sebba, Leonidas, 116, 1670
Seehaus, 28-9
Segerstedt, Torgny, 50-1
Selborne, Lord, 116, 292, 237
Serbs, 9, 26,38
Sethe, Dr, 62
Shanghai, ıı
Shapira, M., 191
Shavli, 68
Shertok, Moshe, 1719, 187-8
Siam, 87
Siedlec, 199
Sikorski, General Wladyslaw, 73, 95, 101,
112, 291,234
Sitbershein, Dr Abraham, 144, 165, 170,
71,4791;188n, ı89n
Silesia, 22-3
Silverman, Sidney, 75, 79-80, 8t, ı60
Simferopol, 85
Simmonds, Lieutenant-Colonel Tony,
167
Simon, Joachim; 166
Sington, Derrick, ı,2
Skotnicky, 61
Slovakia, 32, 136; Jews deported from, 14,
15 61, 72, 140, 153; knowledge of
massacres in, 34-5, 38, 140-6; Vatican
Intervention in, 34-5, 54, 177, 189; Red
Cross and,.38, 60; Jews escape from,
167
Slovenia, 35
Slowo Mlodych, 126
Smolensk, 42, 43
sap manufacture, 82
Sobibor, 12, 14, 20, 22, 131, 132-3, 195:
1680, 192
? alten, 67, 68-9, 88
Soederblom, 48-9, 50
Ai raum nun Ei
Le Soir, zıı
Sokolsky, George, 232
Sommer, Artur, 78n, 213-14
Sompolinsky, David, 151
Sonderkommando Lange, 127
Sorge, Richard, 11
Sosnkowski, K., 101, 212, 213
South America, ıı
Soviet, Foreiga Ministry Information
Burcau, 70
Soviet Union, Eins
in, 11-12, 19, 197; ews deported
15; Red Cross N Irom, Br
Massacres in, 67-73, 12455; Germany
invades, 79, 124; attitude to “final
sohrtion’, 121; koowledge of Massacres
in, 202-3
Soviet War Bulletin, 68
Spain, 41, 53-4,.86, 89-90, 166, 190
De Intelligence Service (S18), 65, 79,
Special Operations Executive (SOE), &,
65-6, 102-3, 105, 116
Spelman, Archbishop, 232
Sportpalast, 44
Springman, Sarnuel, 143
Squire, Paul C., 63-4
SS, 17, 18, 84-5, 138, 139, 152, 198, ı
Stalin, Joseph, 202, Fe de
Stalingrad, 52, 72
Stanislawow, 110
Staro-Konstantinow, 110 j
State Department {USA}, 94, 160, 161-2,
178, 204n, 223-8
Stauffenberg, Colonel Claus Schenk von,
213
Steiger, Eduard von, 47,48
Siernbuch family, 8:, 82, 165,
Stimson, Henry, 26-7, 232
Stockholm, 41, 51-2, 81,92
Stockhalm Tidningen, 88
Storch, Hillel, ı 16, 167n
Strich, Archbishop, 232
Strong, Tracy, 40
Stronski, Professor, 76n
Struma, 166
Stucki, 43
ürmer, 30-1
Sudetenland, 14
Sunday Times, 72
Svenska Dagbladet, 53, 88
Sweden, 36n, 37, 41, 48-53, 68, 86, 87-8,
103-5, 151, 166-7
Swedish Israel Mission, son
171, ı79n
Index 261
Switzerland, 41-8, 59-60, 72, 86-7, ı
136, 143, 166-7, 170-3 : 7
Sztojay, Doene, 33-4
Tabenkin, Y., 186-7
Tanner, Väins, 37
Tartakower, A,, 194
Taylor, Myron, 1, 55, 1 17, 162
Teague, Colonel, 167
Teichmann, Kurt, o1 5
Teichmann, Ruth Sara, 215
Teleki, Pal, 33
Thadden, Eberhard von, 54
Theresienstadt, 64, 148, 178
Thompson, Dorothy, 232
38-9
Thugutt, Micezyslaw, 10
Thümmel, Paul, 163-4 i
Thurgauer Zeitung, 44
Times, 2, 76, gan, 224-5
Tiso, Dr Joseph, 34-5, 141
Tittmann, Harold, 55
Toyabee, Arnold, 8
Transniestria, 14, 64,94, 198, 140, 197
Transocean, 217, 218
Treblinka, 18, 20, 2a,
tablishment of, 12, 14; reports on, 97,
118, 197; escapes from, 168, 169 ”
Trevor-Roper, Sir Hugh, Bsn
Tribune de Genöoe, 46
Troki, 126
Trots Allt, 51
Trott zu Soltz, Adam, 212
Tuka, Vojtech, 56
