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Full text of "Grombach, John V., "The Invisible Weapon," Infantry
Journal, July|August 1940, pp. 340-344.
"
See other formats
The Invisible |
By
Captain John
World War No. 2 and the yeat 1940 have wrought
—— and unforeseen changes in warfare. Neutral,
non-peiigetent, and warcing powers hav ‘m-
selves faced with 4 beled i ph ages ck
motorized and mechanized units, new tactics, parachutists.
and by no means least, the Fifth Column. In all shi
change, communication remains vital to the participant in
wat. And Propaganda and the protection of military
sectets are vital both to participants and to nations neat
the brink of involvement. Thus a mighty power in dhe
strugele for world dominion by nations, forms of govern.
ment, and ideals, is radio.
International radio is just now beginning : evalu-
ated i as the powerful fea oleh
it is. Just as dominance in the air by plane
key te victory on land and $4, $0 ie Wi f she
waves may be the most potent means for mastery of the
minds and hearts of men. without which no hation or ideal
cant survive,
Let us imagine, if we can, the invisible and increasin
world-wide host of lightning messengers impressed on
carner waves. A magic which in effect has banished tine
and space throughout the entire globe. In a minute frac.
tion of a second a mere whisper is audible from the Anti-
podes to the Arctic and from Cathay to the Caribbean, to
one hundred million radio receivers, each capable of lis.
tening in to hundreds of messages. There is one radio
V. Grombach, Infantry, NGUS
teceiver for every twenty inhabitants, almost sixty million,
in the Western Hemisphere alone. The air around our
world scethes with long and short waves radiat itty to those
hundred million receivers from more chan fifty thousand
transmitters of commercial, government, military and
Pise\et.
ora
naval stations, and trom those of over one hundred si
sand efficient and indefatigable amateurs. From anv poitt
in the world, hundreds of powerful short-wave tans-
mitters are easily contacted, relaying: messages item the
most remote points of all continents and from: s venty-
eight different countries. Such, briefly, is the most po-
tentially powerful agency for many purposes thar the
world has ever known.
While the present aitplane, cank, and automatic weapon
have changed conditions of combat, radio broadcasting has
completely revolutionized the problems of the intelligence
sections of the services. For example, before and during
the present war, Englishmen and Frenchmen have clever-
ly sold, in impeccable English and French, Nazi and
Fascist ideals and beliefs over the air. Every day, the
sttongest effort has been made to discourage the English
and French civilian public on war. In France, radio propa-
ganda was used to create suspicion and break down con-
hdence in the English alliance. Moreover, before the
Wat and since, a steady stream of information has been
sent secretly, quickly, and effectively by the German espic-
nage system by way of the radio. The perfece codrdina-
SAS ie Re
tion of troops with aviation, fifth columnists, os 8
chutists, particularly in Poland, Norway, and Ho and,
was accomplished largely through radio broadcasting.
Also, the German submarine that threaded its way
through the safeguards, mines, patrols, nets, and booms
of Scapa Flow on October 14, 1939, and sank the British
battleship Royal Oak, was undoubtedly guided by some
seemingly innocent radio broadcast in England or Hol-
land, perhaps even a band concert or a dramatic ptesen-
tation.
ust as the ancient counterpart of the tank, the elephant,
was emploved by the Persians centuries ago, codes and
ciphers have been used as long as there has been war. In
fact, recorded history tells us that a cryptogram to Ly-
sander of Sparta saved a general, an army, and the empire
later to be enlarged by Alexander the Great. At the same
time, all authorities from Julius Cesar, one of the first
ctyptographers, to the Black Chamber of the last World
War, all agree that there is really no secret writing code of
cipher created by man that cannot be broken by man.
But as Francis Bacon, Lord V erulam, himself one of the
world’s greatest cryptologists, said in his Advancement of
‘earning: “The only truly secret system of writing con-
ceals the existence of a secret.” Little did Bacon know of
the day when the secret would be even better concealed by
Not even being written. Seconds may now send a crucial
crvptogram hurtling thousands of miles through space,
Whose secret meaning and presence is known only to
sender and receiver, And an instant after it is delivered
there is not one shred of evidence, nor even a record of any
kind by which the message can be decipheted into the
clear. Such is the blitzkrieg in the cryptographic battle
of radio in World War No. 2.
A practical illustration will be far more effective, per-
haps, than dissertations in history and literature. Not long
ago, a former world’s heavyweight boxing champion, in
an interview on a major network of thirty-nine United
States stations, capable of being picked up over thousands
of miles, broadcast a message in the most simple jargon
code, so simple thar any amateur ctyptographer or alert
listener should have made it out. The broadcast had a
potential audience of twenty-eight million radio homes
in the United States alone. Evidently not a single listener
caught the message because not a single listener was ¢x-
pecting it. The message was: “S 112—SS. Queen Eliza-
beth sails tonight with hundreds of airplanes for Halifax,
N.B.” Neither che sponsor, the network, the world’s
champion, or the sports commentator interviewing the
champion knew anyching about the message. This pattic-
ular message, of course, was only sent out as an experi-
ment to see whether anyone would pick it up from the
air waves. But if such a message can be sent, with millions
listening in, is it safe to assume that there have not been
far more importance uses made of this agency here in
America.
If radio could be used with such devastating effect in
Europe, it can be used here with even more telling effect.
In America, because of our commercial radio system, our
programs are the best in the world. Single radio per-
formances of many of our network programs would be
events of outstanding importance in other countries. As a
result, we have by far the greatest radio-listening audience
in the world, and in no country can more people be reached
by radio than here. Also, in no country is there any greater
freedom and tolerance. Al! these facts, it seems most
evident, constitute a new and serious military problem.
There are some 813 commercial (long-wave) broadcast-
ing stations in the United States, over six hundred more
than in all Europe combined, and in addition, all of ours
are privately owned. Then there are thirteen short-wave
stations, twenty-one television stations, and sixteen fac-
simile stations. There are over fifty-three million radio
receiving sets, including eight million automobile sets, in
the United States, and a potential audience of over one
hundred million. The problem of planning the control
of radio by the War Department to cover both prewar and
wartime necessities is staggcring. All stations should be
carefully guatded or controlled:
(1) Against cryptic broadcasting, which either relays
military information by enemy espionage agents, or co-
ordinates fifth column activities, this in addition to pro-
viding ordinary censorship of news that might be of value
to the enemy. :
(2) For the broadcasting of propaganda and informa-
tion to combat the enemy's short-wave propaganda which
would be intensified in case of war (there are many for-
eign short-wave broadcasting stations easily picked up
here); also propaganda to serve as a deterrent against
fifth-column activity,
(3) For the ptoper kind of recreation and morale-
building entertainment, which would require minimum
attention from the War Department, since this is a radio
station’s ordinary service in peacetime.
(4) In order to minimize or neutralize the effects of
possible physical seizure by enemy armed forces or the
fifth column.
According to report from excellent authority, though SO
far unconfirmed, the break-through at Sedan on May 14,
1940, which caused the separation of the Belgian and
English forces and the French Army of the North fron:
the main French Army and tesulted in the encirclement
and destruction of the northern units and the final crush-
ing of France, was a German victory in the radio war of
cryptography. Over one of the government-owned and
-operated stations, spies or traitors concealed messages in
code appraising the Germans of the thinly held line at the
elbow between the Maginot and Little Maginot Line, and
of the tem porary gap between the armies moving rapidly
into Belgium and the few divisions under General C3 orap
holding the northern end of the Maginot Line. lt this
report is crue, it shows that government-owned Stations are
as liable to subversive use as stations privately owned. It
also proves that the Battle of France was lost in large part
by radio.
This is doubly strange when one considers the fatalistic
parallel chis war has with World War No. 1. In World
INFANTRY JOURNAL
ion and solution lay,
War No. 1, the turning point was the Battle of the Marne. reception
arg : there was little operation.