Turkey, 39, 41, 53n, 86, 87, 105, 148
112-158, 135;
Ükraine, 69, 70, 87; massacres in, + 1,14,
30-1, 61, 97, 1209, 140, 142, 162, 197;
collaboration in Massacres, 62, 7r, 96,
116, 111; German invasion, 101; Sog
in, 105
Ullmann, ı65, 171
“Vitea', 84-5
United Nations, 6, 118, ı1g,
2040, 2248
United Press, 46
United States of America, Jewish immj-
gration, 11; knowledge of
62, 64, 93-9, 160-2, 1634; intelligence
services, 65; European embaxies, 67;
Jewish Protest meetings, 76; reaction to
Ricgner cable, Bo-ı, 82-3, 93; control
release of information, 91; informed of
ei Podolsk massacre, 139;
137, 201-2,
© http://ww w.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-two/l: & = © || (U Holocaust Memorial Day: T... %
The Telegraph
Home Video News World Sport Business Money Comment Culture Travel Life
Holocaust Memorial Day: Telegraph revealed Nazi gas
chambers three years before liberation of Auschwitz
The Telegraph disclosed the existence of Nazi gas chambers and the “mass
killing” of Jews almost three Years before the liberation of Auschwitz on Jan
DECADES
27,1945
By David Blair
8:52PM GMT 26 Jan 2015
RR » RREER 5773 1010vers
It was under the headline “Germans murder 700,000 Jews in Poland”, that
this newspaper reported the “greatest massacre in the world’s history” on
June 25, 1942.
THEWEEK.
„.RIVERINE HERALD, FRIDAY, [JUNE 26, 1942]
Terrible Atrocities.| GERMAN SAvAcERY
url 1 700,000 Jews Slaughtered
erbians Massacred.
men y En
LONDON, March 21.
The Rome correspondent of the “Daily M LONDON. Juns 3;
'’ says that the Allies shortly ore than 700/000 Polish Jews
will be publishing documentary evidence, have been slaughtered by the
proving that Austria and Bulgaria have Germans in the greatest massacre
been guilty of massacres in Serbia, ex- In the world's history, states a
ceeding tliose practised by Turkey in report smuggled from Poland to
Armenia, The Premier of Serbia (M. Polish National Councıl, and
Pasitch) bas communicated to Italy and printed in
the Pope, testimony showing that there
were 700,000" vietims, whol» districts thus
In Chelmno from November to
being depopulated. Austriuns t00% prisoners || Yarch 5000 people from four towns
women, cuıldren, and old men in churches, end 35,00 from the shetto Jewish dis-
ud Grabe Aheen. wii bayonets or suflo- triet were killedin vans fitted up as
\ . Three guae“chambers into each of which 4u
thousand were sufloeated in on» church in || PFOrle were crowded at a time.
Belsrade, Serbian relugees report seeing The Daily Telegraph understands
Germans and Austrians distribute among |||tbat the Polish Government is com-
the Bulgarians ‚Nmunicating these facts and figure, to
and instructing them in the use of the ||thc Allied Governments. ®
apparatus. The Bulgarians sufloeated many
people in Nish, Pirot, Prizrend, and|| SAME CRIME, SAME DEATH TOLL,
Nezotin, The Austrians employed similar ||SAME PERPETRATOR, SAME MURDER WEAPON,
means in Montenegro, | SAME SOURCE, SAME CIRCUMSTANCES