342 |
Ir was won by radio. In 1914, however,
radiotelephony, but much radiotelegraphy.
filled by radio traflic with many jammed wav engt
French, British, Belgian, and German communications
transformed the German offensive into a mess of faulty
cooperation. On September 2, 1914, von Kluck was
ordered to close up on von Bulow to his left and push the
French away from Paris, He never received this message,
but the French did. He radioed that he was following his
original orders to swing southwest to Paris. This message
was also intercepted by the French, but never received by
the German Ghio, The French cryptographers laid the
deciphered messages side by side before Joffre, and from
them developed the Battle of the Marne, won by radio and
cryptography.
However, ordinary military radio telephonic or tele-
graphic messages, their interception, and the cryptography
relating to them, do not constitute, strictly speaking, a
new problem. Although perhaps more complex now than
it was before, and more exacting, particularly with respect
to time, this is a fairly ceibdicked military problem han-
dled by the Signal Corps. According to the latest book-
let on our armed forces, The A rmy of the United States,
the Signal Corps is charged with intercepting enemy radio
messages and locating enemy (military) radio stations
by radio goniomenry. :
The air was
€ lengths.
The new military problem which is the subject of this
article is more in the province of the Military Intelligence
Division (G-2) which has duties “that relate to collecting,
studying, analyzing, and furnishing all kinds of military
information,” which “supervises any army activities deal-
ing with military surveys, maps and photographs, codes
and ciphers, and translations.” and which “also directs a
Press Relations branch which ptepares and issues War
Department press releases and handles other matters con.
ceming relations with the press and with the public at
large.” To these extensive duties must be added the new
military problem of radio propaganda and counter-propa-
ganda, filth column and coumer-hfch column radio activi-
ties, and the audio-aspects as against the transmitter aspects
of radio from the creation and production of radio enter-
tainment to preventing fifth column or espionage secret
communications by way of radio, ‘
The problem does not always stop at any given line nor
is it any too well-defined. Here, for instance, is an actual
case: One of the most powerful short-wave stations in
Europe, heard all over the world, often emitted either
before or after a scheduled evening broadcast a buzzing
signal resembling static, so fast in vibration it would not
be recognized as consisting of separate noises. However,
that was not the answer, The noise was actually a message
concealed not only in code or cipher, but by speed of trans-
mission, and intended for their nationals in a country six
thousand miles away. First the message had been re-
corded, and then the record was broadcast as played at
perhaps ten times the normal velocity. The key to its
July Angus %
of course, in reversing the 4
i i ; which to- 4
again to the four points of control whic 4
problem of radio, we can =
hy and 4
Returning or
gether represent the new milirary
label them: |
(1) Espionage and fifth-columin cryptogray
censorship;
(2) Propaganda and counter-propaganda; pat
) Recreation, entertainment, and morale-busic ngs
(4) Neutralization of physical seizure of stations by
enemy or fifth column. Aa ’
These form a staggering new assignment for ‘re In- 3
telligence Divison: of aut service. And on the basis of .
European experience, they offer as vital and as ditticule a |
problem as any encountered in the warfare af rgqo.
With regard to espionage and fifth-columin cryptogray
phy and censorship, it will be well to explain and describe 3
in detail how a message can be rae in a commercial q
radio program broadcast. It should be clear that! by 4
the adaptation of a well-known system a cryptogram can |
easily and secretly be transmitted through: audio means |
and doubly concealed in the music, sound effects, and 3
dramatic dialogue of the program, superior cryptographers 7
would have no trouble doing a far better and more ori inal
job for espionage purposes or for the
control of a fifth column.
While many different methods can be used to conceal 7
a cipher or code message in a radio program, including
simple jargon, the most obvious cipher is the radio equiva-
lent of the gtille or “cardan” method , in which the sender
writes his “clear” through the holes of the grille, the letters
following the order of the numbered illes, and then
Fills up the vacant spaces with innocent i. to make a
message. In tadio, actual words in most cases could be
used as letters, and the gtille replaced by key numbers, a!!
based on the order of words in the program from: ics
beginning, or from some key word, Here the difficulty of
even suspecting, much less deciphering without both a
organization and |
He
recording and stenographic transcript of the broadcas:, is :
to be noted. This is what makes sending and receiving
ctyptographic messages by radio casier than their d iscovery
of prevention.
A reverse of the Gronsfeld cipher especially adapted for
radio can also be effectively used. In the Gronsfeld, there
is a set of key numbers in a series that can be casilv
memorized. These numbers are written down over the
“clear” and repeated as often as necessary. Each letter of
the “clear” is then represented in the written message by
a letter which is the number of letters further in the alpha-
bet called for by the key number over it. In the radie |
adaptation, a key word would be written down over the
“Clear” and repeated as often as necessary. Each letter of
the “clear” can then be represented by a number eqpstvae
lent to the number of letters in the alphaber separating che
fetter of the “clear” from the corresponding letter of the
kev word. In the radio program, words with the number
of letters equivalent to chose numbers could be designated |
at indicated spots or kev breaks.
1940
However, the most effective and practical 0% which
would lend itself to radio is whac might be called a radio
adaptation of the Nihilist Bacon biliteral.
In this system, the key is a square as follows:
2-3 2. Se
2 hh SDS ©. Bre
3 F GH JK
4 L MN OP
ee © die a nie: obi, 3,
6 VW ee ee!
In writing the cipher, the numbers describing the posi-
tion of a letter (its codrdinates) are substituted for it. In
the original, the numbers start with 1, but due to the fact
that here also numbers of the message will be given by the
number of letters in a word in the radio program, there are
roo few one-letter words to make the original key practi-
cable. In writing text for the radio encipheted by the
double-transposition system as explained above, it is nec-
essaty to assign them some definite words or order of
words, the number of letters of which will indicate the
inessage. For instance, if the second and fifth words after
cvery musical theme, bridge, curtain, or sound effect (all
of which are called “business” abbreviated BIZ—in radio
work) has been agreed on, a sample written transcript of
part of a program (involving an Oriental servant and a
tan as characters) follows:
PING: If patiently waiting, all things coming, thank you.
BIZ; KNOCKS ON DOOR.
2
MAN; Well—Fancy that—Who is that?
PING: No doubt knock on door meaning honorable self
soon in bathtub, thank you.
MAN: I can’t believe it. Open the door.
BIZ; DOOR OPENS.
2 6
PING: Prediction is correct. Like humbly to present sery-
ant with humble liquid for bach.
MAN: Humble liquid for bath, eh? What is this humble
liquid?
PING: Humble liquid very fine product of most noble
cow,
BIZ: BUCKETS DEPOSITED ON FLOOR.
2
MAN: Cow? Is that stuff Tes milk? I’m supposed to
take a bath in milk?
PING: Water very scarce. Milk very plentiful.
BOTH: Thank you,
MUSIC: FANFARE.
ANNOUNCER: The Foods Reel reels on!
The message would therefore be: 52—26—25, or by
reference to the table, the “clear” would be: QED.
The most important fact in radio cryptography is the
face that while the sender and receiver need only worry
about the key words, a recording and actual stenographic
transcript of the program as it was actually broadcast must
be obtained before a cryptogram can possibly be discovered
or deciphered.
THE INVISIBLE WEAPON
d49
As for censorship, unfortunately, radio can sometimes
do just as much harm in war for lack of efficient censor-
ship as through enemy cryptography, in giving away mili-
tary secrets or aiding ffth-column organization. In
Europe, especially in Belgium and France, where listeners
were so used to accepting news and announcements on
government-controlled stations, lack of confidence and
suggestion of catastrophe made thousands leave their
homes and block the roads, thus to nullify military de-
fense measures. Many broadcasts, no doubt by fifth col-
umnists, urged the populations of whole cities to sur-
render or run. If anyone doubts American mass reaction
to radio, one has but to remember the famous War of the
Worlds broadcast which completely disrupted a quiet and
peaceful New Jersey countryside. Perhaps H. G. Wells
did not discover a secret weapon, but Orson Welles dis-
covered that radio was certainly a weapon through which
man’s mind and imagination could be successfully at-
tacked. d
With regard to propaganda, it is a fact that there ate
definite propaganda short-wave programs already teaching
America. In addition, there are definite programs and a
considerable number of domestic broadcasts. in foreign
languages aimed at the large colonies of foreign-born.
In Europe, before and during the war, German ptopa-
ganda by radio was as far ahead of the French and English
as German superiority in military equipment of ground
and air, Many times a week, at reular] y scheduled times,
outstanding symphonic concerts an Be French music
or radio adaptations of French musical comedies and
Opéra Comigque were broadcast all over France by Ger-
man stations. These programs built up a tremendous
audience because of the superiority of their entertainment
and production. They could be compared with certain
commercial advertisers’ programs in the United States,
which through superior entertainment such as Charlie
McCarthy and Jack Benny, attain such tremendous audi-
ences that the networks have hard work selling any time
competing directly against them. In other words, in
radio propaganda, as in radio advertising, “the show’s the
thing.” The size of the audience is directly in ratio to the
entertainment and showmanship of che program.
After obtaining a large audience by superior entertain-
ment, an advertiser in America takes care to see that his
commercials sell his product and are as sugat-coated and
inocuous as possible. In the more serious game of selling
ideals and ideas, races, countries, and man, radio propa-
ganda and counter-propaganda have become correspond-
ingly adept.
In the German broadcast featuring French music and
drama. occasionally a French speaker spoke to the French
people explainin that Germany definitely did not want
to go to war with France. That the social advantages in
France were only a beginning, but that France was still in
the: grip of capitalists, and that the French people were
forced to fight for England and her economic control of
the world. This was all done in excellent taste, with su-
perior production and accurate statistics, and featured na-
344
tive Frenchmen or Germans speaking perfect French. In
England, the propaganda took a different tack, and from
September to May millions of English and French soldiers
listened to Lord Haw Haw and Paul Ferdonnet prove
that they were fighting for nothing.
How efficient this invisible weapon can be is evidenced
by “The Link,” an English fifth column of English
Fascists meeting regularly in London. It can be positively
stated that this organization owcs more to radio than to
any other single factor. When Fascist Sir Oswald Mosley
visited Paris as a member of the British fencing team at
the world’s championship a number of years ago, he was
wined and dined by the radio executives of the govern-
ment radio agencies of France, Italy, Belgium, Holland,
Germany, and, strangely enough, Denmark, and also by
the owners of several of the few commercial stations on
the Continent.
The importance of the radio weapon is still paramount
in the most militarily efficient country in the world. On
June 27th, the German advance guard artived at the Span-
ish-French border. The firse German unit to reach the
border consisted of twenty specialists of the radio-propa-
ganda section travelling in radio-equipped tucks. They
stated to correspondents that they broadcast many times a
day both from their trucks and from radio stations taken
over in their advance.
Yes, mastery of the sea may be vital to England, mastery
of the air may win the present war for Germany, but
mastery of the minds ff hearts of men must be gained
today to wage war successfully, and that mastery can
only be attained in full by radio.
INFANTRY JOURNAL
July Angast q
The actual recreation, entertainment, and morale- 3
building qualities of radio are almost as importarc as the ; :
propaganda and counter- Gn ae which are in most 4
cases catried within the talks and shows broadcast. If radio |
is a “weapon” then we can carry the compatison turther 3
and call the entertainment the “propellant” by winch ie |
teaches the ears of millions, oy propaganda the “dis- .
ruptive” that either explodes theortes and ideals, and
leaves a horrible débris z apprehension and confusion, or |
ctystallizes the understanding and gives men the urge tw |
fight on. q
The actual physical seizure of radio stations is our least @
important topic because it can only come at a stage in war |
at which radio will already have done its worst. Only upon |
invasion or revolution will the armed forces or che civil #
agencies of law and order be so helpless as to pers the |
seizute of radio stations by the enemy or by the fift)s cole |
umn. Yet plans should nevertheless be formulated to 7
neutralize the effect of such a seizure in part of a nation
just as plans are made for every other military eventuality.
In a visit to England just before the war, it was my very
or forttine to discuss World War No. 2 with my
riend, the late Sir Basil Thomson, who was head of Scot- i
land Yard for eleven years and head of the British sccret
service in World War No. 1. His last remark to me was. e
Remember that in the next war, radio will be the secret
as well as the invisible weapon one always wonders about a
when a new war comes along.” | now know he was right, ©
and I hope thar this article may at least serve to prevent its
readers from underrating the problems created
weapon.
by this new ; |